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1. Why we need ‘culture’ to study ethnocentrism
 
Nothing that strikes our eyes or ears conveys its message directly to us. We always select 
and interpret our impressions of the surrounding world. Some message is brought to us by the 
“light without” but the meaning and significance we give to it are largely added by the “light 
within”. 
Allport 1979[1954]: 165
1.1 Introduction
Imagine you are sitting in a train and someone with another ethnic background than 
your own comes to sit opposite you. If asked to describe this person afterwards, would 
you remember this person’s ethnic background, or would it be other characteristics 
that come to mind first? If this person would behave rudely, for example by talking on 
the phone very loudly, would you judge this person differently than you would have 
done if he had belonged to your own ethnic group? And would you think differently 
about this person if you knew he was highly or low skilled? 
 Just as in any other situation that concerns first-time encounters, the perspectives of 
the people involved in such a situation are essential for the evaluation of the newly 
met stranger. The evaluation of such a first-met stranger will take place by a process of 
social categorization (e.g. Fiske and Taylor 1991; see also Crisp and Turner 2007). Such 
categorization can be based on any personal cue that is picked up about the person. It 
therefore might concern a person’s appearance, manner of talking, ethnic background, 
or any other clue that can be perceived and taken into account in such casual encoun-
ters. The lens through which such a situation is perceived by the person who has 
experienced it will define which elements will be taken into account when placing a 
person in a certain social category. Therefore, questions as asked above can only be 
answered when more is known about the frames of interpretations involved. Never-
theless, this general social insight is often times absent in the sociological study of 
interethnic contacts and their consequences for ideas about ethnic minorities.
Within the literature on the dynamics between interethnic contacts and ethnocen-
trism, which is understood in this study as a generalized negative predisposition 
towards out-groups (cf. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014: 9; Kinder and Kam 2009)1, 
two important perspectives can be distinguished. The first perspective, Group Conflict 
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Theory (Levine and Campbell 1972; Blumer 1958; Coser 1956; Blalock 1967), is 
mainly focused on economic factors. The main explanation for ethnocentrism in this 
perspective is held to be the feeling that one’s economic position is threatened by 
ethnic minorities. The second perspective, Contact Theory, is directed to situations 
that can lead to reduction of negative ideas about ethnic minorities. Scholars involved 
in Contact Theory research typically expect that interethnic contacts, especially inti-
mate ones such as friendships, will lead to prejudice reduction (e.g. Aberson, Shoe-
maker, and Tomolillo 2004; Levin, Van Laar, and Sidanius 2003; see also Pettigrew and 
Tropp 2011). They therefore expect that interethnic contacts will generally lead to less 
ethnocentrism. 
As will become clear from a more detailed description of the theories in the fol-
lowing sections, there is one fundamental problem with both theories, namely their 
blind spot for the role of people’s cultural values. This problem forms an obstacle to 
further understanding of how and under which conditions interethnic contact might 
lead to more or less ethnocentrism. In what follows, the argumentation of the two 
theoretical paradigms that are usually used to study opinions about ethnic minorities, 
Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory, will be explained. The problems that 
arise when interpreting the research results from such studies in which cultural value 
frames are ignored will be examined. Based on those insights, I will formulate an alter-
native theory, Ethnic Reification Theory, for studying interethnic contacts and their 
consequences for ideas about ethnic minorities.
1.2 Group Conflict Theory
The first theory that offers an explanation for understanding ideas about ethnic 
minorities is Group Conflict Theory. It follows an economic logic according to which 
resistance towards ethnic minorities is rooted in self-interest, either on the individual 
or on the group-level. Its basic idea is that negative opinions about ethnic minorities 
are a result of ethnic competition, which leads ‘to attempts at exclusion of one group 
by another’ (Olzak 1992: 163). This ethnic competition can be based either on real, 
‘objective’ threats such as in realistic group threat theory (Blalock 1967) or on per-
ceived threats, such as in group threat theory (Blumer 1958). Whereas the former 
assumes that ethnic competition has ‘objective’ sources, the latter mainly focuses on 
subjective perceptions of threat. Apart from this difference, however, ‘[r]egardless of the 
competition’s actual or perceived nature, natives’ reactions of exclusion and prejudice 
are expected to become manifest when their collective (…) interests are threatened’ 
(Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 318). Therefore, both approaches will be considered as 
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part of the same overarching theoretical tradition (cf. Della Posta 2013), which I refer 
to as Group Conflict Theory. 
 The rise of Group Conflict Theory was first and foremost rooted in the need for an 
explanation for differences in levels of ethnocentrism over time (cf. Quillian 1995). 
Since individual level explanations were unable to explain such differences, a context-
based theory was proposed. The leading principle within this theory is that contexts 
of scarcity would trigger interethnic competition. After all, mainly when resources are 
scarce their distribution might lead to controversies and clashes of interests. One of the 
key indicators for economic scarcity is the country’s economic outlook. What is 
expected in Group Conflict Theory is that economic indicators, such as the level of 
gross domestic product per capita or employment rates, will be negatively related to 
ethnic competition (Quillian 1995; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Coenders et al. 2008a; 
Lahav 2004; Semyonov et al. 2008). The better the economic circumstances in a coun-
try, the less competition for scarce resources, either ‘real’ or perceived, there will be, 
resulting in lower levels of ethnocentrism. 
A similar logic is applied to the share of immigrants in a country. That is, Group 
Conflict Theory predicts that experiences of ethnic threat will be higher the greater 
the share of immigrants in a country. This will be mainly the case concerning immi-
grants in a weak economic position, such as less educated immigrants, because they are 
thought to compete with natives in a similar weak economic position. In this case, the 
same logic applies when the economic circumstances in a country deteriorate (e.g. 
Quillian 1995; Blalock 1967): economic resources such as low-skilled jobs and social 
housing get scarcer, which intensifies competition for such resources. Therefore, a 
relatively high share of less educated immigrants in a country would result in greater 
perceptions of ethnic threat and in more ethnocentrism. 
In sum, Group Conflict Theory predicts that ethnocentrism is rooted in the experi-
ence of economic threat, which will mainly come to the surface under circumstances 
of scarcity. However, this theoretical paradigm does not explain why scarcity of 
resources should necessarily lead to perceptions of ethnic threat, and not in hostility 
towards other social ‘out-groups’. It requires a previous sense of ethnically defined in-
groups and out-groups for scarce circumstances to specifically lead to ethnic threat (cf. 
Allport 1979[1954]: 60). Put differently, only when already thinking in terms of an 
ethnic divide will less affluent economic circumstances lead to scapegoating of ethnic 
minority groups instead of other social groups. While essential for understanding the 
origins of ethnocentric ideas, such group division along ethnic lines is not explained 
by Group Conflict Theory. As such, this theory presupposes a latent ethnic divide that 
is assumed to be ‘activated’ in the light of relatively unfortunate economic circum-
stances or in times of greater presence of ethnic minorities. 
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1.3 Contact theory
1.3.1 Allport’s contact hypothesis
Whereas Group Conflict Theory typically locates sources of ethnocentrism at the 
contextual level (i.e., circumstances of scarcity), the focus of Contact Theory is clearly 
on the individual level. In fact, the latter is not so much a theory that attempts to 
explain ethnocentrism per se, but rather it describes a particular mechanism that might 
lead to reduction of ethnocentrism. The basic argument of Contact Theory is that 
contact with ethnic minorities has the potential to influence people’s opinions about 
ethnic minorities such that ethnocentric ideas will be reduced. The interest in such a 
role of interethnic contact on ethnocentrism arose after World War II, and some argue 
that this contact tradition was initially motivated by the postwar wish to prevent rep-
etition of the holocaust (see Jackman and Crane 1986; Connolly 2000; Torre 2010). 
The first ideas about such a prejudice-reducing role of interethnic contact were 
bundled by Gordon Allport in his seminal work The nature of prejudice. It is in this book 
that he formulated the ‘contact hypothesis’, based on which he is considered the 
founding father of the contact tradition. According to this ‘contact hypothesis’, 
interethnic contacts will produce less negative thinking about ethnic minorities, but 
only under four optimal conditions of contact: when the individuals involved in con-
tact are from equal-status groups; when a common goal is pursued; when contact 
involves cooperation; and when institutional support for contact is present (cf. Allport 
1979[1954]: 279). Under those four optimal conditions, interethnic contact would 
successively lead to more knowledge about ethnic minorities, to more understanding 
for them, and to more positive ideas about them. This hypothesis was based on previ-
ous research findings on interethnic contacts conducted among Marines (Brophy 
1946); among undergraduates (Allport and Kramer 1946); and in the army (Stouffer 
et al. 1949), as well as on an early review of interethnic contact research conducted by 
Williams (1947).
Even though the contact hypothesis echoes a positive idea about the future pros-
pects of interethnic relations, this is not true for other claims made by Allport. Indeed, 
Allport has suggested that with only occasional, superficial contacts, it would be 
impossible to overcome people’s negative opinions about ethnic minorities. In such 
superficial contact situations interethnic contact would ultimately reproduce an indi-
vidual’s initial ideas about ethnic minorities (Allport 1979[1954). Moreover, Allport 
has stated that interethnic contact in general might not work for everyone. He con-
cluded that ‘contact, as a situational variable, cannot always overcome the personal 
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variable in prejudice. This is true whenever the inner strain within the person is too 
tense, too insistent, to permit him to profit from the structure of the outer situation’ 
(Allport 1979[1954]: 280-281). Such a statement is characteristic of Allport’s seminal 
work, in which he not only proposed the contact hypothesis, but also reflected upon 
it critically and placed it within other insights on the formation of ethnic prejudice. 
As such he acknowledges the importance of cultural values for understanding people’s 
interpretations of interethnic contacts and its consequences for ideas about ethnic 
minorities. Despite its later canonization, in which just his contact hypothesis was 
picked up, The nature of prejudice may well be seen as a work that reflects the richness 
of ideas about ethnic prejudice that existed at the time of writing.2
1.3.2 Pettigrew’s Contact Theory
The further development of interethnic contact research has been, for an important 
part at least, put forward by social psychologists. One of the most productive authors 
in this respect is Thomas Pettigrew, who in fact claims to have reformulated Allport’s 
contact hypothesis into Contact Theory (Pettigrew 1998: 75-78). Pettigrew and col-
leagues have not only created an extensive body of research within the intergroup 
contact tradition, but have dominated the field as well. This dominant version of Con-
tact Theory is studied and further elaborated here.
 The logic of Contact Theory departs in two important aspects from the traditional 
contentions in intergroup contact research. First, the role of Allport’s four optimal 
conditions of contact is downplayed within Contact Theory. Allport stated that the 
failure to meet those optimal contact conditions might lead to interethnic contact 
having no effect on ideas about ethnic minorities, or in some cases even to the increase 
of negative ideas (Allport 1979[1954]: 279). Nevertheless, contact scholars claim to 
have found that even in the absence of Allport’s four optimal conditions reduction of 
ethnocentrism through interethnic contacts takes place (e.g. Pettigrew and Tropp 
2008; Stein et al. 2000). As affirmed by Husnu and Crisp, ‘while there may be facilitat-
ing conditions that improve its effectiveness, contact basically works’ (Husnu and Crisp 
2010: 943, italics in original). Therefore, the research focus of Contact Theory turned 
away from Allport’s four optimal conditions, and less and less emphasis is placed on 
studying the conditions under which interethnic contact works.
The second difference between Allport’s ideas and the logic of Contact Theory 
exactly concerns the questions of how and why interethnic contacts influence ideas 
about ethnic minorities. Allport pictured the influence of interethnic contacts on ideas 
about ethnic minorities as some chain in which interethnic contact under the four 
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optimal conditions would create more knowledge of ethnic minority cultures, which 
would therefore result in more understanding for, and ultimately more positive think-
ing about ethnic minorities (Allport 1979[1954]). Pettigrew seems to have interpreted 
this ‘chain’ as a purely cognitive explanation, about which he states that ‘[c]ognitive 
analyses are not so much wrong as they are incomplete. Other processes are also 
involved’ (Pettigrew 1998: 71). 
In the context of an extensive meta-study on intergroup contact research, Pettigrew 
and Tropp claim to have shown that such knowledge mediation does take place, but is 
less important than the mediating effect that works through empathy and perspective 
taking (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). Therefore, in Contact Theory mainly intimate 
contacts, such as interethnic friendships, are expected to lead to reduction of ethno-
centrism (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011; McLaren 2003). From this perspective, contact 
will mostly lead to reduction of negative ideas about ethnic minorities when it offers 
the possibility of empathizing with out-group members and their concerns (Pettigrew 
and Tropp 2008: 923). Such intimate contacts would lead to overthrowing the idea 
that members from ethnic minority groups have different morals and values than in-
group members (McLaren 2003: 913), which should result in blurring the boundary 
between in-groups and out-groups3. This does, however, not answer the essential ques-
tion of how such intimate contacts come into being.
 Altogether, Contact Theory, as put forward by Pettigrew and colleagues, predicts 
that interethnic contacts, especially intimate ones, will lead to less ethnocentrism. Its 
debates, as argued by Connolly (2000), ‘are clearly grounded in social psychological 
perspectives, which focus on an individual’s potential for attitudinal change within 
inter-group contact’ (Connolly 2000: 175). By focusing on such an allegedly universal 
potential for attitudinal change that is thought to be present among all individuals, 
Contact Theory research ‘has tended to create a rather self-referential field where the 
core assumptions and beliefs that underpin the Contact Hypothesis are simply taken 
for granted and thus remain unchallenged’ (Ibid). More specifically, this means that 
Contact Theory research has assumed rather than critically studied the idea that 
interethnic contact can actually produce changes in ideas about ethnic minorities 
among all individuals. As such, the logic of Contact Theory assumes that interpretation 
of interethnic contacts will have a universal effect on ethnocentrism, irrespective of 
the social or cultural background of individuals. In addition, although Contact Theory 
itself claims that its arguments apply mainly to intimate contacts, in research practice 
its insights are extrapolated to all sorts of interethnic contacts. This is for example 
reflected in the claim, already cited above, that ‘while there may be facilitating condi-
tions that improve its effectiveness, contact basically works’ (Husnu and Crisp 2010: 
943, italics in original) for reducing prejudice. 
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1.4 The role of cultural values in studying ethnocentrism
1.4.1 Beyond sociology’s blind spot for culture
As follows from the foregoing, both Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory 
neglect the role of people’s cultural values for understanding ethnocentrism. For the 
former this is reflected in the assumption that people by definition think and perceive 
of reality in terms of ethnic divisions. For the latter this is crystalized in the idea of an 
allegedly universal ‘beneficial’ effect of interethnic contact. As such, both leading theo-
ries in studies on ethnocentrism have a blind spot for culture, a characteristic they 
share with many other social scientific research traditions. Indeed, it was only since the 
1970s and 1980s that a renewed attention to ‘culture’ emerged within the social sci-
ences. This ‘cultural turn’ (see for example Friedland and Mohr 2004; Nash 2001; 
Chaney 1994) was aimed as a critique of the positivist logic that had been dominating 
the social sciences. This positivist nature of the discipline implied a theoretical prefer-
ence for everything that is ‘hard’ and can be measured ‘objectively’.
 The ‘cultural turn’ meant a radical break with such a positivist logic, its core idea 
being that no ‘hard’ and ‘objective’ social facts can exist in social science, since the 
social is always defined through human subjective experience (see for example Hout-
man 2003b: 38-39; Houtman and Achterberg 2012: 389). Such an emphasis on sub-
jectivity ‘allows us to look beyond the material understanding of “society” to the realm 
of meaning’ (Sherwood, Smith and Alexander 1993: 374). Therefore, social science can 
only study what meaning people attach to things in life, instead of attempting to 
uncover an underlying ‘objective’ reality (e.g. Houtman 2008; Houtman and Achter-
berg 2012: 392). Instead of seeing only ‘hard’ factors, such as a person’s economic posi-
tion, as being real, the ‘cultural turn’ thereby paved the way for introducing into 
sociological research the idea that cultural structures have real effects.  
This notion of the autonomy of ‘culture’ and the working of ‘culture’ as an inde-
pendent variable, rather than as only a dependent variable, is the vital insight that has 
led to the revival of cultural sociology.4 As stated by Friedland and Mohr (2004), this 
cultural sociology should not be seen as an emphasis on cultural research topics, but as 
a new paradigm for sociology as a discipline. The fundamental idea behind such a 
cultural sociological paradigm is that ‘culture is not a thing but a dimension, not an 
object to be studied as a dependent variable, but a thread that runs through, one that 
can be teased out of, every conceivable social form’ (Alexander 2003: 7). As such, it has 
gained importance within the sociological discipline in the past fifteen years as ‘a field 
at the crossroads of sociology (…) its prominence results from the disciplinary gaps it 
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has filled’ (Jacobs and Spilman 2005: 2), namely by understanding cultural processes as 
‘the switch point’ between structure and agency (Ibid: 3).
It is in this sense that a cultural sociological approach can lead to advances in the 
study of ethnocentrism. As stated by Lamont, ‘[a] focus on meaning-making is also 
likely to enrich the study of racism and anti-racism (…) we need to gain purchase on 
the broad cultural frameworks that facilitate it’ (Lamont 2000: 604). Indeed, Allport, 
contact tradition’s founding father, already acknowledged that ‘a person’s prejudice is 
unlikely to be merely a specific attitude toward a specific group; it is more likely to be 
a reflection of his whole habit of thinking about the world he lives in’ (Allport 
1979[1954]: 175). It is exactly this ‘habit of thinking’, the cultural values that serve as 
frames of interpretation through which people perceive the world and the experi-
ences they have, that is many times neglected in studies on opinions about ethnic 
minorities. In the following, we will see how this is true for Group Conflict Theory 
and Contact Theory respectively. 
1.4.2 The cultural gap in Group Conflict Theory
In recent years, more and more research evidence emerged showing that more than 
economic threats, cultural threats function as driving forces behind negative ideas 
about ethnic minorities (see for example Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Malhotra, 
Margalit and Hyunjung Mo 2013, for an overview of such studies). At the same time, 
the logic of Group Conflict Theory has been extended to resources other than purely 
economic ones, such as the defense of the ethnic majority culture (e.g. Sides and Cit-
rin 2007; Schneider 2008). Indeed, Biggs and Knauss (2012) do not stand alone in 
preferring ‘a generic formulation of threat, for the prediction about numerical size 
should hold whether the majority feels threatened in economic, political or cultural 
domains’ (Biggs and Knauss 2012: 634).5 
The common assumption among Group Conflict scholars is that cultural threat 
works through the same mechanism as economic threat. Indeed, when referring to 
intergroup competition for scarce resources, Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) argue 
that ‘[i]ssues at stake in such intergroup competition can refer to tangible (e.g. housing 
or labor market issues), as well as intangible, goods (e.g., religious or language issues’ 
(Schlueter and Scheepers 2010: 286). In such an approach, cultural resources are 
framed in the perspective of scarcity as well. It is, however, not self-evident to assume 
that cultural resources can be scarce. Whereas economic resources can be limited, cul-
tural resources are in principle infinite. This goes for example for the belief in a God; 
for common rituals regarding important life-events such as death; and for eating prac-
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tices, with which I do not mean eating manners, but rather the role of food(sharing) 
in social life and ideas about what constitutes ‘good food’. Those examples have in 
common that different ways of acting on those subjects do not necessarily stand in 
each other’s way and are in that sense infinite. Because of this infinite nature of cultural 
resources, an additional explanation that links cultural resources to ethnic competition 
is required. 
An attempt to offer such an additional explanation was made by Coenders et al. 
(2008b). They argue that economic threat is based on realistic group conflict only, 
whereas cultural threat can be understood through social identity theory (Tajfel and 
Turner 1979) and people’s wish for a positive group identity (see Coenders et al. 
2008b). This distinction, however, does not seem to solve the core problem at hand. 
After all, if competition for economic resources should be explained from realistic 
conflict theory only, it can be doubted whether this should necessarily result in ethnic 
competition. As Allport argues, ‘even in so realistic a situation we note the essential 
illogicality of regarding only the man of the other race as a threat (…) There must be 
also a previous sense of in-group and out-group rivalry before the lines of competi-
tion can be perceived as ethnic’ (Allport 1979[1954]: 60). Similarly, if cultural threat 
should be based only on the longing for a positive group identity, a more profound 
explanation is needed to understand why this group identity should necessarily be 
based on ethnic background. 
As such, decomposed under the pressure of the evidence for ‘cultural threat’, a fun-
damental flaw of Group Conflict Theory comes to light. In an attempt to explain 
ethnocentrism, Group Conflict Theory in fact presupposes a perception of society 
which is divided along ethnic and racial lines. As such, Group Conflict Theory in fact 
presupposes ethnocentrism. After all, it assumes that a positive group identity is by 
definition based on an ethnic group identity. This is furthermore confirmed by the 
statement that economic threat can as well be rooted in realistic conflicts that might 
have ‘objective’ sources. This would work such that ‘[e]ven when members of the 
majority group do not have strong discriminative views against immigrants, they may 
become xenophobic because some specific objective conditions incline them to feel 
threatened about losing the resources they have’ (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011: 817). 
How else could this be true, if not by presupposing an ethnic divide? It is at this point 
exactly, where the need for a cultural sociological perspective comes to light.
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1.4.3 A cultural sociological critique of Contact Theory
Whereas the blind spot of Group Conflict Theory for culture, as we have seen, ulti-
mately results in presupposing the very issue it aims to study, Contact Theory’s neglect 
of ‘culture’ results in an overestimation of the potential of interethnic contact to reduce 
ethnocentrism. Even though Contact Theory in the end expects that interethnic con-
tacts can change people’s ideas and values, it ignores the frames of interpretation con-
stituted by people’s cultural values through which interethnic contacts are evaluated. 
Contact Theory seems to adhere to a stimulus response-like approach instead, in 
which interethnic contact has a given effect that is the same for everyone. This approach 
disregards Allport’s initial idea that contact might not work the same for everyone. 
Even though this idea was underlined by Pettigrew himself when stating that ‘prior 
attitudes and experiences influence (…) what the effects of the contact will be’ (Pet-
tigrew 1998: 77), it has not been incorporated into Contact Theory.6 
This fundamental difference of Contact Theory vis-à-vis Allport’s initial ideas 
uncovers an essentially different perception of the mechanism that underlies interpre-
tations of interethnic contact situations. What is overlooked in Contact Theory is that 
contact, just like any other event, is not ‘objectively’ projected onto people, but is 
experienced through people’s subjective frames of interpretation, through which peo-
ple make sense of all external influences. In the context of interethnic contacts, such 
frames of interpretation will most likely be constituted by people’s values concerning 
cultural differences. This will work such that those more culturally tolerant will be 
more likely to evaluate contact in a positive sense than those more culturally intoler-
ant. When interested in understanding how and why interethnic contact might pro-
duce changes in the way individuals think about ethnic minorities, it is therefore 
important to study how such an influence of interethnic contact differs according to 
individuals’ cultural values, or, put differently, how the evaluation of interethnic con-
tact is culturally moderated. 
 The importance of considering cultural moderation of interethnic contacts is fur-
ther underlined by the common interpretation of the relationship between interethnic 
friendship and ethnocentrism. A common finding in research on Contact Theory, as 
shown before, is that mainly interethnic friendships are associated with reductions of 
negative ideas about ethnic minorities. This finding has been interpreted as strongly 
supportive of Contact Theory. However, it can as well be argued that the relationship 
between interethnic friendships and less negative thinking about ethnic minorities is 
the ultimate consequence of the problem of self-selection in interethnic contacts. This 
problem of self-selection concerns the causal direction between contact and ethno-
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centrism: interethnic contact may lead to ethnocentrism, but the inversed causal path 
is as plausible. 
Although commonly acknowledged within interethnic contact research (McLaren 
2003; Dixon 2006; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Aberson et al. 2004), this problem is 
mostly approached from a methodological perspective. For long it has therefore been 
asserted that the path from contacts to ethnocentrism is stronger than the reversed 
path, based on evidence from testing the strength of both paths within the same sam-
ple using structural equation modeling (e.g Pettigrew 1998; McLaren 2003). Besides 
the doubts one can cast on using a statistical construct for addressing such an essential 
problem, there is an alternative theoretical approach that can be applied for testing the 
seriousness of the selection problem of Contact Theory. This alternative, proposed by 
Ethnic Reification Theory which is further elaborated in the following section, con-
siders people’s cultural values as central not only to the interpretation of interethnic 
contact, but also to the selection of interethnic ties. 
1.5  Constructing Ethnic Reification Theory as an 
alternative explanation for ethnocentrism
1.5.1 The ‘cultural’ in studies on ethnocentrism
As has been argued so far, both Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory have a 
blind spot for people’s cultural values. This is problematic because it obstructs further 
understanding of the dynamics between interethnic contact and ethnocentrism. In 
this section Ethnic Reification Theory is presented as a theoretical alternative based 
on a cultural sociological approach in which people’s cultural values are the main 
explanatory factor and are as such taken seriously.
Earlier studies have already suggested the importance of taking ‘culture’ seriously 
when studying ethnocentrism. This is demonstrated by previous findings indicating 
that immigrants are perceived as a ‘cultural threat’ rather than an economic one as 
predicted by Group Conflict Theory (Schneider 2008; Sniderman et al. 2004; 
O’Rourke and Sinnot 2006; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Furthermore, several 
authors have argued that the negative relationship between educational level and eth-
nocentrism, many times interpreted as supportive of Group Conflict Theory (e.g. 
Scheepers et al. 2002; Eisinga and Scheepers 1989; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002; 
Kunovich 2004; Hello et al. 2006), should not be understood in an economic, but 
rather in a cultural, sense (see Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Citrin et al. 1997; 
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Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Van der Waal and Houtman 
2011). As stated by Hainmueller and Hiscox, ‘[t]he conventional story appears to be 
based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the available evidence’ (Hainmueller and 
Hiscox 2007: 401). Hence, as their findings indicate, ‘a large component of the effect 
of education on individual attitudes towards immigrants is associated with differences 
among individuals in cultural values and beliefs’ (Ibid: 401-402). This is in line with 
earlier studies in which it was shown that education is not only an indicator of class or 
socioeconomic position, as conventionally assumed, but also of one’s cultural position 
(cf. Houtman 2003, 2001). In line with this cultural explanation of the relationship 
between education and ethnocentrism, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) conclude 
that cultural factors are more important for explaining ethnocentrism than economic 
factors, and Malhotra et al. (2013) assert that, while findings are rather mixed for 
Group Conflict Theory, cultural explanations are consistently supported.
Altogether, ample empirical evidence is thus available that suggests a greater role for 
people’s cultural values in explaining ethnocentrism. However, ‘the cultural (…) 
approaches that are typically vindicated by empirical testing lack the theoretical preci-
sion of the self-interest [Group Conflict] approach’ (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014: 
3). Indeed, a closer look at the cultural interpretation of the educational effect on 
ethnocentrism reveals that several mechanisms are claimed to be at work. The relation-
ship between education and ethnocentrism is for example stated as a consequence of 
cognitive sophistication (e.g. Bobo and Licari 1989; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993); 
of the liberalizing effect of education (e.g. Espenshade and Calhoun 1993); and of a 
greater predisposition towards ethnic and racial tolerance (e.g. Espenshade and Cal-
houn 1993; McLaren 2001; Citrin et al. 1997). Only rarely are these differing mecha-
nisms underlying the cultural interpretations of the educational effect on ethnocen-
trism further developed, thereby leaving somewhat unclear what exactly is the cultural 
interpretation of the educational effect on ethnocentrism. 
The theoretical imprecision in studies claiming a ‘cultural’ explanation for ethno-
centrism becomes even more apparent when looking at the interpretations offered for 
the influence of contextual sources on ethnocentrism. The main context factor that 
was studied from a cultural perspective for its influence on ethnocentrism is the share 
of immigrants in a country. As stated above, it is found that when the share of immi-
grants is positively related to ethnocentrism, this is mainly through increased feelings 
of cultural threat. Acknowledging the existence and importance of ‘cultural threat’, 
mostly understood as the feeling that the ‘national identity’ and the ‘traditional way of 
life’ are being threatened, is arguably a step forward compared to purely economic 
interpretations of the influence of immigration on ethnocentrism. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that in accounts of ‘cultural threat’ the ‘cultural’ is understood in a cul-
25
tural sociological sense. More specifically, acknowledging ‘cultural threat’ as important 
for ethnocentrism does not imply that people’s cultural values are thought to function 
as interpretative frames through which reality – the immigration context in this case 
- is perceived and provided with meaning. This becomes for example clear from the 
suggestion that ‘[i]f correct information about immigrant stock and flows reached the 
general public (…) the sense of threat might wane, mitigating hostility towards immi-
grants’ (Sides and Citrin 2007: 501). Such a statement neglects the idea that even 
though ‘[s]ome message is brought to us by the “light without” (…) the meaning and 
significance we give to it are largely added by the “light within’ (Allport 1979[1954]: 
165). Neglecting this idea is, in the end, the same as neglecting the cultural values that 
serve as frames of interpretation through which people perceive the world, which I 
have so far identified as the main problem in studies on ethnocentrism.
In sum, not only is it unclear what exactly is the ‘cultural interpretation’ of the edu-
cational effect on ethnocentrism, it is also not explicitly taken into account that con-
texts - as well as contacts for that matter - are not ‘cultural’ in and of themselves, but 
are interpreted through people’s cultural values. The following section explains how 
those two elements – the cultural interpretation of the educational effect on ethno-
centrism and the interpretation of contexts through people’s cultural values - are 
combined in Ethnic Reification Theory. Thereafter, it is explained what should be 
studied in order to test Ethnic Reification Theory against Group Conflict Theory and 
Contact Theory respectively, and how such a test will be developed throughout this 
dissertation.  
1.5.2 Ethnic Reification Theory
The core idea of Ethnic Reification Theory is that the extent to which people hold 
an ethnic reified worldview both explains ethnocentrism and serves as a frame of 
interpretation through which interethnic contacts and immigration contexts are 
interpreted. Those two issues which are explained by ethnic reification correspond 
with the two elements named above, that is, the cultural interpretation of the educa-
tional effect on ethnocentrism and the interpretation of contexts through people’s 
cultural values, which are combined in Ethnic Reification Theory. 
 Let us consider the first element: the cultural interpretation of the educational 
effect on ethnocentrism. The well-established finding that less educated people have 
more ethnocentric ideas than more highly educated people have, as we have already 
seen above, has been interpreted as being a consequence of the ‘liberalizing effect of 
education’; of cognitive sophistication; and of a greater disposition towards ethnic and 
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racial tolerance. Although these seem to be different interpretations of the educational 
effect on ethnocentrism, with the exception of cognitive sophistication, they might fit 
together into one overarching idea as to why highly educated people are more ethni-
cally tolerant than less educated people. The key to such an overarching idea is to see 
education as an indicator of cultural capital, understood here as ´the ability to recog-
nize cultural expressions and to comprehend their meaning´ (cf. Van der Waal et al. 
2010: 352). Some previous studies have already suggested that the greater ethnic toler-
ance among more educated people should be understood from their ample amount of 
cultural capital (e.g. Van der Waal and Houtman 2011; Van der Waal et al. 2010). This is 
because cultural capital, in modern liberal democracies that is, stimulates a de-natural-
ized idea of culture, as opposed to a reified view of culture which can be found among 
less educated people with corresponding limited amounts of cultural capital (cf. 
Gabennesch 1972; Van der Waal et al. 2010).
 Reification is a ‘view of social reality as if it were fixed instead of in process, abso-
lute instead of relative, natural instead of conventional, and in general, as a product of 
forces which are more than human’ (Gabennesch 1972: 863). Such a view of social 
reality will go along with a static idea of the own culture as being ‘natural’ and as 
something that should be preserved in its current form. Furthermore, within a reified 
worldview ethnicity and culture will be seen as fixed combinations: someone with a 
Dutch ethnic background will by definition adhere to Dutch culture, whereas some-
one with a Turkish background will by definition adhere to Turkish culture, etc. From 
such a perspective, anyone with a different ethnic background than the own will be 
thought to hold a ‘deviating’ culture. When holding the opposite of a reified view, a 
de-reified worldview so to speak, it will be acknowledged that no such thing as a fixed 
culture exists. Instead, people holding a de-reified worldview will perceive cultural 
differences as legitimate and as embedded in the workings of society itself. Further-
more, instead of assuming that ethnicity ‘naturally’ comes together with a certain 
cultural story, when holding a de-reified view it is acknowledged that all people, irre-
spective of ethnic background, can ascribe to any cultural story to make sense of the 
world around them. As a result, those with a de-reified view on ethnicity are more 
likely to accept, or even appreciate, various cultural expressions, and will consequently 
be more tolerant towards cultural differences. By contrast, people with an ethnic rei-
fied worldview will be more likely to reject cultural differences since those are con-
sidered to be a threat to the naturalized cultural order.
 Two value patterns can be expected to vary with the extent to which one holds an 
ethnic reified worldview: authoritarianism and distrust. Concerning the first, being 
reluctant to accept cultural differences and perceiving those as infringements on the 
natural order will be likely to go hand in hand with an emphasis on rules and order. 
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Since such an emphasis on rules and order is what authoritarian values stand for, peo-
ple with an ethnic reified view will be more likely to hold authoritarian values, the 
opposite being true for those holding a de-reified view. For the second, distrust, since 
every ‘faux-pas’ in terms of what is considered the ‘natural’ order is seen as threatening, 
people with a reified worldview will be more likely to hold feelings of personal dis-
trust. Hence, any person could potentially form a threat to what is considered ‘nor-
mal’, especially those who are thought to ascribe to different norms and values than 
the own, which from a reified perspective is true for people with another ethnic 
background than one’s own. As such, people holding a reified view of reality will be 
more likely to distrust others than people with a de-reified view. 
 In sum, ethnocentrism can thus be understood by the extent to which one holds 
an ethnic reified worldview. Such a worldview will be prevalent among the less edu-
cated and will go hand in hand with authoritarian conceptions and with greater feel-
ings of distrust. The cultural interpretation of the educational effect on ethnocentrism 
is thus based on the principle of ethnic reification. This same principle also serves to 
explain how immigration contexts and interethnic contacts are interpreted and related 
to ideas about ethnic minorities, which is where the second element of Ethnic Reifi-
cation Theory comes into play. Instead of considering such contexts as ‘objective’ 
sources of ethnocentrism, it is focused on how people themselves make sense of those 
contexts through the relevant cultural values that serve as frames of interpretation. A 
certain context, such as the share of immigrants in a country, will only be related to 
ethnocentrism when interpreted through a frame which is itself related to ethnocen-
trism. The most important frame in this respect, following Ethnic Reification Theory, 
is the extent to which people have an ethnically reified view of reality, or, put differ-
ently, the extent to which people think in terms of an ethnic divide. 
Ethnic Reification Theory thus holds that ethnocentrism can be understood by the 
extent to which one has an ethnically reified view of reality, and that such a reified 
view, which is mainly found among less educated people as a consequence of their 
limited amount of cultural capital, forms the cultural values that serve as frames of 
interpretation through which both immigration contexts and interethnic contacts will 
be interpreted. To study whether this is indeed the case, Ethnic Reification Theory 
will be contrasted with Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory respectively. This 
study is therefore composed of two empirical parts in which Ethnic Reification The-
ory will be further developed and tested alongside Group Conflict Theory and Con-
tact Theory, respectively. Thereby, I attempt to offer an alternative for the problems 
signaled in Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory. In the following I further 
elaborate upon the approach followed in this study, including the corresponding 
research questions that are the focus of the chapters to come. The order in which these 
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are presented matches the ordering of the empirical chapters. Altogether, these 
specific elements should enable me to formulate an answer to this study’s main 
research question, which is as follows: Under which circumstances does interethnic contact 
lead to either more or less ethnocentrism, and how can this be explained? 
1.5.3 Contrasting Group Conflict Theory and Ethnic Reification Theory
In the elaboration of Ethnic Reification Theory it was argued that on the individual 
level people’s cultural values are more important for explaining ethnocentrism the 
economic logic of Group Conflict Theory. However, when attempting to explain dif-
ferences in ethnocentrism over time or between countries, the picture is not yet as 
clear. In order to understand such differences in ethnocentrism contextual character-
istics should be taken into account, the two main characteristics used being national 
economic circumstances and immigration context. Especially when looking at the 
former, the national economic context, a confusing picture arises: although research 
has presented mixed findings concerning the relationship between economic afflu-
ence and ethnocentrism (e.g. McLaren 2001), it is generally considered that ethnocen-
trism will mostly thrive under less affluent economic circumstances (e.g. Burns and 
Gimpel 2000). There is indeed evidence available showing that economic fluctuations 
are related to ideas about immigration (e.g. Harwood 1983; Lapinski et al. 1997). More 
recent examples can be found as a consequence of the recent financial crisis: lower 
levels of economic prosperity turned out to be related to the rise of extreme right-
wing nationalist parties, such as the Golden Dawn in bankrupt Greece (see Ellinas 
2013). Such findings are generally interpreted as supportive of Group Conflict Theory. 
However, it is not clear yet how this can be matched with the well-established finding 
(cf. Malhotra et al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) that on the individual level 
cultural values are more important than economic interests for explaining ethnocen-
trism. 
Whereas Group Conflict Theory expects that less affluent economic circumstances 
will be related to more ethnocentrism because natives will feel more threatened in 
their economic position, a cultural sociological perspective of the account would hold 
that if people’s ideas about ethnic minorities are not so much rooted in economic 
interests, it is unlikely that economic context will be interpreted from an economic 
interest perspective. The alternative possibility, following Ethnic Reification Theory, is 
that people’s ideas about cultural differences and distrust will be more strongly linked 
to ethnocentrism under less affluent economic circumstances. As such, unfavorable 
economic tides cannot only activate economic interests that are related to ethnocen-
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trism, but might just as well reinforce the cultural mechanism that leads to negative 
ideas about ethnic minorities. In order to further understand how ethnocentrism is 
influenced by economic fluctuations, this study considers to what extent the relationship 
between economic context and ethnocentrism can be understood through individuals’ economic 
and cultural position. This question will be examined in the second chapter.
The second context characteristic deemed important for people’s ideas about eth-
nic minorities is immigration context. The studies performed on the relationship 
between the share of immigrants in a country and ethnocentrism are more diverse 
than the ones concerning national economic context, and more attention has been 
paid to the idea of ‘cultural threat’ in addition to ‘economic threat’. Nevertheless, 
whether argued from an economic or a cultural threat perspective, such studies still 
seem to assume that contexts function as ‘objective’ sources of ethnocentrism. This 
becomes for example clear by the use of the terms ‘actual economic threat’ and ‘actual 
cultural threat’ as labels for the immigration context in a country. Instead of assuming 
that certain immigration contexts function as ‘objective’ ethnic threats that invoke 
ethnocentric ideas, Ethnic Reification Theory proposes to study how people’s cultural 
values, namely their ideas about cultural differences and their amount of distrust, serve 
as frames of interpretation through which national immigration contexts are inter-
preted. As such, while a greater presence of immigrants according to Group Conflict 
Theory will lead to more negative ideas about ethnic minorities among people with 
a low socio-economic position, following Ethnic Reification Theory this will be true 
for people with an ethnically reified worldview, expressed in high amounts of author-
itarianism and distrust. The third chapter is therefore dedicated to understanding the 
influence of immigration on opinions about ethnic minorities by studying the follow-
ing question: to what extent does the share of immigrants in a country influence ethnocentrism, 
and how can this be explained by people’s economic interests and by their cultural values? 
1.5.4 Contrasting Contact Theory and Ethnic Reification Theory
Whereas the first empirical part of this study is thus dedicated to contrasting Ethnic 
Reification Theory with Group Conflict Theory, the second empirical part concerns 
a test of Ethnic Reification Theory as an alternative interpretation of the relationship 
between interethnic contact and ethnocentrism. This is important since ignoring the 
role of individuals’ cultural values might have obscured the seriousness of the problem 
of self-selection in interethnic contacts. Not only might contact experiences be inter-
preted differently according to individuals’ ideas about cultural differences, it can also 
be true that those individuals who are more open to cultural differences will be more 
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willing to have interethnic contacts and would therefore be more likely to have inti-
mate interethnic contacts, such as friendships, than people who are less open to cul-
tural differences. Chapter three will therefore study to what extent self-selection can be 
distinguished from ‘genuine’ contact effects by distinguishing the double role of people’s cultural 
values as drivers for self-selection and as frames of interpretation for interethnic contacts. 
Thereafter, the idea that interethnic contacts will be interpreted through people’s 
frames of interpretation will be studied for the evaluation of imagined interethnic 
contacts. The latter is a rather new component of the contact tradition, which, it is 
claimed, would help reduce prejudice. This is presented as an ideal policy tool for 
improving interethnic relations, because it can be applied, so it is claimed, even to 
people who are normally unwilling to engage in interethnic contact because of their 
prejudice (cf. Husnu and Crisp 2010). Such a statement clearly unmasks the problem 
with imagined contact research. After all, if one is too prejudiced to engage in intereth-
nic contacts, how could such a person imagine a contact situation that will take away 
initial resistance? In order to show that, from an Ethnic Reification perspective, this is 
unlikely to take place, a vignette experiment of an imagined contact situation was 
conducted which studies to what extent imagined contact situations are interpreted through 
people’s amount of openness towards cultural differences. This question is addressed in chap-
ter five. 
1.5.5 Overview of data used
All four empirical chapters described above are based on quantitative data. Where pos-
sible, data from the Netherlands are used, namely in chapters three and four, which is 
the preferred option since this research project is developed within a Dutch context, 
and by using Dutch data its results could be more readily translated to everyday situa-
tions. However, the data needed were not available for the Netherlands for all empiri-
cal chapters. Therefore, data for the United States and for 18 European countries were 
used as well. This should not be problematic since the underpinnings of individual 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities are found to be similar in Western countries (cf. 
Citrin and Sides 2008). Moreover, the theoretical rationale studied here is expected to 
work alike in all Western societies.
The first empirical study in chapter two uses data from the United States. This is 
because longitudinal data on ethnocentrism and all other relevant variables are needed, 
which are not available in a long enough time-span for the Netherlands. The best 
available time-series data that include all relevant variables have been found in the US 
General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2013), which are therefore used. The choice for 
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data for the second empirical study in chapter three was driven by the availability of 
information on the share of less educated and non-Western immigrants in a country. 
Since there is no information on those two measurements for the Netherlands nor for 
any other Western country over a longer time-span, the only viable option was to use 
a country comparative approach. The first wave of the European Social Survey (Jowell 
et al. 2003) is then the preferred option, which resulted in a country comparative 
study using 18 European countries including the Netherlands. The third empirical 
study in chapter four is also based on the first wave of the European Social Survey. 
However, since no country characteristics are needed here, only the Dutch sample of 
this dataset was used. Finally, the fourth study described in chapter five is based on data 
from the Netherlands as well. This is the only empirical study that was based on pri-
mary data. One module of the dataset used, which is the third wave of the CROCUS 
Survey on Worldviews in the Netherlands (Achterberg et al. 2012), was especially 
designed for this study.
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2.  Economic Contexts and Ethnocentrism: A 
Non-Economic Relationship
2.1 Introduction
Trends in ethnocentrism tend to be explained following an economic logic. Arguing 
along the lines of Group Conflict Theory (e.g. Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Levine and 
Campbell 1972), the main argument for such an economic interpretation is that in 
times of economic hardship, when resources are more scarce, natives will feel more 
threatened in their economic position (e.g. Blalock 1967).7 As a consequence, they 
will try to preserve the resources available to the group they identify with as their in-
group. This is expected to lead to a more reluctant stance towards ethnic minorities, 
and thus, to more ethnocentrism8. 
 Indeed, a comparison of trends in ethnocentrism and the level of per capita gross 
domestic product, as shown in Figure 2.1, indicates that those trends are roughly 
inverted. At first sight, it therefore seems true that higher levels of per capita GDP are 
associated with lower levels of ethnocentrism and vice versa. Similar trends have been 
reported by Lapinski et al. (1997) and Wilkes et al. (2008). Furthermore, the current 
financial crisis has been shown to go hand in hand with the growth of nationalist, anti-
immigrant parties and movements, such as the Golden Dawn in Greece, which has 
grown considerably since the country has gone bankrupt (Ellinas 2013). Thus, an 
economic explanation for the relationship between economic circumstances and eth-
nocentrism as proposed by Group Conflict Theory seems plausible. 
Nevertheless, such an economic explanation is not self-evident. To understand the 
relationship between economic circumstances and ethnocentrism it is vital to look at 
the way in which people interpret and relate economic contexts to their political 
attitudes. Such an interpretation cannot just be ‘objectively’ assigned by scholars by 
simply basing it on the nature of the context in question, but should be studied. In the 
case of the relationship between economic circumstances and ethnocentrism, the 
interpretative frames that are likely to be important should be based on the individual-
level mechanisms that are considered relevant for explaining ethnocentrism. 
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Figure 2.1: Trends in Ethnocentrism and GDP per capita, US 1972-2002
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The two individual-level mechanisms that are considered most important for explain-
ing ethnocentrism are based on an economic and a cultural logic respectively. The first 
is derived from Group Conflict Theory and holds that ethnocentrism will be mainly 
rooted in experiences of economic threat. The second can be placed under Ethnic 
Reification theory and holds that ethnocentrism is mainly explained by people’s 
stance towards cultural differences. Whereas the economic interest-based logic has 
received ample attention over the years, more and more studies emphasize that it is of 
relatively small importance for explaining ethnocentrism (e.g. Malhotra et al. 2013; 
Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). The cultural explanation for ethnocentrism is found 
to be far stronger (cf. Malhotra et al. 2013: 392). 
As a consequence, economic circumstances might not be related to ethnocentrism 
through economic interest frames, but rather through frames of interpretation consti-
tuted by people’s cultural values. Hence, even though the economy might by defini-
tion be considered economical, this does not preclude an interpretation by means of a 
cultural logic as well. Therefore, before concluding that fluctuations of the economy 
and ethnocentrism that go hand in hand should be interpreted through an economic 
logic only, it is important to consider the possibility that economic hardship functions 
as a condition under which mechanisms of cultural threat are especially invoked. This 
chapter therefore studies two explanations of how economic prosperity influences 
ethnocentric ideas. 
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2.2  Two interpretations of the relationship between 
economic context and ethnocentrism
A general idea that links economic circumstances to ethnocentrism is that of scape-
goating. The basic principle is that under less affluent circumstances people will 
searched for individuals or groups of people to blame for those circumstances. Group 
Conflict Theory assumes that such scapegoats will most likely be ethnic minority 
groups, because under less affluent circumstances, natives will try to preserve eco-
nomic resources for their own in-group, resulting in more ethnocentrism. However, 
instead of working strictly through an economic logic, it could also be true that those 
holding an ethnic reified worldview will become more ethnocentric under less afflu-
ent circumstances. Both interpretations of the relationship between economic circum-
stances and ethnocentrism are further elaborated below.
2.2.1 The economic interests approach
The idea that economic contexts influence political attitudes is not exceptional in 
sociology. In fact, it is a dominant thread running through a great variety of socio-
logical research fields. It can be linked back to both Marxist and rational choice para-
digms. Furthermore, it is a common feature of the positivist tradition in sociology in 
which mainly ‘hard’, exogenous forces that can be measured ‘objectively’ are used as 
explanations for ‘soft’ phenomena such as values and opinions. As such, several studies 
have for example argued that the economic context influences voting behaviour (e.g. 
MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992; Lewis-Beck 1988) and levels of postmaterialism 
(e.g. Duch and Taylor 1993; Clarke and Dutt 1991). There is thus widespread agree-
ment, not restricted to the study of ethnocentrism alone, upon the idea that economic 
structures have an important impact on individual’s values and opinions. Researchers 
studying ethnocentrism are therefore not exceptional in stating that ‘clearly the econ-
omy is important in determining people’s attitudes and behaviors’ (McLaren 1999: 
169).
 This importance of the economy for ethnocentrism is, following Group Conflict 
Theory, attributable to the idea that contexts of scarcity will trigger interethnic com-
petition. Blumer (1958) was one of the first influential scholars that developed such a 
theory. His main contribution to the field is the idea that ethnocentrism should be 
mainly understood from a sense of group position. According to Blumer ethnocen-
trism would therefore be rooted in a sense of perceived ethnic threat that results in the 
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wish to preserve resources for the in-group. This idea forms the basis of what is labeled 
group threat theory. 
Later on, the focus was shifted from perceived ethnic threat to realistic ethnic threat 
(Bobo 1983; Levine and Campbell 1972; Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011). This can be 
linked to a positivist logic according to which opinions are mainly affected by ‘objec-
tive’ sources. As stated by Hjerm and Nagayoshi, realistic group threat theory ‘leads to 
an important insight: anti-immigrant attitudes might have objective sources. Even when 
members of the majority group do not have strong discriminative views against immi-
grants, they may become xenophobic because some specific objective conditions 
incline them to feel threatened about losing the resources they have’ (Hjerm and 
Nagayoshi 2011: 817). 
Although ‘[d]ebates exist on whether the circumstances favoring intergroup hostil-
ity need to be real (…) or just imagined’ (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 318), in the 
end both branches of Group Conflict Theory are used within the same line of argu-
mentation. Some scholars connect those branches by stating that perceived ethnic 
threat is rooted in ‘real’ ethnic threat (e.g. Coenders and Scheepers 2003). Others 
explicitly merge both approaches; for instance Velásco Gonzalez et al. (2008) state that 
‘[t]he core issue here is (perceived) competition over scarce resources’ (Velásco Gon-
zalez et al. 2008: 669), thereby suggesting that both realistic and perceived threat func-
tion similarly. 
In sum, both branches of Group Conflict Theory expect that the amount of eco-
nomic prosperity is negatively related to ethnocentrism as a result of ethnic competi-
tion over scarce resources (e.g. Blalock 1967; Quillian 1995; Coenders and Scheepers 
1998). Such competition over economic resources is argued to be stronger among 
natives with a weak economic position than among those with a strong economic 
position, because competition for resources will be most severe for people holding 
economic positions similar to those of ethnic minorities. As most ethnic minorities in 
Western societies hold ‘weak to very weak’ economic positions (Coenders, 2001; 
Scheepers et al., 2002; Gijsberts et al. 2004), it is primarily natives in a low economic 
position with whom they compete over scarce resources. Consequently, for the most 
part, people in a low economic position will adopt a negative stance towards ethnic 
minorities in order to protect their own, or their own group’s, position. 
Following this line of reasoning implies that we cannot expect economic contexts 
to have the same effect on ethnocentrism across the whole population. Since the 
Group Conflict explanation for the relationship between economic circumstances and 
ethnocentrism is based on a logic of economic interest, and given that those economic 
interests will be mostly present among people in a low economic position, less affluent 
economic circumstances should lead to more ethnocentrism among natives in a low 
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economic position. Based on Group Conflict Theory the hypothesis concerning an 
explanation for the relationship between economic circumstances and ethnocentrism 
should thus be as follows: the less affluent the economic circumstances in a country, 
the more people in a low economic position, as measured by low income and a weak 
labor market position, will be inclined to have ethnocentric ideas (hypothesis 1). Tech-
nically speaking, it can therefore be expected that the relationship between economic 
position and ethnocentrism will be stronger the less affluent the economic circum-
stances in a country are.
2.2.2 The cultural values approach
Although it might be true that living in times of economic recession leads to a stronger 
inclination towards protection of economic resources, there are reasons to argue that 
this economic interest-based theory does not tell the whole story. In effect, research 
has shown that on the individual level cultural concerns are more important for 
explaining ethnocentrism than the Group Conflict explanation (cf. Malhotra 2013: 
392; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; 
Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Van der Waal and Houtman 2011). If we want to 
understand how economic contexts influence ethnocentrism, this cultural explanation 
for ethnocentrism should also be considered when studying the relationship between 
economic prosperity and ethnocentrism. 
The common finding in research on ethnocentrism that an individual’s educational 
level is most strongly related to the opinion about ethnic minorities (e.g. Coenders 
and Scheepers 2003; Hello et al. 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010) serves as a start-
ing point for such a cultural interpretation. This educational effect has many times 
been interpreted as an effect of an individual’s economic position (e.g. Scheepers et al. 
2002; Eisinga and Scheepers 1989; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002; Kunovich 2004; 
Hello et al. 2006). However, research has shown that a person’s educational level is not 
only an indicator of economic position, but of the extent to which a person possesses 
cultural capital as well (Houtman 2001: 177-178; Kalmijn 1994; De Graaf and Kalmijn 
2001; Houtman 2000: 42). This implies that the negative relationship between educa-
tion and ethnocentrism on the individual level can also be explained through a cul-
tural logic. 
The rationale behind this cultural logic, which forms one of the two elements of 
Ethnic Reification Theory discussed in the former chapter, is that highly educated 
people in liberal Western democracies, due to their ample amount of cultural capital, 
are better able to recognize cultural expressions and to understand their meanings. 
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They therefore hold a de-reified worldview and are thus less inclined to reject deviant 
life styles, more willing to value cultural diversity and to accept cultural differences 
(Gabennesch 1972). The opposite is true for less educated people with limited cultural 
capital, who will tend to hold an ethnic reified worldview in which every deviation 
from what is seen as the ‘natural order’ will be rejected. Such a tendency to reject all 
that is different from what is deemed ‘natural’ is likely to go together with feelings of 
distrust towards other people. This is because everyone could potentially cause an 
infringement on the natural order and might therefore initially be seen with suspicion. 
As a consequence, feelings of distrust will be more present among less educated people 
without ample cultural capital. Such feelings of distrust are then likely to be translated 
into intolerance towards ethnic minorities, which has indeed been shown by previous 
research (Achterberg and Houtman 2009; Blank 2003; Derks 2006; Eisinga and 
Scheepers 1989; Elchardus and Smits 2002; McDill 1961; Roberts and Rokeach 1956; 
Srole 1956). 
Such an Ethnic Reification explanation of ethnocentrism matches more recent 
developments within the study of ethnocentrism, in which cultural factors were found 
to be more important for explaining ethnocentrism than other factors such as eco-
nomic ones. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) have for example shown that the rela-
tionship between education and ethnocentrism is rooted in cultural values. Further-
more, Velásco Gonzalez et al. (2008) state that ‘[o]utgroups that have a different world 
view can be seen as threatening the cultural identity of the in-group’ (Velásco Gonza-
lez et al. 2008: 669). Various other studies have shown that such a cultural threat is 
related to more negative ideas about ethnic minorities (e.g. Sniderman, Hagendoorn 
and Prior 2004; Esses, Hodson and Dovidio 2003). As a consequence, based on a 
review of almost a hundred studies, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) conclude that 
cultural factors do a better job of explaining ethnocentrism than economic ones.
From the previous it can be concluded that a cultural, Ethnic Reification explana-
tion for ethnocentrism is indeed important, and it might well be true that the cultural 
concerns in which ethnocentrism is rooted come mainly to the fore under less afflu-
ent economic conditions. Hence, just like Group Conflict’s rationale that economic 
concerns will be most salient under less affluent economic circumstances, it can also 
be true that under relatively scarce economic circumstances ethnocentrism will be 
invoked among people experiencing high amounts of distrust and that as such a sort 
of ‘cultural scapegoating’ takes place. As a consequence, it can be expected that the 
effect of cultural values on ethnocentrism will be stronger under less affluent eco-
nomic conditions. The corresponding hypothesis therefore holds as follows: the less 
affluent the economic circumstances in a country, the more people holding an ethnic 
reified view, as indicated by a low educational level and high level of distrust, will be 
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inclined to have ethnocentric ideas (hypothesis 2). Technically speaking, it can therefore 
be expected that the relationship between cultural position and ethnocentrism will be 
stronger the less affluent the economic circumstances are.
2.3 Data and measures
2.3.1 Data
The data used in this study are taken from the cumulative file of the United States 
General Social Survey 1972-2012 (Smith et al. 2013). It includes a total of 57,061 
completed interviews carried out in the months of February, March and April in 29 
different years.9 In all years independent samples were drawn from the English-speak-
ing population aged 18 years and older living in non-institutional arrangements in the 
US. From 2006, sampling was extended to the Spanish- speaking population. The 
cumulative file is prepared in such a way that it is suitable for trend analysis. No exten-
sive procedures were, therefore, needed for using the same variables in different years. 
Because not all the variables of interest for this study were included in all 29 survey 
years, the analysis was restricted to 17 years from 1972 to 2002.10 Furthermore, since 
our theories are aimed at explaining the influence of economic circumstances on 
ethnocentrism among natives, all non-whites were excluded from the analyses. In 
addition, since some variables of interest had missing values, the total N used in the 
analyses was further reduced to 25,443 respondents. The individual level data were 
complemented with year level statistics for the country’s economic outlook. Those 
data were taken from the World Bank and from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2.3.2 Dependent variable: ethnocentrism
The dependent variable ethnocentrism is measured with a scale composed of four 
items.11 The exact formulation of those items can be read in Table 2.1, in which the 
results of a factor analysis on those items are shown. This analysis indicates that the four 
items tap into one dimension. Reliability analysis has confirmed that the four items 
together form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha is .73). Since not all items of this scale 
were measured in every year, a scale score was calculated for each respondent with at 
least two valid scores. Scale scores are computed as the mean score on those items, 
ranging from zero to six. A higher score stands for more ethnocentrism.
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Table 2.1: Principal factor analysis on items for ethnocentrism, N=7,819
Item Factor score
1. Blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they’re not wanted .60
2.  White people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they 
want to, and blacks should respect that right
.74
3.  How strongly would you object if your family wanted to bring a Black friend 
home to dinner?
.60
4.  Do you think there should be a law against marriages between Blacks and 
whites?
.63
Eigenvalue 1.67
R2 .42
Source: General Social Survey cumulative file 1972-2012; own calculations.
2.3.3 Individual level variables
On the individual level four independent variables and two control variables were 
used. The four independent variables on the individual level are education, income, 
unemployment, and distrust. The first independent variable, education, is measured as the 
highest degree obtained. This variable consists of five categories which are scored as 
follows: zero is ‘lower than high school’; score one stands for ‘high school’; score two 
refers to ‘junior college’; score three is ‘bachelor level’; and score four refers to ‘gradu-
ate’. 
Income is measured as the total family income per month. It is composed of twelve 
categories that range from lower than 1,000 US dollars to 25,000 US dollars or more.12 
Unemployment is a binary variable in which we have coded those that are unem-
ployed as score two and all others as score one. This resulted in 2.8 percent of the 
respondents included in our sample being unemployed.13 
Distrust was measured as a scale of three items. Factor analysis, the results of which 
are shown in Table 2.2, indicates that all items taps into one dimension. The three 
items form a reliable scale, as indicated by a Cronbach’s alpha of .66. Scale scores have 
been computed as the mean score of answers on the items for each respondent with 
at least two valid answers. A higher score on this scale stands for more distrust. The 
scale for distrust ranges from one to three.
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 The control variables used are age and sex. Age was measured in years and ranges 
from 18 to 89 years. Sex measures whether a respondent is female (score 2) or male 
(score 1). The distribution of this variable in the sample used is as follows: 55 percent 
female and 45 percent male.
Table 2.2: Principal factor analysis on items for distrust, N=28,401
Item Factor score
1.  Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are 
mostly just looking out for themselves?
.62
2.  Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try to be fair?
.69
3.  Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
.58
Eigenvalue 1.20
R2 .40
Source: General Social Survey cumulative file 1972-2012; own calculations.
2.3.4 Year level variables
Two independent variables are used on the year level, namely GDP per capita and 
unemployment rate. Statistics for the gross domestic product per capita were taken from 
the Worldbank database (Worldbank 2013). It is measured as the absolute level based 
on current US dollars and expressed in thousands of dollars. Within the 17 years stud-
ied, the level of per capita GDP ranges from 5.20 to 35.50 thousand dollars. 
The unemployment rate stands for the percentage unemployed persons of the total 
labor force. Those data were taken from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Within the 
17 years studied, the unemployment rate ranges from 4.10 to 9.50 percent.14 In order 
to cover the time period until the effect of economic circumstances can be translated 
into values and attitudes, I did not measure the economic indicators in the year of the 
survey, but rather the mean score for the two years before the survey year.15 
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2.4 Results
In order to test the hypotheses two-level hierarchical linear regression analysis was 
used. The design is composed of a sample of 25,443 individuals nested in 17 years. 
Tables 2.3 to 2.6 show the results of this analysis. To facilitate comparison of the rela-
tive strength of each effect within a model, standardized variables were used. First, it 
will be tested whether there is indeed a multilevel problem; thereafter I will look at 
the fixed effects both on the individual and year level, followed by the core of the 
analysis which focuses on the cross-level interactions between economic year charac-
teristics and individual level mechanisms.
The first model in Table 2.3 is an intercept only model in which the total variance 
of ethnocentrism is divided between the individual level and the year level. As can be 
calculated from the variance components shown in this first model, 9.33 percent of 
the total variance is located at the year level, which means that there is indeed a multi-
level problem. In the second model the fixed effects of the individual level variables 
are shown. Those individual-level variables explain about 22 percent of the variance 
in ethnocentrism on the individual level, as well as about 22 percent of the year level 
variance. Therefore, about a fifth of the fluctuation of ethnocentrism over time can be 
attributed to the composition of the population. The elements that are most important 
in this respect are age, educational level and the amount of distrust. From the indica-
tors of economic position only income has a significant effect on ethnocentrism. The 
income effect is also considerably smaller than the effect of education and distrust. This 
replicates previous findings in which such cultural factors were also found to be more 
important predictors of ethnocentrism than purely economic indicators (cf. Hainmu-
eller and Hopkins 2014; see Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Citrin et al. 1997; 
Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Van der Waal and Houtman 
2011). 
After including the economic indicators in the third model in Table 2.3, the year-
level variance of ethnocentrism is further reduced by 53 per cent of the total year-
level variance. This means that more than half of the variance in ethnocentrism over 
the years can be explained by national economic circumstances. Those economic cir-
cumstances are thus clearly important for understanding trends in ethnocentrism. This 
is true for both GDP per capita and for unemployment rates, since both are signifi-
cantly related to ethnocentrism. The effect of per capita GDP is the strongest predictor 
in this model (the coefficient is -.68, p<.001) and is in line with the trend pictured in 
Figure 2.1 in the introduction. The higher the level of GDP per capita, the lower the 
scores on ethnocentrism are. Remarkably, the indicator for unemployment rate (the 
coefficient is -.21, p<.05) functions exactly opposite to what would be expected 
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according to the economic logic: the higher the unemployment rate, the lower the 
scores on ethnocentrism. Even though the unemployment rate is a renowned indica-
tor for the economic situation of a country, it does not function as expected when 
following an economic logic. 
Table 2.3: Multi-level regression on ethnocentrism, fixed effect models
M1 M2 M3
(Constant) 1.76*** 1.78*** 1.55***
Income -.07*** -.07***
Unemployed (1=no, 2=yes) -.02 -.02
Education -.47*** -.47***
Distrust .28*** .29***
Year variables
GDPlevel -.68***
Unemployment rate -.21*
Control variables
Age .53*** .53***
Sex (1=male, 2=female) -.07*** -.07***
Variance components
Individual level (N=25,443) 3.12 2.42 2.42
Year level (N=17) .32 .25 .08
-2LL 47245.58 44270.21 44252.30
Source: General Social Survey, cumulative file 1972-2012; own calculations.
*p<.05; ***p<.001
One possible interpretation of this contradictory finding, which would also be in line 
with Group Conflict Theory, is that at higher unemployment levels in a country fewer 
ethnic minorities will be present on the labor market. This would imply that there will 
be less ethnic competition among the general population, and more ethnic competi-
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tion among those unemployed. Whether this alternative interpretation for the contra-
dictory effect of unemployment rate on ethnocentrism holds will become clear from 
what follows. 
Table 2.4: Model fit overview random slope models
-2LL ∆-2LL d.f.=∆m p
M3: all fixed effects 44252.30 - - -
M3a: M3 + slope income 44252.21 .09 1 n.s.
M3b: M3 + slope unemployed 44252.30 0 1 n.s.
M3c: M3 + slope education 44233.28 19.02 1 .001
M3d: M3 + slope distrust 44249.63 2.67 1 .10*
Source: General Social Survey, cumulative file 1972-2012; own calculations.
N=25,433 individuals, 17 years; -2LL=-2*loglikelihood; m=number of estimated parameters
In models 3a to 3d I tested whether the individual-level effects of economic and cul-
tural factors differ among the 17 years studied. For this purpose, each individual-level 
predictor was allowed to vary randomly over the years in a separate model. The model 
fits for those tests can be found in Table 2.4, in which each random slope model is 
compared in terms of model fit to the model with all fixed effects (model 3 in Table 
2.3).16 If the model fit of a random slope model is significantly higher than that of 
model 3 which functions as a base model here, this means that the corresponding 
variable does indeed vary randomly over the 17 years of study. Significance of this 
change in model fit was tested by applying a chi-square test. What can be told from 
this assessment is that only the effect of education on ethnocentrism varies signifi-
cantly among the years. This implies that it is rather unlikely that the other three indi-
cators will significantly influence the relationship of national economic indicators and 
ethnocentrism. The cross-level interactions tested below will show whether this is 
indeed the case.
 Table 2.5 serves to test the first hypothesis which is derived from Group Conflict 
Theory, according to which less affluent economic circumstances will lead to more 
ethnocentrism mostly among those in a low economic position. As already expected 
* This is the rounded p-value; the exact value is .1022. Therefore, the random slope of distrust is an instance of border-
line significance.
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from the insignificant random slopes, none of the four cross-level interactions are sig-
nificant, meaning that the hypotheses based on Group Conflict Theory should be 
rejected. This is also true for the alternative interpretation suggested for the contradic-
tory direct effect of unemployment rate on ethnocentrism: It is not true that higher 
unemployment rates lead to less ethnocentrism among the general population and to 
more ethnocentrism among those unemployed. Displacement of ethnic competition 
from within the working native population towards the unemployed native popula-
tion is therefore unlikely to take place and cannot serve as an alternative explanation 
for the contradictory effect of unemployment rate. 
Altogether, although my findings clearly show that national economic circum-
stances are important for explaining trends in ethnocentrism – as we have seen those 
explain more than half of the variance in ethnocentrism over the years – this influence 
cannot be understood from Group Conflict Theory’s economic logic. The hypothesis 
that less affluent economic circumstances lead to more ethnocentrism because of con-
cerns over economic resources is, therefore, not supported.
In Table 2.6 it is tested whether the importance of economic circumstances for 
ethnocentrism can be understood through a cultural logic. The second hypothesis, 
which is based on Ethnic Reification Theory, predicts that mostly among those less 
educated and with more feelings of distrust will less affluent circumstances ignite eth-
nocentric ideas. The corresponding cross-level interactions with education are shown 
in the first two models of this table, models 1a and 1b. As can be read from the table, 
the unemployment rate does not affect the relationship between education and eth-
nocentrism, whereas the cross-level interaction with GDP per capita is significant. 
Figure 2.2 is a graphical representation of this interaction effect, which facilitates its 
interpretation. It clearly shows that the difference in ethnocentrism between lowest 
and highest educated is greater at the minimum level of GDP, which is in line with the 
second hypothesis. Although some might see this finding as fitting the Group Conflict 
paradigm as well, there are two reasons to dismiss such an economic interpretation of 
this educational effect: first, as stated before, previous studies have consistently shown 
that education functions as a cultural mechanism in the context of out-group attitudes 
(cf. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Van der Waal et al. 
2010; Malhotra 2013). Second, if the economic interpretation were valid, how then 
could we explain that the other indicators for economic position, namely income and 
unemployment, do not operate in the same way? 
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Table 2.5: Multi-level regression on ethnocentrism, economic cross-level interactions
M1a M1b M2a M2b
(Constant) 1.55*** 1.55*** 1.55*** 1.55***
Income -.09*** -.08** ‘-.07*** -.07***
Unemployed (1=no, 2=yes) -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02*
Education -.47*** -.47*** -.47*** -.47***
Distrust .29*** .29*** .29*** .29***
Year variables
GDPlevel -.68*** -.68*** -.68*** -.68***
Unemployment rate -.21* -.21* -.21* -.21*
Cross-level interactions
Income*GDPlevel -.02
Income*Unemp.rate .00
Unemployed*GDPlevel .00
Unemployed*Unemp.rate .01
Control variables
Age .53*** .53*** .53*** .53***
Sex (1=male, 2=female) -.07*** -.07*** -.07*** -.07***
Variance components
Individual level (N=25,443) 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42
Year level (N=17) .08 .08 .08 .08
Slope income*10-2 .00 .00
Slope unemployed*10-2 .00 .00
-2LL 44251.25 44252.20 44252.29 44251.57
Source: General Social Survey, cumulative file 1972-2012; own calculations.
One-sided test, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 2. 6:  Multi-level regression on ethnocentrism, cultural cross-level interaction models
M1a M1b M2a M2b
(Constant) 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.55*** 1.55***
Income -.07*** -.07*** -.07*** -.07***
Unemployed (1=no, 2=yes) -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02
Education -.42*** -.47*** -.48*** -.47***
Distrust .28*** .28*** .23*** .28***
Year variables
GDPlevel -.67*** -.67*** -.67*** -.67***
Unemployment rate -.20* -.20* -.21*** -.21*
Cross-level interactions
Education*GDPlevel .11**
Education*Unemp.rate .01
Distrust*GDPlevel -.09***
Distrust*Unemp.rate -.00
Control variables
Age .52*** .53*** .53*** .53***
Sex (1=male, 2=female) -.07*** -.07*** -.07*** -.07***
Variance components
Individual level (N=25,443) 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42
Year level (N=17) .07 .07 .08 .08
Slope education*10-2 .21 .83
Slope distrust*10-2 .00 .20
-2LL 44223.46 44233.22 44234.95 44249.62
Source: General Social Survey, cumulative file 1972-2012; own calculations.
One-sided test, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Figure 2.2: Effect of GDP on ethnocentrism, minimum and maximum conditions of education
3.5
4
4.5
Figure 2.2: Effect of GDP o  ethnocentrism, ini um and maxim m 
conditions of education
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
.xamPDG.nimPDG
E
th
no
ce
nt
ri
sm
Education min.
Education max.
Figure 2.3: Effect of GDP on ethnocentrism, minimum and maximum conditions of distrust
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This latter argument could as well be used against the cultural interpretation of the 
educational effect found if distrust turns out to show different results. Models 2a and 
2b in Table 2.6 reveal that this is not the case. A significant interaction is found for 
GDP level and distrust, which is pictured in Figure 2.3. The effect of less affluent eco-
nomic circumstances (minimum level of GDP) on ethnocentrism is strongest among 
those experiencing most distrust, which also supports the second hypothesis. Similar 
to the cross-level interaction with educational level, the relationship between unem-
ployment rate and ethnocentrism does not depend on people’s amount of distrust. 
What thus becomes clear from the results presented in this last step of the analysis is 
that under harsh economic circumstances the cultural mechanisms that evoke ethno-
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centrism will be more strongly present, whereas the economic competition based 
logic can be rejected. Whereas economic circumstances do indeed serve to explain 
trends in ethnocentrism, this explanation is not economic, but cultural in nature. 
2.5 Conclusion and discussion
In this chapter the relationship between the economic situation in a country and eth-
nocentrism was studied. Even when such a relationship exists, this does not necessarily 
mean that it should be interpreted through an economic logic. In order to understand 
what such a relationship means, it has to be opened up, and the underlying theoretical 
mechanisms for such a relationship should be studied. 
Based on a longitudinal analysis for the United States, the two most relevant of such 
theoretical mechanisms were studied here: Group Conflict Theory and Ethnic Reifi-
cation Theory. The general conclusion of the results obtained is that the economy 
mainly affects ethnocentrism by activating the cultural processes that are associated 
with ethnocentric ideas. Under relatively unfortunate economic circumstances, those 
people who are less open towards cultural differences and who hold stronger feelings 
of personal distrust will translate those feelings more strongly into ethnocentric ideas 
than those who are more open towards cultural diversity and less distrusting. There-
fore, although the economic context of a country is indeed linked to ethnocentrism 
and even explains more than half of its variance over the years, this does not mean that 
this relationship can be understood though an economic rationale.
A first implication of these findings is that the basis of Group Conflict Theory is 
further eroded. As stated above, many scholars have already signaled that on the indi-
vidual level, Group Conflict Theory is rather unimportant for explaining ethnocen-
trism. The findings in this chapter show that even a relationship that might intuitively 
be seen as economic does not operate through an economic rationale. One might, 
therefore, start to wonder how it is possible that much of the research on ethnocen-
trism still ‘has remained fixated in the theoretical soil of competitive threat’ (Ceobanu 
and Escandell 2010: 310). Indeed, it can be stated that ‘the potential for cross-national 
explorations of public views towards immigrants ‘has been constrained because of (…) 
reluctant extensions of the theoretical models researchers have traditionally relied 
upon’ (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 323). Further theoretical development will be 
difficult to achieve if scholars keep relying on Group Conflict Theory as the most 
important source for understanding (fluctuations in) ethnocentrism.
Another implication of the findings presented here concerns the distinction 
between economic and cultural domains. Although in studies on ethnocentrism the 
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cultural explanation is often times presented as opposed to the economic interpreta-
tion, this does not mean that the economic and the cultural are unrelated to each 
other. As shown in this chapter, feelings of distrust do not exist in a vacuum, but can 
be more or less salient depending on economic circumstances. Therefore, by definition 
favoring economic approaches above cultural ones or vice versa can be unproductive. 
Instead, it is important to be aware of the possible dynamics between economic and 
cultural domains.
As a final remark, it is important to note that this study is an example of how for 
studying contextual influences on people’s ideas and beliefs, subjective interpretations 
of those contexts are more important than the ‘objective’ interpretations that are 
applied to contexts by scholars. We have indeed seen that contexts do not bring along 
meaning in themselves, but that their interpretations depend on the frames of inter-
pretation through which they are perceived.
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3.  Immigration and Ethnocentrism: Beyond the 
idea of ‘actual threat’17
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have seen that economic circumstances are related to eth-
nocentrism through a cultural mechanism rather than through an economic one. Peo-
ple who experience more distrust generally express more ethnocentrism in times of 
less affluent economic circumstances. This finding is supportive of the idea that instead 
of functioning as an ‘actual threat’ that invokes a direct reaction aimed at protecting 
people’s economic interests, a certain context will be viewed according to people’s 
frames of interpretation. The present chapter builds upon this idea for studying how 
the share of immigrants in a country is related to ethnocentric ideas.
The relationship between immigration context and ethnocentrism has been widely 
studied in recent years, which is not surprising given the increase in immigration to 
Western countries over the past few decades (e.g. Davidov et al. 2008; Hainmueller 
and Hiscox 2007; Castels and Miller 2003). The focus of such studies can be mainly 
located within the Group Conflict perspective. Even though originally this Group 
Conflict perspective led to the prediction that immigration will cause people to expe-
rience a threat to their economic resources (e.g. Quillian 1995; Semyonov et al. 2006; 
Scheepers et al. 2002; Kunovich 2002), nowadays many studies acknowledge that 
immigration can also be seen as a cultural threat and will therefore be positively related 
to ethnocentrism (e.g. Coenders et al. 2008b; Scheepers et al. 2002).
At first sight, this two-sided approach to studying the relationship between immi-
gration context and ethnocentrism seems to match the previous chapter’s approach, in 
which the economic explanation of Group Conflict Theory was compared with the 
Ethnic Reification explanation. However, a closer look at the studies that distinguish 
between economic and cultural explanations for the relationship between immigra-
tion context and ethnocentrism reveals an important problem: by generally defining it 
in terms of ‘actual economic’ and ‘actual cultural threat’, the share of immigrants in a 
country is many times treated as an objective source of ethnocentrism. Possibly as a 
consequence of the former, knowledge of the individual-level mechanisms that should 
serve to further understand the relationship between immigration and ethnocentrism 
is limited. Although Group Conflict Theory does offer an account of the economic 
52
mechanisms that can be expected to play a role, one can doubt whether these mecha-
nisms are indeed ‘economic’, as suggested by the previous chapter as well as by numer-
ous other studies (see Malhotra et al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmuel-
ler and Hopkins 2014; Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade and 
Calhoun 1993; Van der Waal and Houtman 2011). Following Ethnic Reification The-
ory offers a way of studying the cultural mechanism as well.
This chapter therefore studies how immigration contexts can be linked to ethno-
centrism, and for whom this is mainly the case. In the following, I will first elaborate 
upon the conceptualization of the share of immigrants in a country and how this is 
thought to be linked to ethnocentrism. Next, I will explain which individual-level 
mechanisms might be involved in people’s evaluation of immigration contexts. These 
two elements come together when formulating hypotheses on how immigration con-
texts are linked to ethnocentrism and how this can be understood through Group 
Conflict Theory and Ethnic Reification Theory respectively. The hypotheses derived 
from these interpretations are tested using comparative data for 18 European coun-
tries. Altogether, this should result in greater insight into the way in which immigra-
tion contexts are related to ethnocentric ideas. 
3.2 Economic and cultural forms of ‘actual ethnic threat’
In studies on ethnocentrism it is generally acknowledged that negative ideas about 
ethnic minorities tend to be based on two types of concerns: economic interest-based 
and identity-based. These are characterized by the fear of losing material resources and 
the fear of losing cultural resources respectively. Despite widespread agreement on the 
existence of both forms of concern (Sides and Citrin 2007; Semyonov, Raijman and 
Gorodzeisky 2006), this distinction often remains implicit when dealing with the 
concept of ‘actual ethnic threat’ which is claimed to be formed by the share of immi-
grants in a country. Hence, its conceptualization is usually limited to the percentage of 
non-EU citizens in a country (e.g. Quillian 1995; cf. Schneider 2008). This is prob-
lematic, as Schneider (2008) states, since such a conceptualization represents a cultur-
ally different out-group and not an out-group that might invoke fears of losing mate-
rial resources. 
To do justice to both economic and cultural concerns as a consequence of the share 
of immigrants in a country, Schneider suggests a conceptualization that allows for 
distinguishing between ‘actual economic threat’ and ‘actual cultural threat’. Applying 
this conceptual distinction, Schneider (2008) has found that the size of the economi-
cally threatening out-group is not related to greater perceptions of ethnic threat. Such 
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perceptions of ethnic threat are rather related to the size of the culturally different 
out-group. Therefore, Schneider concludes that identity-based questions are more 
important for ethnocentrism than economic interest-based questions.
Although this more precise conceptualization of the share of immigrants in a coun-
try is already a step forward compared to previous research, an additional step is needed 
when attempting to understand how people make sense of immigration contexts. A 
closer look at the way in which the share of immigrants is conceptualized, namely as 
an ‘actual economic threat’ or an ‘actual cultural threat’, reveals that scholars dealing 
with such concepts somehow assume that these can be ‘objectively’ found in social 
reality, and as such follow a positivist logic. As for Group Conflict Theory, such a 
positivist logic is basically intertwined in the theory’s very logic. This is especially true 
for realistic group threat theory, which, as we have seen before, argues that ethnocen-
trism is rooted in objective sources of economic threat (e.g. Hjerm and Nagayoshi 
2011; Coenders et al. 2008; Blalock 1967; Levine and Campbell 1972). But it also 
applies to the economic approach in general. Hainmueller and Hiscox for example 
argue that an economic explanation for ethnocentrism is unlikely because there is 
almost no real economic impact of immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). In 
other words, it is not all that important if people themselves think that a greater share 
of immigrants in a country might affect the economy; what is thought to count most 
is whether there actually is a real, ‘hard’ effect of immigration on the economy.
In the literature on cultural threat some examples of assuming ‘objective’ cultural 
threat can be found as well. In a well-cited study by Sniderman et al. (2004) they dis-
tinguish between galvanizing and mobilizing effects of situational triggers, of which 
the share of immigrants in a country is an example. Whereas in galvanizing effects 
situational triggers mostly affect those already concerned about an issue, in mobilizing 
effects a situational trigger ‘may mobilize citizens whether or not they were already 
disposed to be concerned about the problem’ (Sniderman et al. 2004: 36). Applied to 
issues concerning immigration, they then argue that a mobilizing effect of situational 
triggers is more likely than a galvanizing effect, both for concerns about the economy 
and about the national culture (Sniderman et al. 2004: 36). This argument is actually 
quite similar to the logic of realistic group conflict theory, according to which objec-
tive sources may invoke ethnocentrism even among those individuals who are not 
predisposed to hold such negative ideas about ethnic minorities (cf. Hjerm and Nagay-
oshi 2011). The closing of their article furthermore suggests that Sniderman et al. 
adhere to an essentialist logic. Sniderman et al. argue that the findings in their study 
‘point to the possibility that the strains over immigration in Western European democ-
racies are rooted in a genuine conflict of values’ (Sniderman et al. 2004: 47). Talking 
about a ‘genuine conflict of values’ suggests there is also such a thing as a false conflict 
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of values. Such a distinction would only be made when believing in a ‘real’ reality that 
goes beyond people’s interpretation of the reality.
In sum, research that has studied the relationship between the share of immigrants 
in a country and ethnocentrism seems, in more explicit or more subtle ways, to be 
drenched with the idea that immigration contexts can somehow be objectively linked 
to ideas about ethnic minorities. Such an approach might also explain the number of 
studies that have only studied direct effects of the share of immigrants in a country on 
ethnocentrism (e.g. Schneider 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 1998, 2008a). By con-
trast, one of the two elements that underlines Ethnic Reification Theory and that 
forms the basic focus in this chapter is that contexts can only acquire meaning through 
people’s subjective interpretations. As such, what is needed to gain further understand-
ing about the relationship between the share of immigrants in a country and ethno-
centrism is to study the frames of interpretation that are salient for the issue at hand. 
In the following, I will therefore elaborate upon the individual processes that are likely 
to be important for the interpretation of immigration contexts. 
3.3 Economic and cultural explanations for ethnocentrism
As in the previous chapter, the two individual-level mechanisms that are studied to 
further understand the relationship between a context characteristic and ethnocen-
trism are based on Group Conflict Theory and Ethnic Reification Theory respectively. 
Whereas the former holds that the evaluative consequences of the share of immigrants 
in a country on ideas about ethnic minorities will be based on economic interests, 
according to the latter this will be based on cultural interests. Both interpretations are 
elaborated below.
3.3.1 The Group Conflict approach
As stated in the previous chapter, Group Conflict Theory explains ethnocentric ideas 
following an economic logic. As such, negative ideas about ethnic minorities will be 
rooted in the fear of losing economic resources which can be present in a self-interest-
based form, as well as on a form based on the economic interests of the social group 
with which one identifies. The core idea is that ‘competition for resources leads to 
attempts at exclusion of one group by another’ (Olzak 1992: 163). This competition 
will be strongest among people with a similar socio-economic position as ethnic 
minorities, the latter mostly having weak or very weak socio-economic positions and 
55
being generally less educated (Coenders 2001; Scheepers et al. 2002). Therefore, eth-
nocentrism will be mostly found among individuals in a low economic position.
 A general – although not often studied - assumption within Group Conflict The-
ory is that authoritarianism intervenes in the relationship between natives’ socio-eco-
nomic position and their stance toward ethnic minorities. Research has indeed shown 
that authoritarianism is strongly and positively related to negative feelings regarding 
ethnic minorities (Grabb 1979; Felling, Peters and Scheepers 1986). The idea that 
authoritarianism mediates the relationship between economic position and ethnocen-
trism resonates with Lipset’s idea of working class authoritarianism (Lipset 1959). 
Hence, Lipset has already argued that the working class is characterized by authoritar-
ian ideas because of their weak labor market position. However, as Eisinga and Scheep-
ers (1989: 65) state, belonging to a certain social class does not directly lead to the 
formation of authoritarian attitudes. Authoritarianism is rather invoked by feelings of 
status fear and status frustration (see Feldman and Stenner 1997; Scheepers, Felling and 
Peters 1990) and will thus mainly rise out of dissatisfaction with precarious circum-
stances, and out of fear that those will further deteriorate as a consequence of immi-
gration (Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim 2004; Tolsma, Lubbers and Coenders 2008). It is 
therefore suggested that individuals in precarious economic positions are more 
authoritarian because of their economic position and that this authoritarianism is 
translated in a negative stance toward ethnic minorities. 
 Thus, following an economic logic, Group Conflict Theory predicts that the inter-
pretation of the share of immigrants in a country depends on economic interests. This 
interpretation will be such that mostly people in a low economic position and with 
authoritarian conceptions will perceive a greater presence of immigrants as an eco-
nomic threat. Therefore, a greater share of immigrants in a country will be related to 
more ethnocentrism for those in a weak economic position with significant authori-
tarian ideas.
3.3.2 The Ethnic Reification approach
Next to this economic explanation, it can also be argued that the share of immigrants 
will be interpreted through people’s cultural values as predicted by Ethnic Reification 
Theory. The most important evidence for such a cultural interpretation can, as we 
have previously seen, be found in the negative relationship between education and 
ethnocentrism. As was also discussed in the previous chapter, this relationship is often 
used as supporting evidence for Group Conflict Theory. However, as stated by Hain-
mueller and Hiscox (2007), ‘contrary to the conventional wisdom, the connection 
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between the educational (…) attributes of individuals and their views about immigra-
tion appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labor-market com-
petition’ (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007: 401). Instead, educational level is positively 
related to ethnic tolerance and a preference for cultural diversity (e.g. Hainmueller and 
Hiscox 2007; Citrin et al. 1997; Fetzer 2000; Van der Waal et al. 2010). This idea was 
further elaborated within the framework of Ethnic Reification theory, resulting in the 
claim that less educated people will be more inclined to hold ethnocentric ideas due 
to their ethnic reified worldview. Following this argument, we can not only under-
stand why education would be related to a greater preference for cultural differences 
and therefore a more positive stance towards ethnic minorities, but also why it serves 
to further define who might be inclined to hold ethnocentric ideas and for whom this 
may be less plausible.
Such further refinement can be obtained by focusing on the concepts of distrust 
and authoritarianism. Concerning the first, it is likely that people who experience 
distrust will be more reluctant towards cultural differences, since they place an even 
greater burden on the number of cultural expressions such people have to deal with. 
This idea is supported by previous research which has shown that distrust is indeed 
positively related to authoritarianism and cultural intolerance (Achterberg and Hout-
man 2009; Blank 2003; Derks 2006; Eisinga and Scheepers 1989; Elchardus and Smits 
2002; McDill 1961; Roberts and Rokeach 1956; Srole 1956). As for the second, even 
though according to Group Conflict Theory authoritarianism is seen to be rooted in 
a weak economic position, another interpretation is that authoritarian conceptions are 
rooted in a weak cultural position. As such, authoritarian ideas can be expected among 
individuals who have relatively little cultural capital, of which education forms an 
important part, at their disposal. Hence, characterized by difficulties with managing 
cultural differences, these individuals are likely to favor clear rules and orders and to 
oppose cultural differences, which is what authoritarian values stand for. Supportive of 
this interpretation, previous research has shown that authoritarianism is related to a 
person’s educational level, representing institutionalized cultural capital (Stubager 
2009), and to an individual’s amount of cultural participation, which stands for embod-
ied cultural capital (Houtman 2003a; Achterberg and Houtman 2006). 
To sum up, according to Ethnic Reification Theory ethnocentrism will be mainly 
found among less educated people without cultural capital as a consequence of an 
ethnic reified worldview, which is accompanied by a stronger inclination towards dis-
trust and authoritarianism. Applied to the evaluative consequences of the share of 
immigrants in a country on ideas about ethnic minorities, it can therefore be expected 
that this will mostly lead to more ethnocentrism for less educated people with more 
authoritarian conceptions and who are culturally insecure. 
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3.4  Economic and cultural interpretations for the 
relationship between share of immigrants and 
ethnocentrism
The two above named individual-level explanations for ethnocentrism suggest that 
the share of immigrants in a country will not influence in the same way the opinions 
of all people about ethnic minorities. The relationship between immigration context 
and ethnocentrism is expected to depend on people’s economic interests and on their 
cultural values which serve as the frames through which immigration contexts are 
interpreted.
Following the individual-level explanation of Group Conflict Theory for ethno-
centrism, primarily people with a weak economic position and with ample authori-
tarian conceptions should view the presence of immigrants as a threat to their socio-
economic positions. However, this should only be the case when it concerns immi-
grants that can be considered a threat to scarce economic resources. Therefore, mainly 
low-skilled immigrants should be considered a potential economic threat, which, fol-
lowing Schneider’s conceptualization, should be the percentage of less educated immi-
grants in a country. Similar to the case of deteriorated economic circumstances 
described in the previous chapter, a relatively high share of less educated immigrants 
in a country would intensify competition for economic resources among people with 
a weak economic position and with ample authoritarian conceptions.18 Therefore, I 
hypothesize that people in a weak economic position, namely with a low income, a 
weak labor market position, and a high level of authoritarianism, will hold more eth-
nocentric ideas (hypothesis 1). Furthermore, it is expected that a greater percentage of 
less educated immigrants will lead to more ethnocentrism among those in a weak 
economic position and with ample authoritarian conceptions (hypothesis 2). Techni-
cally speaking, I thus expect that the relationship between economic position and 
authoritarianism with ethnocentrism will be stronger when the share of less educated 
immigrants in a country is higher.
 Arguing along the lines of Ethnic Reification Theory, it can be expected that 
mainly individuals in a weak cultural position19, with ample authoritarian conceptions 
and experiencing more distrust will equate a greater share of immigrants in a country 
with more ethnocentric ideas. This will be mostly true for the percentage of non-
Western immigrants in a country, since non-Western immigrants can arguably be seen 
as more culturally different from natives in Western countries than Western immi-
grants are. Hence, a greater share of non-Western immigrants supposes a larger input 
of different cultures within society, which can be expected to invoke resistance towards 
ethnic minorities among those in a weak cultural position, with ample authoritarian 
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conceptions and distrust. As a consequence, I hypothesize that people in a weak cul-
tural position, namely with a low educational level and a low occupational educational 
level, and with high levels of authoritarianism, and high levels of distrust, will show 
greater amounts of ethnocentrism (hypothesis 3). Furthermore, it is expected that a 
greater percentage of non-Western immigrants will lead to more ethnocentrism 
among those less educated, with a low occupational educational level, with ample 
authoritarian conceptions and with high levels of distrust (hypothesis 4). Technically 
speaking, I thus expect that the relationship between cultural position and cultural 
values will be stronger when the share of non-Western immigrants in a country is 
higher.
3.5 Data and Operationalization
3.5.1 Data
The data used for the analyses are taken from the first wave of the European Social 
Survey (Jowell et al. 2003). Due to extensive use in studies in the field of interethnic 
relations, it has been shown that these data are of high quality (e.g. Meuleman 2009). 
The database is composed of survey data from 21 European countries and Israel. Four 
countries are dropped because of lacking relevant data. The remaining 18 countries 
used are: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. A total of 30,949 respondents completed the 
questionnaire in those countries20. The ESS 2002 sample is complemented with con-
textual data from Schneider (2008) based on the OECD database on immigrants and 
expatriates (2005), and own calculations based on this same database. 
3.5.2 Operationalization
The dependent variable ethnocentrism21 is measured using six items in which respond-
ents are asked if: immigrants take away jobs or rather create new jobs (1); immigrants use more 
taxes than they contribute (2); immigration is good or bad for the economy (3); the country’s 
cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants (4); immigrants make the country a worse 
or better place to live (5); and if immigrants make the country’s crime problems worse or better 
(6) . A factor analysis on those six items is shown in Table 3.1. While one might argue 
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that those items actually include perceptions of both economic (items 1, 2 and 3) and 
cultural threat from immigrants (items 4 and 5), the results of the factor analysis show 
that both forms of threat are part of one underlying construct. As such, in people’s 
ideas about ethnic minorities, there is no clear distinction between an economic and 
a cultural dimension of ethnocentrism. If people are inclined to say that immigrants 
are a threat for the nation’s economy, they will also be inclined to state that immigrants 
pose a threat to the nation’s cultural identity and vice versa. One way of interpreting 
this finding is that economic and cultural threat usually go hand in hand and are there-
fore found to tap into one underlying dimension. Another interpretation is that indi-
viduals themselves do not differentiate between both forms of threat in their judgment 
about ethnic minorities. To put it bluntly, they either like ‘them’ and therefore do not 
have any clearly negative thoughts about ethnic minorities, or they do not like ‘them’ 
and are willing to relate ethnic minorities to all sorts of negative judgments.  
Given the results of the factor analysis discussed above, it may come as no surprise 
that the six items produce a highly reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.84). The scores 
for this scale of ethnocentrism are calculated as the mean score on those items. Scale 
scores are calculated for each respondent with at least three valid answers; a higher 
score stands for a greater amount of perceived ethnic threat.
Table 3.1: Principal factor analysis on items for ethnocentrism
Item Factor score
1. Immigrants take away jobs or rather create new jobs .64
2. Immigrants use more taxes than they contribute .63
3. Immigration is good or bad for the economy .78
4. The country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants .72
5. Immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live .78
6. Immigrants make the country’s crime problems worse .56
Eigenvalue 3.37
R2 56.10
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations.
Income is measured as the net household income per month. Using a show card, 
respondents could indicate to which category their net household income belongs. 
Differing answer categories have been used for income in France, Hungary and Ire-
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land. All categories have therefore been replaced by their median, such that an approx-
imate monthly net household income of €500 to under €1,000 now corresponds to 
the value of €750, an income of €1,000 to under €1,500 to the value of €1,250, etc.  
Labor market position is measured as a dichotomous variable that distinguishes 
between those currently unemployed and all other respondents. This is because fol-
lowing Group Conflict Theory mainly unemployed people who are actively looking 
for a job will feel threatened by a greater share of immigrants in a country who can 
be considered a competitive threat in their job search.22
Educational level is measured in two ways. First, a straightforward measurement of 
educational level as the number of years of full-time school attendance is used. All 
scores above 28 years have been set to 28, which is a reasonable amount of time in 
which to have reached the highest educational level available.  
The second way of measuring educational level is through an individual’s occupa-
tional educational level, which does not measure formal education, but ‘on the job train-
ing,’23 and can be seen as a more refined measurement of educational level. It is meas-
ured as a combination of the ISCO-88 occupational groups and the years of full-time 
education attended (cf. De Graaf and Kalmijn 1995, 2001; Kalmijn 1994). The occu-
pational groups have been reduced to the two-digit level. For each group then, the 
average years of full-time school attendance is calculated. A score of 10 on this variable 
for occupational educational level thus corresponds to an average of ten years of full-
time schooling within the occupational category a respondent belongs to.   
 Authoritarianism is measured using the following six items: ‘it is important to do 
what you are told and to follow the rules’ (1); ‘it is important to be humble and mod-
est (2); ‘it is important to have a strong government that ensures safety’ (3); ‘it is impor-
tant to live in a safe environment’ (4); ‘it is important to behave properly’ (5); ‘it is 
important to follow traditions and habits’ (6). On all items, respondents indicated to 
what extent they find those applicable to themselves using a range from ‘not at all 
applicable’ (score 1) to ‘very much applicable’ (score 6). The items form a reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s alpha is 0.80), the scores of which are calculated by taking the mean 
scores on all items for every respondent with at least four valid scores. The scale ranges 
from one to six, a higher score standing for a greater amount of authoritarianism.
Distrust is measured as in the previous chapter by using the following three items: 
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking 
out for themselves? (1); Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got 
a chance, or would they try to be fair? (2); Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? (3). As in the previous 
chapter, factor analysis has shown that those three items tap into one dimension. Reli-
ability analysis has shown those to form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha is .78). Scale 
61
scores are calculated as the mean score on the items for each respondent with at least 
two valid scores.
Table 3.2: Principal factor analysis on items for authoritarianism
Item Factor score
1. It is important to do what you are told and follow the rules .54
2. It is important to be humble and modest .46
3. It is important to have a strong government that ensures safety .62
4. It is important to live in a safe environment .61
5. It is important to behave properly .68
6. It is important to follow traditions and habits .51
Eigenvalue 2.64
R2 44.07
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations.
On the individual level we control for age (in years, ranging from 14 to 102), and gen-
der (man=0, woman=1) as previous research has shown those variables to be important 
for the way people think about ethnic minorities (Coenders 2001; Quillian 1995; 
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009).24 
For the measurement of the share of less educated immigrants25 I have used Schneider’s 
percentage less educated immigrants. This is measured as the percentage foreign born with 
a low educational level. A low educational level is defined as having completed sec-
ondary education or less (ISCED levels 0, 1 and 2, cf. Schneider 2008). 
 The measurement for the share of non-Western immigrants is also Schneider’s original 
measurement, the percentage non-Western immigrants in a country, which is the percent-
age non-Western, foreign-born inhabitants26. Western countries are: the EU-15, the 
EFTA-countries, Europe’s microstates, North America, Australia and New Zealand. 
This measurement is based on the same OECD database (2005). 
As a control variable on the country-level I have used the real Gross Domestic Product 
per capita (rGDP/c) in thousand constant international US dollars (referred to the year 
2000 exchange rate). This is taken from Schneider (2008) and represents a harmonized 
version of the GDP, calculated by using purchasing power parities and weights for the 
population size, thus ensuring international comparability. 
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3.6 Results 
The central point in this chapter is to investigate whether the share of immigrants in 
a country, interpreted through economic interests or cultural values, influences the 
amount of ethnocentrism people experience. Answering this research question requires 
solving a multi-level problem, which is analyzed using multi-level analysis tools27. For 
reasons of clarity only relevant results are shown.28 All predictors and control variables 
have been standardized, allowing for comparison of the coefficients within a model in 
terms of their respective strength.29
3.6.1 The roots of authoritarianism and distrust
Since Group Conflict Theory and Ethnic Reification Theory both hypothesize a 
positive relationship between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism and consider 
this as an interpretative frame for the share of immigrants in a country, in a first step 
it is tested whether authoritarianism is rooted in a weak economic or a weak cul-
tural position. The results for this test are presented in Table 3.3. In the first model 
the variables for economic position are included. Both income and being unem-
ployed are significantly related to authoritarianism. Whereas the income effect is in 
the right direction – the higher one’s family income the less authoritarianism – the 
effect of unemployment is contrary to what is expected in Group Conflict Theory 
– those unemployed have less instead of more authoritarian conceptions. 
In the second model authoritarianism is explained from a weak cultural position. 
Both educational level and occupational educational level are significantly related 
to authoritarianism, the direction of both effects being in line with the expecta-
tions. The model fit of this model is significantly better than the first model (chi-
square value is 220.28, p<.001), which implies that one’s cultural position is more 
important for authoritarianism than one’s economic position. One might find this 
conclusion unconvincing since education is known to serve as an indicator for 
economic position as well. The third model serves to shed further light on this mat-
ter. If the educational effect functions mostly as an economic indicator, it should be 
true that its effect will be minimized when including other more direct indicators 
for economic position. However, model three shows that this is only slightly the 
case, thus implying that education functions mainly as a cultural indicator here. 
Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that authoritarianism is more strongly rooted 
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in a weak cultural position than in a weak economic position, which is in line with 
previous research on this matter (cf. Houtman 2003a).
Table 3.3 Multi-level regression analysis on authoritarianism, standardized regression coefficients
M1 M2 M3
(Constant) 4.21*** 4.20*** 4.20***
Income -.09*** -.05***
Unemployed -.02** -.02***
Education (in years) -.10*** -.09***
Occupational educational level -.04*** -.03***
Control variables
Age (in years) .23*** .21*** .20***
Sex (male is reference) .01** .02** .01**
Variance Components
Individual (N=20,532) .63 .62 .62
Country (N=18) .07 .08 .07
-2LL 48765.35 48545.07 48475.55
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations.
**p<.01; ***p<.001
For completeness, a similar analysis is done for distrust, the results of which are shown 
in Table 3.4. Whereas both economic and cultural indicators are related to distrust, the 
effects of the cultural indicators are clearly stronger, thus suggesting that distrust is 
mainly rooted in a weak cultural position.
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Table 3.4 Multi-level regression analysis on distrust, standardized regression coefficients shown
M1 M2 M3
(Constant) 4.73*** 4.72*** 4.72***
Income -.15*** -.06***
Unemployed .07*** .06***
Education -.18*** -.16***
Occupational educational level -.15*** -.13***
Control variables
Age (in years) -.07*** -.13*** -.13***
Sex (male is reference) -.06*** -.05*** -.06***
Variance Components
Individual (N=20,532) 2.87 2.83 2.82
Country (N=18) .81 .79 .75
-2LL 80041.45 79720.70 79672.04
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations.
***p<.001
3.6.2 Economic and cultural explanations for ethnocentrism
Table 3.5 shows the results for testing the individual-level explanations for ethnocen-
trism30. The first model only includes a random intercept and serves to show that we do 
indeed face a multi-level problem (11 percent of the total variation in ethnocentrism 
can be attributed to differences between countries). The first hypothesis derived from 
Group Conflict Theory is that ethnocentrism can be explained from a weak economic 
position and high authoritarian conceptions. Whereas the latter was shown to extent 
economically rooted only to a small extent, model 2 in which only the economic indi-
cators are included suggests that at least for a person’s economic position this hypoth-
esis is quite strongly supported. However, after including the other indicators in model 
5, the effects of economic indicators remain rather weak compared to the other explan-
atory variables. So, yes, a weaker economic position is related to more ethnocentrism; 
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however, the relevance of this relationship is relatively small, which is in line with previ-
ous research findings (e,g, Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). 
The results show that the Ethnic Reification hypothesis which predicts that ethno-
centrism can be explained from a low educational level, a low occupational educa-
tional level, high authoritarian conceptions and high amounts of distrust is quite 
strongly supported. All four relevant indicators are significantly related to ethnocen-
trism and all directed as expected. The effects found are rather strong, the strongest 
being distrust, followed by authoritarianism and educational level. Those findings are 
supportive of an Ethnic Reification explanation for ethnocentrism. As such, negative 
ideas about ethnic minorities are mainly rooted in reluctance towards cultural differ-
ences. 
Table 3.5: Multi-level regression on ethnocentrism, individual level models
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
(Constant) 5.52*** 5.51*** 5.49*** 5.50*** 5.48***
Income -.20*** -.04**
Unemployed .06*** .03**
Education (in years) -.35*** -.28***
Occupational educational level -.18*** -.13***
Authoritarianism .26*** .21***
Distrust .49*** .43***
Control variables
Age (in years) .11*** .01 .08*** -.01
Sex (male is reference) .01 .02* .03** .02*
Variance Components
Individual (N=20,532) 2.42 2.37 2.22 2.16 2.05
Country (N=18) .30 .24 .30 .12 .18
-2LL 76527.59 76062.09 74756.92 74184.42 73063.98
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations.
 One-sided test, *p<.05, **p<.01; ***p<.001
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3.6.3 The share of less educated and non-Western immigrants
What should now be tested is whether these economic and cultural effects on ethno-
centrism condition the interpretation of the share of immigrants in a country. Before 
turning to the corresponding cross-level interaction hypotheses, the direct effects of 
the country-level variables are calculated in model 1 of Table 3.6. None of these direct 
effects is significant. However, this does not mean that the share of immigrants in a 
country is unrelated to ethnocentrism. Since we have conditional hypotheses, it is not 
until we test the cross-level interactions with both measurements of immigration con-
text that we can assess its influence. Before doing so, we must test separately for all 
individual-level whether the effects of these vary over countries. The corresponding 
results can be found in Table 3.7. The change of the goodness of fit measurement 
when comparing model 1 of Table 3.6 with each of the random slope models shows 
that for all the individual-level predictors the relationship with ethnocentrism varies 
among countries. However, this is stronger for education, occupational educational 
level, authoritarianism and distrust than it is for income and unemployment. For the 
latter, it is interesting to note that in the previous chapter, the effect of unemployment 
on ethnocentrism did not vary across contexts, whereas here it does vary significantly. 
This might be due to the fact that chapter two concerned a comparison over time 
within the same country, whereas this chapter studies differences between countries at 
the same point in time. It is plausible that unemployment regimes vary more between 
countries than within countries over time, which might explain this difference in 
findings between the two chapters.
Having assessed the random slope variances, we can turn to the cross-level interac-
tions, which in the end form the core part of this analysis. Only significant interactions 
are shown, namely in models 2a to 2c in Table 3.6. None of the strictly economic 
interactions, namely the percentage of less educated immigrants with income and 
with unemployment, yielded significant results. Together with the previous finding 
that authoritarianism and education function as cultural rather than economic indica-
tors in this context, this means that hypothesis 2 should be refuted. The Group Con-
flict logic according to which a greater share of economically threatening immigrants 
should lead to greater perceptions of ethnic threat among those in a weak economic 
position is therefore not corroborated. Apparently, people do not place emphasis on a 
country’s immigration context in terms of potential economic loss. 
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Table 3.6: Multi-level regression on ethnocentrism, cross-level interaction models
M1 M2a M2b M2c
(Constant) 5.48*** 5.49*** 5.49*** 5.49***
Individual level variables
Income -.04** -.04** -.04** -.04**
Unemployed .03** .03** .03** .03**
Education (in years) -.28*** -.28*** -.28*** -.28***
Occupational educational level -.13*** -.13*** -.13*** -.13***
Authoritarianism .21*** .20*** .20*** .20***
Distrust .43*** .42*** .42*** .42***
National level variables
% Less educated -.10 -.09 -.09 -.09
% Non-Western .12 .11 .11 .11
Cross-level interactions
Authoritarianism*%less educated .05* .00
Authoritarianism*%non-Western .07** .06*
Control variables
Age (in years) -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01
Sex (male is reference) .02* .02** .03** .03**
GDP per capita .04 .02 .03 .02
Variance Components
Individual (N=20,532) 2.05 2.04 2.04 2.04
Country (N=18) .17 .17 .17 .17
Slope authoritarianism*10-2 .68 .54 .54
-2LL 73063.39 73007.85 73004.87 73004.86
Source: European Social Survey 2002, Schneider 2008, OECD 2005; own calculations.
 One-sided test, *p<.05, **p<.01; ***p<.001
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What I did find was support for a cultural interpretation of the relationship between 
immigration and perceived ethnic threat. Models 2a to 2c show the significant cross-
level interactions for authoritarianism that were found. Initially, a significant cross-
level interaction with authoritarianism was found both for the percentage of less edu-
cated immigrants and for the percentage of non-Western immigrants. However, when 
including both cross-level interactions in model 2c, only the one with the percentage 
of non-Western immigrants remained significant. Furthermore, the model fits of the 
cross-level interaction models indicate that model 2b should be the preferred model. 
This serves to further underline that mainly the share of non-Western immigrants will 
be interpreted through a cultural frame, which supports hypothesis four. 
Figure 3.1:  Effect of % non-Western immigrants on ethnocentrism, minimum and maximum 
conditions of authoritarianism
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A clearer picture of the significant cross-level interaction arises by using a graphical 
representation, which is shown in Figure 3.1. This figure shows that whereas for those 
highest in authoritarianism, a greater presence of non-Western immigrants is related 
to more ethnocentrism, the opposite is true for those lowest in authoritarianism. It 
thus becomes clear that the evaluative consequences of the share of immigrants in a 
country depend on people’s cultural values: People who are uncomfortable with cul-
tural differences will have stronger ethnocentric ideas the greater the percentage of 
culturally different immigrants in a country. The opposite is true for those who favor 
cultural differences; for them a greater presence of culturally different people in a 
country leads to less ethnocentrism. Given that a greater presence of culturally differ-
ent people in a country generally leads to increased possibilities of interethnic contact 
(see Meuleman 2009; Schlueter and Wagner 2008; Della Posta 2013; Laurence 2013; 
Bowyer 2009), it is unclear how this finding should be interpreted from a Contact 
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Theory perspective. Contact Theory assumes that interethnic contact will have a uni-
versal prejudice-reducing effect on ethnocentrism; however, the finding that the rela-
tionship between the share of immigrants in a country and ethnocentrism depends on 
people’s ideas about cultural differences suggests something else is going on here.
Table 3.7: Model fit overview random slope and cross-level interaction models
-2LL ∆-2LL d.f.=∆m p
M1: individual and national fixed effects 73063.39 - - -
M1a: M1 + slope income 73056.40 6.99 1 .05
M1b: M1 + slope unemployed 73058.79 4.60 1 .05
M1c: M1 + slope education 72984.18 79.21 1 .001
M1d: M1 + slope occupational educational level 72992.43 70.96 1 .001
M1e: M1 + slope authoritarianism 73012.84 50.55 1 .001
M1f: M1 + slope distrust 73048.03 15.36 1 .001
M2a: M1 + authoritarianism*%less educated 73007.85 55.54 2 .001
M2b: M1 + authoritarianism*%non-Western 73004.87 58.52 2 .001
M2c: M1 + significant interactions 73004.86 58.53 3 .001
Source: European Social Survey 2002, Schneider 2008, OECD 2005; own calculations. N=20,548, 18 countries
-2LL=-2*loglikelihood; m=number of estimated parameters
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter studied to what extent the share of immigrants in a country influences 
ethnocentrism and how this can be explained following an economic and a cultural 
logic. To this end, Schneider’s (2008) distinction between the share of immigrants that 
may be seen as a burden to economic resources and the share of immigrants that is 
culturally different was applied. This was taken one step further by arguing that what 
is to be studied is not so much whether a certain immigration context can be seen as 
an ‘objective’ source of ethnocentrism, but rather that it is more insightful to study 
which frames of interpretation are used to make sense of immigration contexts. To this 
end it was tested whether a country’s immigration context is interpreted from an eco-
nomic interests perspective or according to people’s cultural values, derived from a 
Group Conflict rationale and an Ethnic Reification explanation respectively. 
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The findings indicate that one’s stance towards cultural differences is important for 
the interpretation of immigration contexts. The greater the presence of culturally dif-
ferent immigrants, the more ethnocentrism will be found among those with negative 
attitudes toward cultural differences as compared to less ethnocentrism among those 
in favor of cultural differences. This is roughly in line with earlier findings by Stenner 
(2005) showing that menaces to social cohesion are associated with greater intolerance 
among authoritarians and with greater tolerance among libertarians. Moreover, on a 
more general note, it can be concluded that instead of attempting to ‘objectively’ assess 
immigration contexts in terms of ‘actual economic threat’ and ‘actual cultural threat’, 
it is more fruitful to consider the ways in which immigration contexts are interpreted 
through the relevant frames of interpretation.
An implication of this chapter’s findings is that immigrants do not function as an 
economic threat. No direct effect of the percentage of less educated immigrants on 
ethnocentrism was found, which excludes the possibility of an economic interpreta-
tion of ethnocentrism following a collective economic interests rationale. Further-
more, personal economic interest also did not appear to function as a condition under 
which the share of immigrants in a country is interpreted. Combined with the fact 
that economic indicators on the individual level were of relatively small importance 
for explaining ethnocentric ideas, this study is another example of the relative unim-
portance of Group Conflict Theory for explaining ethnocentrism. As such, recalling 
the interpretation of the factor analysis for the items of ethnocentrism, which include 
both economically and culturally characterized items, it does not appear to be true 
that economic and cultural threat go hand in hand. Since no strong influence whatso-
ever of economic interests on ethnocentrism was found, it seems more plausible that 
individuals do not really differentiate between economically and culturally based ideas 
about ethnic minorities. People’s stance towards ethnic minorities seems to be mostly 
defined by their perception of culture and their ideas about cultural differences.
Another implication of this chapter’s findings concerns the role of interethnic con-
tact within the explanatory framework for the consequences of immigration on per-
ceptions of ethnic threat. As the share of immigrants is positively related to possibilities 
of intergroup contact (see Meuleman 2009; Schlueter and Wagner 2008; Della Posta 
2013; Laurence 2013; Bowyer 2009), a greater share of immigrants in a country should 
be related to lower perceptions of ethnic threat according to a straightforward inter-
pretation of Contact Theory. Hence, the original contact hypothesis predicts that 
interethnic contact will ultimately result in the tempering of ethnocentric reactions 
(Allport 1979[1954]; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Although some research findings 
support such an individual contact effect, this is not unequivocally accompanied by 
lower averages of perceived ethnic threat, or other measurements related to ethnocen-
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trism, on the country level (McLaren 2003; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). The effect 
of interethnic contact on people’s opinion about ethnic minorities might thus differ 
along social groups. Based on this study’s research findings one can tentatively suggest 
that this might be explained through the cultural predispositions individuals hold. This 
issue will be studied in further detail in the two chapters to come.
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4.  Why There is Less Supportive Evidence for 
Contact Theory Than They Say There Is
4.1 Introduction
The two previous chapters have been dedicated to studying how economic contexts 
and immigration contexts affect people’s ideas about ethnic minorities. By testing 
both Group Conflict Theory and Ethnic Reification Theory simultaneously, it became 
clear that national contexts affect ethnocentrism by activating cultural mechanisms, 
more than economic. Basically, contexts are by definition interpreted through people’s 
frames of interpretation, and it was demonstrated that when it comes to ethnic minor-
ities, people’s ideas about cultural differences are more important than their economic 
interests. This basic idea can also be applied when studying the influence of interethnic 
contacts on people’s ideas about ethnic minorities. It is yet to be seen what will be left 
of Contact Theory when applying this basic insight. The next chapter will address this 
question for a specific type of interethnic contact, namely imagined contact. The pre-
sent chapter concentrates on distinguishing between self-selection effects and cultur-
ally framed effects of interethnic contacts on ethnocentrism. 
The central idea of Contact Theory is that interethnic contact will lead people to 
think more positively about ethnic minorities. A vast amount of research evidence 
shows that contact with ethnic minority group members is related to less negative 
thinking about ethnic minorities (e.g. Schalk-Soekar, Vijver, and Van de Hoogsteder 
2004; Wagner et al. 2003; see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006 for an overview). However, the 
existence and strength of the association between interethnic contact and opinions 
about ethnic minorities vary among different types of contact. What is most com-
monly found is that interethnic friendships are more strongly related to less negative 
thinking about ethnic minorities than other types of contact, such as with colleagues 
and neighbors (e.g. Aberson, Shoemaker, and Tomolillo 2004; Levin, Van Laar, and 
Sidanius 2003; see also Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). 
In the Contact Theory literature this differing influence of interethnic friendships 
compared to other types of interethnic contact is often attributed to the fact that 
friendship is a more intimate form of contact. McLaren, for example, holds that ‘if a 
contact situation provides an opportunity to see that beliefs are actually similar, preju-
dice should be reduced. The primary type of contact that should provide this oppor-
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tunity is intimate contact, such as friendship’ (McLaren 2003: 913). Recognizing that 
beliefs may not be completely similar, Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) suggest that ‘[i]
ntergroup contact, and especially, close, cross-group friendship, may enable one to take 
the perspective of outgroup members and empathize with their concerns’ (Pettigrew 
and Tropp 2008: 923). It might thus not be surprising that a growing number of stud-
ies on interethnic contact has been focusing on interethnic friendships (Pettigrew and 
Tropp 2011: 121). 
Nonetheless, an alternative explanation for the frequently found association between 
interethnic friendships and ethnocentrism may be applicable. This alternative explana-
tion is based on the idea that friendship is the type of contact that is most prone to 
self-selection. The problem of self-selection resides in the fact that it is as plausible to 
argue that interethnic contact leads to less negative thinking about ethnic minorities, 
as it is to hold that negative thinking about ethnic minorities will lead to avoidance of 
interethnic contact. Consequently, when finding a negative association between 
interethnic contact and ethnocentrism, this may very well be due to the fact that those 
with positive thoughts about ethnic minorities will be more likely to choose members 
of ethnic minority groups among their friends. It is, hence, not clear how this associa-
tion between interethnic friendship and thinking about ethnic minorities should be 
interpreted. 
Since self-selection is an obvious problem in interethnic contact research, the issue 
of self-selection is commonly acknowledged within Contact Theory research (Aber-
son et al. 2004; Dixon 2006; McLaren 2003; Sigelman and Welch 1993). What seems 
to be under-acknowledged, however, is that the problem of self-selection will be most 
important in interethnic friendships. As De Souza Briggs (2007) states, ‘[w]hile homo-
phily shapes many types of relationships, it appears to act more powerfully on close or 
strong ties, including marriage and friendships, than on acquaintanceships or other 
“weak” ties’ (De Souza Briggs 2007: 267; cf. Granovetter 1973; Marsden 1988). 
Accordingly, if self-selection were to be an issue within interethnic contact research, it 
should be most salient within interethnic friendships. 
 The conclusion that interethnic friendship has the strongest influence on the way 
individuals think about ethnic minorities thus seems premature, given the fact that 
friendships are most prone to self-selection. It calls for a greater understanding of the 
phenomenon of self-selection in interethnic contact research. In this chapter I there-
fore attempt to further explore the extent to which self-selection is important for 
interethnic contacts and their influence on the way individuals think about ethnic 
minorities. This is done following Ethnic Reification Theory by introducing educa-
tional level, known as one of the most important predictors of cultural tolerance, as a 
means of theoretically hypothesizing about self-selection effects in cross-sectional 
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datasets. The data used for testing this are taken from the first wave of the European 
Social Survey in the Netherlands. Altogether, this should enable to exemplify the role 
of self-selection in interethnic contacts and the extent to which the commonly found 
evidence for Contact Theory can indeed be attributed to interethnic contact.  
4.2  Self-selection and contact effects: three elements for 
their distinction
4.2.1 A theoretical approach to self-selection 
The idea that people may choose to avoid interethnic contacts and that this avoidance 
may be higher among individuals who dismiss ethnic diversity constitutes the core 
principle of the problem of self-selection within interethnic contact research. The 
soundest solution to this selection problem, in methodological terms, would be to 
perform panel studies by which causality can be assessed directly. Panel data for 
interethnic contacts are, however, quite rare. This has recently been confirmed by Pet-
tigrew and Tropp, who have done an extensive meta-analysis including more than 500 
studies on Contact Theory (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011: 118). The few studies available 
that incorporate changes over time have typically shown that the path from contact to 
prejudice is about equally strong as the path from prejudice to contact (Binder et al. 
2009; Levin, Van Laar and Sidanius 2003; Sidanius et al. 2008; Van Laar et al. 2005; Van 
Laar, Levin, and Sidanius 2008; cf. Pettigrew and Tropp 2011)31. As such, these findings 
suggest that self-selection alone cannot account for all the direct relationships between 
contact and prejudice found in intergroup contact research. 
 It is, however, problematic to generalize upon the few longitudinal studies available 
because they are mostly based on limited research samples. The types of samples used 
are mostly composed of college students (Eller and Abrams 2003, 2004; Binder et al. 
2009) or undergraduates (Levin, Van Laar and Sidanius 2003; Sidanius et al. 2008; Van 
Laar et al. 2005; Van Laar, Levin and Sidanius 2008). For both types of samples different 
results can be expected than for the general population. As to the former type, this is 
because samples based on college students have a tendency ‘to yield stronger mean 
effects than adults [which] is consistent with Sears’ (1986) contention that college 
students’ attitudes are typically more flexible and open to change than those of older 
adults’ (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011: 58). The latter type of sample is biased because it 
studies only more highly educated individuals. These are known to differ from the 
general population in important aspects as well, which has been convincingly shown 
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by Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010). Concerning the use of American under-
graduates as the subpopulation on which the empirical foundation of the behavioral 
sciences is principally based, they state ‘[i]t is not merely that researchers frequently 
make generalizations from a narrow subpopulation. The concern is that this particular 
population is highly unrepresentative’ (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010:79). 
This leads the authors to conclude that undergraduates may be ‘one of the worst sub-
populations one could study for generalizing’ (Ibid). It therefore seems premature to 
discard the importance of self-selection on interethnic contact research based only on 
the few limited longitudinal studies available to date. 
 It follows from the above that, ideally, panel studies using general population sam-
ples would be needed. In the absence of such data and given that a majority of the 
empirical studies on Contact Theory are based on cross-sectional data, an alternative 
for assessing self-selection in contact research has been suggested: testing whether the 
path of contact to prejudice is stronger than the reversed path, hereby using structural 
equation modeling. The findings obtained from applying this technique show that 
the path from interethnic contact to reducing prejudice is indeed stronger than the 
reversed path from prejudice to contact (Pettigrew 1997, 1998; Van Dick et al. 2004). 
This finding has been used as evidence for the idea that self-selection does not com-
pletely underlie the contact effects found and has furthermore served as justification 
for not assessing self-selection in one’s own analyses (e.g. Biggs and Knaus 2012; 
Dhont and Van Hiel 2009; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009). Given the importance of 
self-selection as a problem in interethnic contact research and its potential for distort-
ing interpretation of the results obtained in research on the influence of interethnic 
contacts so far, it is questionable whether using a statistical construct, as is done by 
measuring both causal paths through structural equations modeling, suffices as a solu-
tion to the problem. 
From this perspective, the current state of interethnic contact research seems unable 
to solve the problem of self-selection in methodological terms. Therefore, theoretical 
solutions for this problem have been suggested. As such, Pettigrew (1998) has proposed 
to compare different types of contact, distinguishing between those that are and are 
not prone to self-selection32 (see also Welch and Sigelman 2000; Wilson 1996). McLaren 
has furthermore suggested including variables in the analysis that are theoretically 
prior to prejudice (McLaren 2003). These two suggestions have been combined by 
Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) who have studied types of contact that are less open 
for choice combined with statistically controlling for individuals’ unwillingness to 
have interethnic contact by including variables prior to prejudice (Dixon and Rosen-
baum 2004: 261). This combination used by Dixon and Rosenbaum seems useful 
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since it can determine whether contact effects differ amongst choice and restricted 
choice contacts, and also if this is influenced by factors prior to prejudice.
In this chapter, I will pursue a similar path as suggested by Dixon and Rosenbaum 
(2004). However, one crucial element is lacking in their theoretical solution. This defi-
ciency stems from the common assumption in interethnic contact research, rooted in 
the neglect og Contact Theory for the role of cultural values, that such contacts will 
have a direct influence on opinions about ethnic minorities. What has sometimes been 
suggested (e.g. Pettigrew 1998), but rarely incorporated into Contact Theory research 
(cf. Hodson, Harry and Mitchell 2009), is the idea that interethnic contact will be 
interpreted according to the way people think about ethnic minorities. In other words, 
it is probable that the evaluative consequences of interethnic contact will depend on 
people’s ideas about cultural differences which form the frames through which such 
contacts are interpreted. Such frames of interpretation, as argued within the Ethnic 
Reification framework, will be constituted by people’s stance towards cultural differ-
ences and will most likely coincide with the ‘factors prior to prejudice’ mentioned 
above. This is because the same views that serve as a framework for interpreting 
interethnic contacts function as a selection mechanism on which the willingness to 
engage in interethnic contacts depends. Therefore, the interpretation of interethnic 
contact through framing should be distinguished from the direct influence of such 
frames on the selection of interethnic contacts. 
It is therefore necessary to distinguish three elements, which will be further elabo-
rated in the following sections: the amount of choice in contacts; cultural preferences 
for contact selection; and the interpretation of interethnic contacts through framing. 
Combining these three elements should open the door for dealing with the problem 
of self-selection in cross-sectional data (see also Welch and Sigelman 2000), not in 
methodological terms, but by theoretically reasoning upon an individual’s motivation 
to avoid or engage in interethnic contacts33. 
4.2.2 Self-selection in different types of contact
The first of the three elements that need to be distinguished consists of a comparison 
of types of interethnic contact according to their degree of eligibility. In studies on the 
influence of interethnic contact it has been frequently emphasized that as a rule 
interethnic friendships are associated with less negative thinking about ethnic minor-
ities. Numerous studies have in fact shown such a negative relationship between 
interethnic friendships and ethnocentrism (e.g. Aberson, Schoemaker and Tomolillo 
2004; Levin, Van Laar and Sidanius 2003; Paolini et al. 2004; Pettigrew 1997, 1998; 
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Powers and Elison 1995; Wagner et al. 2003). Moreover, previous evidence of the sig-
nificance of interethnic friendships for less negative opinions about ethnic minorities 
is sometimes used for narrowing the scope of Contact Theory research. McLaren 
(2003), for example, justifies her choice of testing only interethnic contact with friends 
in her research by stating that this form of contact will most likely induce perceptions 
of similarity between members of ethnic minority groups and the self. 
The common idea that underlies the importance attached to intimate contacts in 
Contact Theory is that it offers the possibility of perceiving more similarities between 
the self and the ‘other’. Such an argument is contrary to Allport’s (1979[1954]) line of 
reasoning, according to which interethnic contact serves to provide people with more 
knowledge of, therefore more understanding for, ethnic minorities, which should 
result in more positive ideas about them. Instead, that intimate contacts provide indi-
viduals with the opportunity to empathize with out-group members and their con-
cerns is considered to be more important (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008: 923). Such 
intimate contacts would invalidate the idea that members from ethnic minority groups 
have different morals and values than in-group members (McLaren 2003: 913), which 
should result in blurring the boundary between in-groups and out-groups34. This 
mediational effect of empathy and perspective taking is found to be operating inde-
pendently from the effect of knowledge mediation and would furthermore be sig-
nificantly more important than other mediating processes (cf. Pettigrew and Tropp 
2008). This should then result in more positive thinking about members of ethnic 
groups other than one’s own group in general. 
However, contrary to the idea that the intimacy of interethnic friendship would 
result in more positive ideas about ethnic minorities, it can be argued that interethnic 
friendship presumes low degrees of ethnocentrism. Hence, as Kinder and Kam empha-
size when citing Brewer and Campbell (1976), ‘the fundamental distinction between 
in-group and out-group is captured by feelings of trust, familiarity, and personal secu-
rity’ (Kinder and Kam 2009: 49). Since friendship is typically based on these kinds of 
feelings, it is highly unlikely that people will actively perceive their friends as members 
of an out-group. Given that ethnocentric reactions are by definition accompanied by 
negative out-group perceptions, high levels of ethnocentrism would be incompatible 
with interethnic friendships. In other words, it can be assumed that friendships are 
based on mutual trust and empathy, making it highly unlikely that a person with 
negative ideas about ethnic minorities will have an ethnic minority friend at all. 
Rather than assuming a reduction of ethnocentric conceptions through interethnic 
contacts, as is common practice within Contact Theory research, another possibility is 
therefore that interethnic friendships are by definition accompanied by a positive 
stance towards ethnic minorities.
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From the above it follows that interethnic friendships will be primarily based on 
self-selection. The same does not hold true for other types of interethnic contact, such 
as with neighbors35 and colleagues, which are typically more restricted by contact 
opportunities and individuals’ social environments. Of course, the social environment 
will influence friendship choice to some extent as well, hence ‘[w]hile friends reflect 
an element of personal choice, they do not reflect a free choice: we are most likely to 
become friendly with those who are thrown consistently in our path’ (Jackman and 
Crane 1986: 467). Furthermore, Kalmijn’s work on assortative mating has indeed 
shown the importance of contact opportunities and third parties in interethnic mar-
riage, second to the importance of individual preferences (Kalmijn 1998; see also 1991, 
1994) and it has been argued that these findings can be extended to other forms of 
interethnic contact (cf. Martinovic, Van Tubergen and Maas 2009). Nonetheless, the 
degree of eligibility is quite certainly higher when it comes to interethnic friendships 
than in the case of less intimate interethnic contacts such as with neighbors and with 
colleagues. On the whole, it may thus be expected that self-selection plays a decisive 
role for interethnic friendships, while this is not true for interethnic contact with 
neighbors and with colleagues. Since this self-selection is mostly determined by indi-
vidual cultural preferences, an explanation for understanding these individual prefer-
ences will be developed below. 
4.2.3 Cultural preferences for interethnic contact selection
The second element to be distinguished in this discussion of self-selection and contact 
effects focuses on how self-selection can be understood. This element fulfills the same 
function as ‘adding variables prior to prejudice’, suggested by McLaren (2003) and 
adopted by Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004), albeit integrated within a broader theo-
retical framework. In previous research it has been argued that the process of contact-
selection is a cultural process. Hence, as Vaisey and Lizardo (2010) emphasize when 
citing Thompson et al. ‘routines of contact-selection enable actors to ‘seek out social 
relationships that are compatible with their [cultural] bias and shun those relations in 
which they feel less at home’ (Thompson et al. 1990: 266, in: Vaisey and Lizardo 2010: 
1602). Similarly, Douglas (1978) has emphasized that the friendship choice process is 
inherently culturally biased. Moreover, research has shown that ‘highly prejudiced 
individuals engage in less intergroup interaction, finding contact undesirable and aver-
sive’ (Hodson, Harry and Mitchell 2009, see also Altemeyer 1998; Hodson 2008; Pet-
tigrew 1998). Indeed, if any pattern in preferences for having contact with ethnic 
minorities were to be found, such a pattern would most likely be driven by individu-
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als’ stances towards cultural diversity. Since interethnic contact presumes having con-
tact with individuals from a different cultural background, it can be expected that 
individuals who have a negative attitude toward cultural differences will be less inclined 
to have interethnic contact than individuals who are more open to such differences.  
 Previous research has shown time and again that education is highly important for 
the tolerance of cultural differences (e.g. Emler and Frazer 1999; Stubager 2008, 2009). 
Accordingly, numerous studies have shown that highly educated individuals tend to 
have less negative opinions about ethnic minorities than less educated ones (e.g. 
Kunovich 2004; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002). This was confirmed by the 
previous two chapters. Those chapters have furthermore shown that this educational 
effect is to be understood in a cultural sense such that the more highly educated will 
have less ethnocentric ideas because they are more likely to value cultural diversity and 
to accept cultural differences. It is therefore likely that an individual’s educational level 
will be decisive for the cultural preference for avoiding or embracing interethnic con-
tacts. Following this line of reasoning we may expect that less educated individuals will 
be more reluctant to accept ethnic diversity and will therefore attempt to avoid 
interethnic contacts. More highly educated people, on the contrary, are expected to be 
more receptive of ethnic diversity and would thus tend to embrace interethnic con-
tacts.
4.2.4 Distinguishing self-selection from contact effects
So far I have argued that self-selection will be paramount for the existence of intereth-
nic friendships, whereas it will be less important for interethnic contacts with col-
leagues and with neighbors. Moreover, I have contended that self-selection, which is 
caused by a preference for engaging (or not) in interethnic contact, can be understood 
through an individual’s educational level. Combining these two elements is, however, 
neither sufficient for testing the extent to which self-selection plays a role in different 
types of interethnic contact, nor for determining to what extent the common findings 
in research on Contact Theory are attributable to interethnic contact or to self-selec-
tion. To accomplish this, one crucial element in the discussion of self-selection and 
contact effects needs to be added. This third element is based on the idea that educa-
tion plays a double role in this puzzle: we need to distinguish between direct effects of 
a person’s educational level on ethnocentrism and contact-related effects on this opin-
ion. Such a distinction can be made through a contextualization of Contact Theory in 
which individuals’ cultural frames function as the contexts in which interethnic con-
tacts are interpreted. 
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Relatively little research attention has been paid to the idea that interethnic contact 
might be interpreted differently according to the social groups people belong to (cf. 
Hodson, Harry and Mitchell 2009). But some authors have mentioned the possibility 
that individuals react differently to interethnic contact according to the predefined 
ideas they have about ethnic minorities. Pettigrew has, for example, suggested that 
interethnic contact will not influence individuals’ opinions about ethnic minorities in 
a direct sense, but rather that it would reaffirm their ‘initial attitudes’ (Pettigrew 1998). 
From this perspective, variation in reactions to interethnic contact is not only informed 
by the type of contact, as would be the case when contact is expected to affect opin-
ions about ethnic minorities in a direct sense. But it is at least as plausible that such 
variation comes from a different interpretation of contact because of individuals’ cul-
tural values. An alternative theory about the way in which interethnic contact might 
affect opinions about ethnic minorities is therefore needed.
Instead of looking at interethnic contacts as stimuli to which only one ‘natural’ 
response is possible, an alternative way is to perceive these contacts as any situation that 
would, according to the ideas of framing analysis (Gitlin 1980; Goffman 1974), be 
interpreted by means of individuals’ cultural frames. These frames are understood here 
as ‘principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories 
about what exists, what happens, and what matters’ (Gitlin 1980: 6). When applying 
this idea of framing to interethnic contact, it implies that such contact would reaffirm 
the ideas about ethnic minorities that individuals already have. In other words, in 
similar conditions of interethnic contact, individuals might have different interpreta-
tions of such contact according to their previous stance towards ethnic minorities. 
Consequently, we may expect that individuals who already think negatively about 
ethnic minorities interpret their contact in a negative sense and find their negative 
ideas about ethnic minorities reaffirmed. For people who have positive ideas about 
ethnic minorities, we expect that interethnic contact will reaffirm these positive ideas. 
Within the framework of Ethnic Reification Theory, it was argued that individuals’ 
stances towards ethnic minorities will be mainly related to their educational level 
because highly educated people have ample cultural capital and will therefore be more 
likely to hold a de-reified worldview, whereas the opposite will be true for those less 
educated. As a consequence, among people from different educational levels clear dif-
ferences can be expected in the extent to which they are open toward people from an 
ethnic background other than their own. Given that the less educated will be more 
negative toward ethnic minorities than the highly educated, following the ideas of 
framing analysis results in the expectation that interethnic contact will lead to more 
positive thinking about ethnic minorities among more highly educated individuals, 
while leading to more negative opinions about ethnic minorities among less educated 
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individuals. The third element needed for distinguishing between self-selection and 
‘genuine’ contact effects thus consists of the idea that the effect of interethnic contact, 
in principle, will be conditional on an individual’s cultural values, here indicated by a 
person’s educational level.
4.2.5 Hypotheses 
To summarize: in order to distinguish between contact and self-selection effects, the 
expectation of the conditional role of education for contact effects should be com-
bined with the distinction among types of contact according to their degree of eligi-
bility and with the role of education as a driving force for self-selection. Taken together, 
these three elements allow for formulating hypotheses according to the following 
general logic: in types of interethnic contacts which people are able to select them-
selves, the role of education will be exercised in the self-selection process. And no 
more framing can be expected after such a selection. After all, when one selects his or 
her friends, one generally already ‘knows’ the contacts with these friends are going to 
be pleasurable and fully in line with pre-existing cultural values. On the contrary, for 
interethnic contacts that are not so much prone to self-selection, the role of education 
will be mainly exercised within the interpretation of those contacts. For only when 
confronted with contacts with ethnic minorities one did not select will someone’s 
pre-existing cultural values help interpret these contacts. 
When these ideas are applied to ethnocentrism, two clusters of hypotheses can be 
formulated. The first cluster of hypotheses applies to interethnic contacts that are 
prone to self-selection, namely interethnic friendships. We expect to find that people 
who are open to ethnic diversity will tend to engage in interethnic friendships, while 
those who are less open to it will tend to avoid such contacts. This should result in 
finding a positive association between education and interethnic friendships (hypothesis 
1) and a negative relationship between interethnic friendship and ethnocentrism 
(hypothesis 2). Furthermore, since the individual’s stance toward ethnic minorities will 
have driven the very existence of the friendship, we do not expect to find framing 
effects for interethnic friendships. Therefore, we do not expect to find a significant 
influence of interethnic friendship on the relationship between educational level and 
ethnocentrism (hypothesis 3). Technically speaking, we thus expect no interaction effect 
of education and interethnic friendship on ethnocentrism. Only when all three 
hypotheses are corroborated would we conclude that interethnic friendship effects 
found in interethnic contact research are attributable to self-selection. 
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 The second cluster of hypotheses concerns interethnic contacts in which choice is 
restricted, namely contacts with colleagues and neighbors. Since I have argued that 
self-selection will not be very important to these contacts, I do not necessarily expect 
to find an association between interethnic contact with colleagues and educational 
level, nor with interethnic neighborhood contact and education. Based on the idea 
that interethnic contact will not influence the opinion about ethnic minorities directly, 
I do not necessarily expect to find a significant direct effect of interethnic contact with 
colleagues and with neighbors on ethnocentrism, as is the case for interethnic friend-
ships. It was argued instead that choice-restricted contacts will influence individuals’ 
initial ideas about ethnic minorities. Therefore, I hypothesize that interethnic contact 
with colleagues and neighbors will strengthen the negative relationship between an 
individual’s educational level and ethnocentrism (hypothesis 4). Technically speaking, a 
significant interaction effect for education and interethnic contact with colleagues on 
ethnocentrism should thus be found, and the same goes for interethnic neighborhood 
contact and education on ethnocentrism. 
4.3 Data and Operationalization
4.3.1 Data
As in the previous chapter, the data used in this paper are taken from the first wave of 
the European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003). Since the hypotheses only include 
individual-level relationships, I have chosen to use data for one country of the dataset, 
namely the Netherlands. Using data from the Netherlands is convenient since numer-
ous other studies in the field of research on interethnic contact have used data from 
this country, which allows for comparison of our results as well as detection of possible 
anomalies in our data as compared to previous research findings. A total number of 
2,364 respondents are included in the Dutch dataset. This dataset is especially apt to 
use in this chapter as it contains measurements of the three forms of interethnic con-
tact to be studied.
4.3.2 Operationalization36
The dependent variable ethnocentrism is measured using six items in which respondents 
are asked if immigrants take away jobs or rather create new jobs (1); if immigrants use more 
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taxes than they contribute (2); whether immigration is good or bad for the economy (3); if the 
country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants (4); whether immigrants make 
the country a worse or better place to live in (5); and if immigrants make the country’s crime 
problems worse or better (6). These six items together produce a highly reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s alpha is 0.84). The scale score is calculated by taking the mean score on 
those items. A scale score is calculated for each respondent with at least three valid 
answers on the set of six items; a higher score stands for a greater amount of perceived 
ethnic threat.
 Interethnic contact is measured in three ways: with friends, with colleagues at work, 
and in the neighborhood. Respondents were asked if they have any immigrant friends 
(1 yes, several, 2 yes, a few, 3 no, none at all); if they have any immigrant colleagues (1 yes, 
several, 2 yes, a few, 3 no, none at all; 4 not currently working); and if there are people of a 
minority race or ethnic group in their current living area (1 almost nobody, 2 some, 3 
many). All three variables were recoded into dichotomous variables that indicate if a 
respondent does (2) or does not (1) have this type of interethnic contact.  
 Educational level is measured in two ways. The first one concerns formal educational 
level (in the results referred to as ‘education’), which stands for the number of years that 
a respondent has attended full-time schooling. The educational level of the respond-
ents in our sample ranges from three up to 25 years of full-time schooling, the median 
being 13 years.
The second way of measuring educational level is through an individual’s occupa-
tional educational level, which does not measure formal education, but ‘on the job train-
ing’37 and can be seen as a more refined measurement of educational level. It is meas-
ured as a combination of the ISCO-88 occupational groups and the years of full-time 
education attended (cf. De Graaf and Kalmijn 1995, 2001; Kalmijn 1994). The occu-
pational groups have been reduced to the two-digit level. For each group then, the 
average years of full-time schooling attendance is calculated. A score of 10 on this 
variable for occupational educational level thus corresponds to an average of ten years 
of full-time schooling within the occupational category a respondent belongs to.   
 The control variables included are age (in years, ranging from 15 to 91), gender 
(man=0, woman=1), living environment (city=1, village=0), income (as net household 
income per month), and labor market insecurity (ranging from 0 to 3), as previous 
research has shown these variables to be important for the way people think about 
ethnic minorities (e.g. Coenders 2001; Quillian 1995; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 
2009). All variables have been standardized, allowing for comparison of the coeffi-
cients within a model in terms of their respective strength as well as for preventing 
problems with multicollinearity when calculating interaction terms.
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4.4 Results
The analyses are performed in two steps. First, we look at the results that would be 
obtained by the conventional way of testing Contact Theory. Second, we study the 
interactions of the three types of interethnic contact with the two measurements of 
educational level. Table 4.1 shows the results of the first step in our analysis, which is 
a linear multiple regression model of the direct effects of the three types of interethnic 
contact on ethnocentrism, including the control variables. From this model one would 
conclude that only interethnic contact with friends is significantly, and quite strongly, 
related to ethnocentrism. This finding corroborates our second hypothesis expecting 
a negative relationship between interethnic friendship and perceived ethnic threat. 
More important, however, is that the conclusion based on Table 4.1 is that interethnic 
friendships effectively lead to lower amounts of ethnocentrism, while the other forms 
of interethnic contact do not. This finding is perfectly congruent with the common 
emphasis in interethnic contact studies on the importance of interethnic friendships 
for reducing negative thoughts about ethnic minorities. After testing the remaining 
hypotheses in the following, we will see whether this conclusion will still be sup-
ported.
The second step in the analysis entails a test of the influence of the three types of 
interethnic contact on the relationship between educational level and ethnocentrism. 
For this purpose multiple linear regression analysis is used. Table 4.2 corresponds to 
the results concerning the influence of interethnic friendships: again, a rather strong 
and negative direct effect of interethnic friendship on ethnocentrism is found. More 
important, there is no significant influence of interethnic friendship on the relation-
ship of each of both indicators of educational level with ethnocentrism. This corrobo-
rates our third hypothesis and suggests that it is indeed true that the commonly found 
relationship of interethnic friendship with less ethnocentrism is mainly attributable to 
self-selection, and not as much to contact effects. Nevertheless, there is one more test 
needed for this conclusion to be convincing: it should be true that there is a significant 
relationship between an individual’s educational level and interethnic friendships, as 
predicted by our first hypothesis, for if it is not we would have no empirical evidence 
for the idea that selection of interethnic friendships is driven by cultural preferences. 
The correlations in Table 4.3 indicate that there actually is such a positive relationship 
between education and interethnic friendship. Together with the lack of a framing 
effect, this validates the conclusion that the strong influence of interethnic friendship 
on ethnocentrism is mainly attributable to self-selection.
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Table 4.1 Regression on ethnocentrism, direct contact effects-model
Standardized coefficient
(Constant) 5.47***
Contact
   Friends -.19***
   Colleagues -.05
   Neighbors .03
Education -.24***
Occupational educational level -.13**
Control variables
Income -.04
Insecurity -.03
Age -.05
Gender (man=reference) -.02
Living area (city=1, village=0) .04
R2 .08
N 1.578
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations. **p<.01; ***p<.001
Now that we know how selection works for interethnic friendships, it is time to turn 
to interethnic contact with colleagues (Table 4.4) and with neighbors (Table 4.5). In 
both cases a direct relationship between contact and ethnocentrism is lacking, while 
we do find a framing effect for both types of contact on the relationship between 
educational level and ethnocentrism. Our fourth hypothesis is therefore also corrobo-
rated, although in the case of contact with colleagues this is only true for occupational 
educational level. Further research is needed to explain why only this measure of 
educational level works for contact with colleagues. Nevertheless, our results provide 
significant evidence for the idea that interethnic contact, when not formed by self-
selection, is interpreted according to individuals’ cultural frames. 
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Table 4.2 Regression on ethnocentrism, interethnic friendship models
Model 1 Model 2
(Constant) 5.47*** 5.47***
Contact
   Friends -.18*** -.18***
   Colleagues -.05 -.05
   Neighbors .03 .03
Education -.24*** -.24***
Occupational educational level -.13** -.13**
Control variables
Income -.04 -.04
Insecurity -.03 -.03
Age -.05 -.05
Gender (man=reference) -.02 -.02
Living area (city=1, village=0) .04 .04
Interactions
Education*friends -.02
Occupational educ.*friends -.01
R2 .08 .08
N 1.578 1.578
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
A visual representation for one of these interactions, namely for the influence of 
neighborhood contact on the relationship between occupational educational level and 
ethnocentrism, is given in Figure 4.1. It clearly shows that for individuals with the 
lowest occupational educational level more contact is associated with more ethnocen-
trism, while the opposite is true for individuals with the highest occupational educa-
tional level. A similar picture applies to the interactions with occupational educational 
level and colleagues and with education and neighborhood contact. This means that 
interethnic contact that is not prone to self-selection reaffirms individuals’ initial ideas 
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about ethnic minorities. It is thus clear that more interethnic contact in restricted 
choice situations leads to greater polarization of ethnocentric ideas along the lines of 
individuals’ educational level. 
Table 4.3 Pearson’s correlations cultural indicators with interethnic friendship
Friends Education
Education .14**
Occupational educational level .11** .43**
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations. **p<.01
Since it is known that friendships tend to rise from everyday encounters such as previ-
ous contacts with neighbors and with colleagues, some might argue that restrictions 
play a more important role for friendships than we have argued up to now. However, 
our results concerning the effect of contact with colleagues and with neighbors on the 
relationships of educational level with ethnocentrism indicate that even if friendships 
grow mainly out of neighborhood and workplace contacts, this would mostly be the 
case among higher educated individuals. This point reaffirms our previous findings 
which indicate that interethnic friendships are mostly attributable to self-selection. 
Figure 4.1:  Effect of neighborhood contact on ethnocentrism, minimum and maximum conditions of 
occupational educational level
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Table 4.4 Regression on ethnocentrism, contact with colleagues models
Model 1 Model 2
(Constant) 5.47*** 5.48***
Contact
   Friends -.19*** -.19***
   Colleagues -.05 -.02
   Neighbors .03 .03
Education -.24*** -.24***
Occupational educational level -.13** -.13***
Control variables
Income -.04 -.04
Insecurity -.03 -.03
Age -.05 -.05
Gender (man=reference) -.02 -.02
Living area (city=1, village=0) .04 .04
Interactions
Education*colleagues .00
Occupational educ.*colleagues -.08*
R2 .08 .09
N 1.578 1.578
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 4.5 Regression on ethnocentrism, contact with neighbors models
Model 1 Model 2
(Constant) 5.47*** 5.47***
Contact
   Friends -.19*** -.19***
   Colleagues -.05 -.05
   Neighbors .04 .07
Education -.24*** -.24***
Occupational educational level -.13** -.13**
Control variables
Income -.05 -.04
Insecurity -.03 -.03
Age -.06 -.06
Gender (man=reference) -.02 -.02
Living area (city=1, village=0) .03 .04
Interactions
Education*neighbors -.07*
Occupational educ.*neighbors -.12***
R2 .09 .09
N 1.578 1.578
Source: European Social Survey 2002; own calculations. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
4.5 Conclusion and discussion
In this chapter my aim was to study the role of self-selection in interethnic contacts 
while using cross-sectional data. To this end, a distinction has been made between (i) 
types of interethnic contact that are and are not prone to self-selection; (ii) the role of 
an individual’s educational level in selecting interethnic contacts; and (iii) cultural 
framing of the interpretation of interethnic contacts in restricted choice situations. 
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Our results have shown that selection of interethnic contact concerning individual 
preferences can indeed be understood through an individual’s educational level. As 
such, we have shown that the relationship between interethnic friendship and the 
opinion about ethnic minorities is attributable to cultural self-selection. Furthermore, 
for the types of contact that are less open to self-selection, we have found interethnic 
contact to reaffirm individuals’ initial ideas about ethnic diversity. Hence, greater 
polarization in ethnocentrism was found: individuals with a lower educational level 
have more ethnocentric ideas when they have many interethnic contacts with neigh-
bors and colleagues, while individuals with a higher educational level will have less 
ethnocentric ideas through such contacts.
 These findings have implications for three aspects of the Contact Theory literature. 
First, the findings strongly point towards the idea that the often found ‘beneficial 
effect’ of interethnic friendships on the way people think about ethnic minorities can 
be attributed to the fact that such friendships are chosen by individuals who already 
think positively about ethnic minorities. In other words, self-selection in interethnic 
friendships plays a greater role than commonly suggested in the literature. Of course 
replication of this study using data for other countries is needed before extracting 
strong conclusions from the results presented here. However, I have no theoretical 
reasons to expect that such replications would lead to different results than those 
obtained here. I therefore think it safe to object to the idea that ‘especially, close, cross-
group friendship, may enable one to take the perspective of outgroup members and 
empathize with their concerns’ (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008: 923). The results presented 
in this chapter indicate that those individuals who are already empathetic toward cul-
turally different people are more likely to engage in interethnic contact, which explains 
the strong, direct and often found association between interethnic friendships and 
positive opinions about ethnic minorities. Therefore, it can be doubted whether the 
emphasis on interethnic friendships in the Contact Theory literature is legitimate. 
 Second, the results indicate that interethnic contact reaffirms already existing ideas 
about ethnic minorities and as such, confirms a frame-analytic approach to the influ-
ence of interethnic contact on the way people think about ethnic minorities. These 
results contradict earlier findings on this issue, which showed that interethnic contact 
leads especially to less prejudiced thinking among individuals who have the strongest 
authoritarian conceptions (Dhont and Van Hiel 2009; Hodson, Harry and Mitchell 
2009). The results of these studies suggest that interethnic contact leads to an inversion 
of individuals’ initial stance towards ethnic minorities, which is diametrically opposed 
to our findings. One possible explanation for these contradictory results is that the 
previous studies are based on a small sample of college students. As mentioned before, 
college student samples are likely to show greater contact effects than the general 
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population (cf. Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). Furthermore, given that the sample is com-
posed of more highly educated individuals who are in general already more empa-
thetic towards ethnic minorities, a similar effect as suggested by Pettigrew and Tropp 
(2011) concerning attitudes towards elderly might be applicable: ‘there may be a ceil-
ing effect that makes it more difficult for contact to enhance attitudes that are already 
largely positive’ (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011: 54).
Third and finally, it was shown that the method of measuring both causal paths 
within a cross-sectional dataset may not be a sufficient solution to the problem of self-
selection. When using the alternative method as followed in this chapter, it becomes 
clear that the importance of self-selection has been underestimated in previous 
research. Of course panel data for the general population would be, purely methodo-
logically speaking at least, the soundest way of assessing whether the often found 
relationship between interethnic contact and individuals’ opinion about ethnic minor-
ities is attributable to contact effects or to self-selection. However, given that such 
panel data are mostly absent, the alternative of inserting a concept through which 
self-selection and ‘genuine’ contact effects can be theoretically disentangled in cross-
sectional datasets, as presented here, seems to offer a valuable solution to the problem 
of self-selection in contact research. In this study, at least, such a solution has led to 
results that put into question the tenability of the core idea of Contact Theory that 
interethnic contact would in itself positively influence the way individuals think about 
ethnic minorities. 
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5. Why Imagined Contact Does Not Always Help
5.1 Introduction 
In recent years, a new policy instrument has been promoted by Contact Theory schol-
ars: imagined contact. By letting people imagine interethnic contact situations, for 
example through a short text in which people are asked to think of an encounter with 
an out-group stranger they sit next to on the bus, it is claimed that people’s ideas about 
interethnic contacts are positively influenced. More specifically, such imagined con-
tacts would provide the opportunity to show people that ‘positive’ encounters with 
out-group members are possible (Crisp and Turner 2009), to increase willingness to 
engage in future contacts (Husnu and Crisp 2010), and to lead to reduced intergroup 
anxiety (Turner, Crisp and Lambert 2007). In short, imagined contact is claimed to be 
‘the strongest possible testament to the power, flexibility and enduring appeal of the 
contact hypothesis’ (Crisp et al. 2008). 
As such, scholars studying imagined interethnic contacts seem to reproduce Con-
tact Theory scholars’ often made claim that interethnic contact is ‘one of the most 
widely used interventions for the reduction of prejudice and the improvement of 
intergroup relations’ (Turner, Crisp and Lambert 2007: 428, see also Oskamp and 
Jones 2000; Brambilla, Ravenna and Hewstone 2012), and ‘while there may be facili-
tating conditions that improve its effectiveness, contact basically works’ (Husnu and 
Crisp 2010: 943, italics in original). However, the previous chapter has shown that 
such statements are likely to be overstated. By following Ethnic Reification Theory, 
self-selection was shown to be a bigger problem than usually acknowledged in the 
literature, and the interpretation of interethnic contacts was shown not to be universal 
but dependent on people’s cultural values. Therefore, it can be questioned whether 
results obtained so far from imagined contact studies will remain stable once imagi-
nary interethnic contact has been studied from an Ethnic Reification perspective.
In this chapter, I will therefore test Ethnic Reification Theory as an explanation for 
the evaluative consequences of imagined interethnic contact. More specifically, I will 
study the question of whether the evaluation of persons met in an imaginary contact 
situation is culturally moderated. To do so, I use a vignette experiment carried out 
among a representative sample of the Dutch population. The results thus obtained will 
be compared with studies on imagined interethnic contact conducted up until now 
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and will enable assessment of the tenability of claims about the potential of imagined 
interethnic contact as a tool for improving interethnic relations.
Such an approach furthermore enables a more direct test of Ethnic Reification 
Theory as an explanation for the interpretation of interethnic contact. In the previous 
chapter this explanation was studied indirectly, through people’s educational level. A 
vignette experiment among a representative sample of respondents offers the possibil-
ity to directly assess whether interpretation of interethnic contact actually works 
through people’s cultural values as predicted in Ethnic Reification Theory. Hence, 
such a research design serves to rule out the problem of self-selection and allows for 
testing causal ordering. As such, survey experiments can overcome a common criti-
cism directed at ‘cultural’ explanations, which is that such explanations are tautological 
because they attempt to explain a certain set of attitudes with another set of attitudes. 
Indeed, survey experiments are the method par excellence to show that culture can 
have real effects and functions as an independent variable (cf. Houtman et al. 2013; 
Houtman and Achterberg 2012). 
5.2  Reincorporating cultural values in studying imagined 
contact 
5.2.1 Imagined interethnic contact research
Up until now, imagined interethnic contact has been studied mainly in the context of 
lab experiments performed among small samples of undergraduates (Stathi and Crisp 
2008; Husnu and Crisp 2010; Turner, Crisp and Lamberts 2007). The design of such 
experiments is usually as follows: the research sample is divided into two groups. Both 
groups will be asked to imagine a certain situation, which is followed by a set of ques-
tions that addresses respondents’ opinions about out-groups in general (e.g. Turner, 
Crisp and Lambert 2007), projection of positive traits onto out-group members (Stathi 
and Crisp 2008), willingness to engage in future interethnic contact (e.g. Husnu and 
Crisp 2010) and the like. One group will function as a control group and will be asked 
to imagine a situation that has nothing to do with an interethnic contact situation. The 
treatment group will be asked to imagine an interethnic encounter which is typically 
said to be a pleasant meeting in which nice things are learned about the person in the 
vignette. A general formulation used for such vignettes is as follows: “We would like 
you to take a minute to imagine yourself meeting [an out-group] stranger for the first 
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time. Imagine that the interaction is positive, relaxed, and comfortable.” (taken from 
Crisp and Turner 2009: 234).38
Such studies on imagined interethnic contact are typically considered part of ‘[o]ne 
intriguing line of research [that] considers whether indirect forms of intergroup con-
tact, interventions derived from the contact hypothesis but not involving face-to-face 
contact, are sufficient to reduce prejudice’ (Turner and Crisp 2010: 130, italics in 
original). Imagined contact has furthermore been ‘proposed as a further implementa-
tion of Contact Theory that can capitalize on the benefits of contact, even where 
opportunities for contact are unlikely or impossible’ (Birtel and Crisp 2012: 745). In 
addition, imagined contact is seen as a ‘versatile experimental paradigm for exploring 
the psychological processes underlying the impact of social contact’ (Husnu and Crisp 
2010: 943). Scholars studying imagined intergroup contact thus explicitly place their 
work within the paradigm of Contact Theory. 
Given this placement within the Contact Theory tradition, it may come as no sur-
prise that the same two problems I have previously signaled in Contact Theory 
research, which result from the neglect of the role of people’s cultural values, also 
appear in imagined contact research. Those two problems are self-selection and the 
assumption of universality of contact effects. Concerning the former, the experimen-
tal design generally used for testing imagined contact excludes the possibility of 
encountering self-selection effects. Nevertheless, there is still a selection problem in 
such studies, namely the use of pre-selected research samples. Similar to what is gen-
eral practice in Contact Theory research, in which studies are mostly based on limited 
samples of college students (e.g. Eller and Abrams 2003, 2004; Binder et al. 2009) or, 
more specifically, undergraduates (Levin et al. 2003; Sidanius et al. 2008; Sidanius et al. 
2004; Van Laar et al. 2005; Van Laar, Levin and Sidanius 2008), imagined contact 
research is mostly based on small samples of undergraduates (e.g. Husnu and Crisp 
2010). Recent research has shown that such samples are highly unrepresentative (Hen-
rich et al. 2010). This is all the more pressing for interethnic contact research since 
educational level is strongly related to ideas about ethnic minorities, which can influ-
ence the evaluative consequences of interethnic contact. After all, as shown in the 
previous chapter, among those ‘self-selected’ samples of more highly educated respond-
ents, it is more likely that contact will ‘work’ than it is among the general population. 
The latter idea leads to the second problematic characteristic of Contact Theory 
research that also applies to studies on imagined interethnic contact: the assumption of 
universal contact effects. Although this assumption is not stated explicitly by Contact 
Theory scholars39, it can be inferred from the way in which Contact Theory is usually 
tested, namely by expecting direct relationships between a certain type of intergroup 
contact and ethnocentric ideas. Those ‘main contact effects’ are only interesting under 
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the assumption that the effect of contact on ideas about ethnic minorities has a uni-
versal nature. Furthermore, only when assuming that contact works the same for eve-
ryone can results obtained from highly selective populations be claimed to hold for the 
population in general, so as to allow the statement that ‘contact basically works’ (Husnu 
and Crisp 2010: 943, italics in the original). These problems are reflected in imagined 
contact research as well, since most of such studies assume direct imagined contact 
effects (cf. Brambilla et al. 2012). Furthermore, despite being tested among small ‘self-
selected’ samples of undergraduates, scholars studying imagined interethnic contact do 
not hesitate to sing its praises as a policy tool for improving interethnic relations. 
5.2.2 Cultural moderation in imagined interethnic contacts
Contrary to the universalist, stimulus-response-like approach in Contact Theory, Gor-
don Allport, founding father of the contact tradition, has already concluded that ‘con-
tact, as a situational variable, cannot always overcome the personal variable in preju-
dice. This is true whenever the inner strain within the person is too tense, too insistent, 
to permit him to profit from the structure of the outer situation’ (Allport 1979[1954]: 
280-281). This suggests a distinction between two elements of contact situations, 
namely the ‘objective’ structure of the contact situation and the personal subjective 
interpretation of contact: not in all cases can the ‘objective’ conditions of contact 
mitigate prejudice. As such, this implies that intergroup contacts that are the same in 
terms of their ‘objective’ structure will not be interpreted by every person in the same 
way. Rather, the evaluative consequences of such contacts will depend upon people’s 
initial ideas about ethnic minorities. 
 The importance of including such initial ideas in the study of the evaluative conse-
quences of interethnic contact can be exemplified when thinking of Contact Theory 
research that distinguishes between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ intergroup contacts (e.g. 
Bekhuis, Ruiter and Coenders 2013; see also Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). It is claimed 
that only ‘positive’ contacts work for prejudice reduction, but the list of conditions that 
are regarded as ‘positive’ does not take into account that these ‘objective’ conditions 
might not result in a ‘positive’ experience for everyone. There are of course social 
conventions of politeness that are more or less generally shared, so that following them 
is generally experienced as ‘positive’. Yet, in intergroup contact situations ethnic back-
ground may for some be a strong enough trigger to disturb this process. This will 
typically depend on the cultural frames of interpretation involved in such evaluations.
To understand which cultural frames will operate in the evaluation of interethnic 
contacts, it is important to realize how attitudes towards ethnic minorities are consti-
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tuted. The previous chapters have shown that a person’s cultural position is most 
important for understanding people’s ideas about ethnic minorities. Both leading to 
ethnic reification, distrust and authoritarianism were found to be most strongly related 
to ethnocentric ideas. This is in line with previous studies which have shown in vari-
ous ways that cultural intolerance is most important for having negative ideas about 
ethnic minorities: ethnic intolerance is mainly directed toward groups that are most 
culturally distant from the in-group population (e.g. Dustmann and Preston 2007; 
Fuchs, Gerhards and Roller 1993), and ethnic intolerance among in-group members 
is mainly rooted in perceiving immigrants as a cultural threat (see chapter three as well 
as for example Kluegel and Smith 1983; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Van der Waal et 
al. 2010; Van der Waal and Houtman 2011). 
Given the former, it can be expected that people’s ideas about cultural differences 
will function as the frame of interpretation through which an interethnic contact situ-
ation is evaluated. In a general sense, those who are more culturally tolerant will be 
likely to interpret interethnic contact in a more positive way than people who are 
more uncomfortable with cultural differences. I can therefore expect that contact will 
mostly ‘work’ for people who are already relatively culturally tolerant.40 Translated to 
the evaluation of a non-Western person in a vignette ‘met’ in an imaginary contact 
situation, it can be expected that this newly-met person will be judged as being more 
sympathetic the more culturally tolerant one is.
This argument can be further extended to consider the evaluative consequences of 
intergroup contact in situations that develop either ‘positively’ or ‘negatively’ in terms 
of social conventions of politeness. The expectation is that in such situations the eval-
uative consequences of contact will also depend on the receiver’s stance towards cul-
tural differences. More specifically, it is likely that ‘negative’ intergroup contacts are 
judged more negatively by those who are culturally intolerant than by those who are 
more open toward cultural diversity. Following the same logic, it can be expected that 
‘positive’ intergroup contacts will lead to more positive judgments among people who 
embrace cultural tolerance than among those more uncomfortable with cultural dif-
ferences. Such differentiating between contact situations that develop either ‘posi-
tively’ or ‘negatively’ in terms of social conventions of politeness is important, since it 
can then be shown that ‘positive’ situations are not by definition evaluated ‘positively’ 
and vice versa for ‘negative’ situations. As such, the tendency of Contact Theory to 
ascribe the failure of contact to ‘work’ for reducing prejudice to characteristics of the 
contact situation itself can then be properly contrasted with the emphasis put on the 
subjective interpretation of situations as put forth by Ethnic Reification Theory.
In sum, the core idea of cultural moderation within the Ethnic Reification approach 
to the evaluative consequences of interethnic contact is that those consequences will 
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depend upon a person’s stance towards cultural differences. When translated to imag-
ined interethnic contacts, this means that I expect imagined contact with a non-
Western person in a vignette to be evaluated more negatively than contact with a 
Western person in a vignette by culturally intolerant persons. Furthermore, I expect 
that violations of social conventions of politeness will result in more negative evalua-
tions of non-Western than Western persons in vignettes the more culturally intolerant 
one is. The two hypotheses derived from Ethnic Reification Theory for understanding 
the evaluative consequences of imagined interethnic contact are therefore as follows: 
Cultural intolerance will lead to more negative evaluative consequences for imagined 
contact with non-Western persons than with Western persons (hypothesis 1). Further-
more, cultural intolerance will lead to stronger negative evaluative consequences for 
imagined contact with non-Western persons who deviate from the social convention 
of politeness (hypothesis 2).
5.3 Research design
5.3.1 Data collection
For a valid test of the hypotheses data are needed from a population that varies in 
terms of cultural intolerance. This study is therefore based on data collected from a 
representative sample of the Dutch population. The data have been specifically 
designed and collected for this study and are part of a larger survey on religion, politics 
and the European Union (Achterberg et al. 2012). The data collection was carried out 
by CentERdata (University of Tilburg) by means of an online survey in the months 
of June and July of 2012. CentERdata is an institute for data collection that specializes 
in online research. Its aim is to maintain a panel of respondents aged 16 years and older 
representative of the Dutch population. The questionnaire was presented to 1,707 
panel members, of whom 1,302 completed the questionnaire. The corresponding 
response rate is therefore 76.3 percent. For this specific study respondents with a non-
Dutch background were excluded. In accordance with the definition of the Dutch 
Bureau for Statistics (CBS), these are respondents at least one parent of whom was 
born outside the Netherlands or who have themselves been born and raised outside 
of the Netherlands. This reduces the number of respondents to 1,177 which in the 
final analysis has been further reduced to an N of 1,103 due to respondents with miss-
ing values on some of the relevant variables. 
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5.3.2 The vignette experiment
The core part of the data collection used for this study is a vignette experiment, in 
which respondents are presented with a vignette (e.g. a short text) that describes a 
hypothetical situation. This situation is then evaluated by the respondents, for example 
by judging the desirability of the situation expressed in the vignette. All aspects of 
interest to the researcher are varied randomly among the vignettes,41 and all vignettes 
are assigned randomly to respondents. Such a vignette experiment enables two types 
of comparisons within the data: comparisons between vignettes and comparisons 
between respondent characteristics. The first type of comparisons allows the assess-
ment of whether certain vignette characteristics affect the evaluation of the vignette, 
whereas the second type allows the determination of whether respondent character-
istics affect vignette evaluations. Of course, and this is an important asset, interactions 
between respondent characteristics and vignette characteristics can be tested as well.42 
These features make such vignette experiments especially suitable for cultural socio-
logical studies aimed at testing whether elements of the situation are evaluated differ-
ently when perceived through a different frame of interpretation. 
The vignettes used vary in four aspects, two of which will be included in the 
analysis.43 The total number of different vignettes that were created can be calculated 
by multiplying the number of options per vignette characteristic used. For the total of 
four characteristics this amounts to 280 different vignettes (based on 5x2x14x2 
options). The vignette characteristics were included in a textual description of a con-
tact situation. The aim was to create a situation that would be realistic both in terms 
of the place of encounter and in the way in which information about the person in 
the vignette is revealed. Therefore, I have chosen to use an encounter situated in a train 
with a stranger who is having a telephone conversation. For illustrative purposes, an 
example of two of the vignettes used can be found in Figure 5.1 below. All respond-
ents were asked to take a moment to read the text and to imagine the situation 
described in it. 
Only the two characteristics that are relevant for this specific study were included 
in the analysis. The first characteristic concerns the nationality of the person in the 
vignette. Five different nationalities were used, namely Dutch, Scandinavian, Eastern-
European, Surinamese and Northern African. These have been converted into a 
dummy variable that distinguishes between Western (Dutch, Scandinavian) and non-
Western (Eastern European44, Surinamese and Northern African), scored one and two 
respectively.
 The second characteristic measures the reaction of the person in the vignette to the 
respondent’s request to lower his voice. A dummy variable is used for measuring this 
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whereby score one stands for a willing reaction including apologies from the person 
in the vignette, whereas score two stands for an unwilling reaction in which the indi-
vidual simply continues his telephone conversation in the same way as before the 
respondent’s request. I will refer to this variable as negative reaction.
The vignette was followed by a set of questions that are aimed at evaluating the 
respondents’ opinion about the person they experienced the imagined contact with. 
Each respondent evaluated only one vignette. All respondents were asked to answer 
questions on political and cultural attitudes as well, including their ideas about ethnic 
minorities. For half of them this was done after the vignette experiment, whereas the 
other half of the respondents first answered those questions and thereafter completed 
the experiment.
Figure 5.1 Two examples of vignettes
 
During a train journey a middle-aged Eastern European man comes to sit facing you. He has 
a telephone conversation in a loud voice. From this conversation you can tell that he works as 
a journalist. You are bothered by the conversation and ask him to lower his voice. The man 
reacts unwillingly and continues his telephone conversation with the same tone.
During a train journey a middle aged Scandinavian man comes to sit facing you. He has a 
telephone conversation. From this conversation you can infer that he works as a road worker. 
You are bothered by the conversation and ask him to lower his voice. The man reacts willingly 
and immediately offers apologies.
5.4 Measures
5.4.1 Dependent variable: vignette evaluation
The dependent variable used consists of five items that evaluate the person in the 
vignette on the extent to which he is seen as sympathetic (i.e. is he trustworthy, do you 
feel safe with him, would you like to talk to him again, etc.). The answer categories 
used for each item range from 1 ‘absolutely not applicable’ to 9 ‘very much applicable’. 
All items used for the dependent variable and the corresponding results from factor 
and reliability analysis can be found in Table 5.1. The results of these analyses show that 
all items tap into one dimension and that a reliable scale can be formed (Cronbach’s 
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alpha is .87). A scale score was calculated for every respondent with a valid score on all 
five items and consists of the mean score on those items. A higher score on this scale 
stands for a greater amount of sympathy for the person in the vignette. 
Table 5.1  Principal factor analysis on items for sympathy,  
Cronbach’s alpha is .87, N is 1,177
Positive
This man can be trusted .74
I would like to talk to this man again .74
I feel safe with this man .85
I feel related to this man .69
This is a nice man .76
Eigenvalue 2.88
R2 .58
Source: CROCUS Survey on Worldviews in The Netherlands III 2012; own calculations.
5.4.2 Respondent variables
For testing Ethnic Reification Theory a cultural value scale was constructed com-
posed of two subscales. The first subscale is a measurement of authoritarianism which is 
a short version of the F-scale that has been validated by previous research (for use of 
the same scale in the Netherlands see De Koster et al. 2010). The scale is composed of 
7 items that tap into one dimension. A Cronbach’s alpha of .77 indicates that they 
form a reliable scale. The scores are computed as the mean score on all items for each 
respondent with at least five valid answers; a higher scale score stands for more author-
itarianism.
 The second subscale, ethnic intolerance, was measured using the six items that are 
listed in Table 5.2. This table shows that these items tap into one underlying dimension 
and form a reliable scale. All six items are based on five answer categories that range 
from 1 ‘completely disagree’ to 5 ‘completely agree’. Scale scores are calculated as the 
mean of those items for each respondent with a valid answer on all six items. A higher 
scale score stands for a greater amount of ethnic intolerance. Both value scales were 
taken together into one variable. This is legitimate because both scales tap into the 
same overarching theoretical concept45. The final cultural value variable is calculated 
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as the mean score of both subscales and will be further referred to as cultural intolerance. 
A higher score on this scale stands for more cultural intolerance.
Table 5.2  Principal factor analysis on items for ethnic intolerance,  
Cronbach’s alpha is .87, N =1,115.
Factor
Foreigners carry all sorts of dirty smells with them. .76
With Moroccan people you’re never sure whether they will suddenly become aggressive. .84
Most Surinamese people work rather lazily. .84
Most Turkish people are rather easy-going at work. .82
Foreigners who live in the Netherlands should adopt Dutch customs and habits. .52
The Netherlands should actually have never brought in foreign guest workers. .58
Eigenvalue 3.32
R2 .55
Source: CROCUS Survey on Worldviews in The Netherlands III 2012; own calculations.
5.4.3 Control variables 
Since the vignette experiment followed a random design, no association is expected 
between the vignette characteristics, nor between vignette characteristics and respond-
ent characteristics. An inspection of the bivariate correlations for all vignette charac-
teristics as well as four respondent background variables - age, gender, income, and 
educational level – shows that randomization has been successful.46 Therefore, no 
extensive control variables were used in the analysis. However, because half of the 
respondents answered attitudinal questions before the vignette experiment, while the 
other half did so after the experiment, I did control for question ordering. Since this 
did not alter the results for the variables of interest, it is not included in the results 
presented in the following. 
5.5 Results
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the results of OLS regression analysis on the extent to which 
the person in the vignette was seen as sympathetic. First, Table 5.3 serves as the base-
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line model in which the direct relationship between vignette characteristics and eval-
uation of the imagined person was estimated. A remarkable finding is that on average 
in the vignettes non-Western persons tend to be judged more positively than Western 
persons. This could be an indication of socially desirable answering. However, a closer 
look at the second and third models in Table 5.3 shows that this is unlikely to be the 
case: the second model in Table 5.3 shows that a ‘negative’ encounter, in which the 
person in the vignette reacts unwillingly to the respondent’s request, clearly leads to 
perceiving that person as less sympathetic. The third model shows that this effect of 
‘positive’ versus ‘negative’ contacts occurs for Western and non-Western imagined 
persons alike, as indicated by the non-significant interaction term. This is not what one 
would expect to find when social desirability had an important role in the evaluation 
of non-Western persons in the vignettes. Hence, in the latter case ‘negative’ contacts 
with non-Western persons in the vignette should have been evaluated less negatively 
than ‘negative’ contacts with Western persons in the vignette.
Table 5.3:  Direct effect models, OLS regression on sympathy, non-standardized regression 
coefficients shown
M1 M2 M3
(Constant) 3.51*** 6.55*** 6.50***
Vignette characteristics
Non-Western .22* .31*** .34
Negative reaction -2.10*** -2.06***
Interaction term
Non-Western*negative reaction -.02
N 1.108 1.108 1.108
R2 .00 .38 .38
Source: CROCUS Survey on Worldviews in The Netherlands III 2012; own calculations
*p<.05; ***p<.001
 
In Table 5.4 the results for a test of Ethnic Reification Theory are shown. First it was 
expected that more cultural intolerance will lead to a less positive evaluation of Non-
Western imagined persons. The first model of Table 5.4 shows the results for the test 
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of this hypothesis. The significant interaction effect indicates that the interpretation of 
imagined interethnic contacts is indeed culturally moderated. Hence, the more cultur-
ally intolerant one is, the stronger the tendency to evaluate a non-Western person in 
a vignette more negatively than a Western. A visual representation of this interaction 
effect is included in Figure 5.2 in which the relationship between vignette nationality 
and sympathy felt for the person in the vignette is plotted for the minimum and 
maximum values of cultural intolerance. Looking at the evaluation of non-Western 
persons, Figure 5.2 shows that those most culturally intolerant tend to find non-
Western persons less sympathetic than Western in these vignettes, whereas for people 
most culturally tolerant this effect is reversed. This supports the first hypothesis and is 
a clear indication that imagined interethnic contacts are culturally moderated.
Figure 5.2   Influence of vignette nationality on sympathy, minimum and maximum conditions of 
cultural intolerance
7
8
9
Figure 5.2 In�luence of vignette nationality on 
sympathy, minimum and maximum conditions of cultural 
intolerance
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
nretseW-noNnretseW
S
ym
p
a
th
y
Min.
Max.
In model 2 of Table 5.4 the second hypothesis is tested which concerns the extent to 
which the sympathy felt for the vignette person depends upon the interplay between 
the person in the vignette’s type of reaction and the respondents’ amount of cultural 
intolerance. I expected to find that more cultural intolerance will lead to a stronger 
penalization of a negative reaction given by a non-Western person than by a Western 
. To test this, the sample was split into two parts, namely one part with respondents that 
were confronted with a Western person, and a second part in which respondents had 
to imagine a contact situation with someone from a non-Western background47. For 
respondents confronted with a non-Western person, a significant interaction effect 
was found which is in line with the second hypothesis: whereas an uncooperative 
reaction by the person in the vignette always results in less sympathy felt by the 
respondent, this is more strongly the case for those with high scores on cultural intol-
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erance than with low scores, but only when confronted with a non-Western person. 
Figure 5.3 shows this interaction effect more clearly. The line between a willing and 
an unwilling reaction for those in the maximum condition of cultural intolerance is 
much steeper than for respondents in the minimum condition. This means that an 
unwilling reaction is indeed penalized more strongly for non-Western persons by 
more culturally intolerant people than by those who are more culturally tolerant. 
Table 5.4  Cultural moderation models, OLS regression on sympathy, non-standardized regression 
coefficients shown
M1 M2 M2
Western non-Western
(Constant) 6.49*** 7.08*** 7.20***
Vignette characteristics
Non-Western .95*
Negative reaction -2.10*** -1.89** -1.32**
Cultural framing
Cultural intolerance .02 -.08 -.01
Non-Western*cultural intolerance -.23*
Negative reaction*cultural intolerance -- -.09 -.29*
N 1.108 439 669
R2 .40 .40 .39
Source: CROCUS Survey on Worldviews in The Netherlands III 2012; own calculations. 
One-sided test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.
All in all, the findings are thus supportive of Ethnic Reification Theory, because they 
show that cultural moderation is important for the evaluative consequences of imag-
ined interethnic contacts. These findings not only contradict the universalistic approach 
to the interpretation of imagined interethnic contacts propagated by Contact Theory 
so far, they also underline the importance of testing the role of imagined contact for 
ideas about ethnic minorities among representative samples of the population. After 
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all, the interaction effects have shown that mainly those who are already tolerant 
towards cultural differences will feel more sympathy for the non-Western person in 
the vignette. Therefore, when testing this theory among selective samples composed 
of people who are already receptive of cultural differences, one might be able to con-
clude that imagined contact ‘works’. My findings, however, show that it is too soon to 
praise the potential of imagined intergroup contact for improving intergroup rela-
tions.
Figure 5.3   Influence of vignette reaction on sympathy, minimum and maximum conditions of cultural 
intolerance
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5.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this chapter Ethnic Reification Theory was tested as an interpretation of how 
imagined interethnic contact is evaluated in terms of the way people think about eth-
nic minorities. A greater understanding of how specific interethnic contact situations 
are related to ideas about ethnic minorities can be attained, so I have argued, by taking 
into account the interpretative frames in which such contacts are evaluated. The results 
are supportive of such logic of cultural moderation: I have found that people with 
more culturally intolerant ideas tend to see non-Western persons in vignettes as less 
sympathetic than Western persons, which is not true for people with culturally toler-
ant ideas. Furthermore, my results show that the interpretation of the ‘objective’ situ-
ation of contact depends on those cultural value frames as well. In effect, whereas 
deviation from social conventions in general leads to less sympathy for non-Western 
persons than for Western persons in vignettes, this effect is stronger the more culturally 
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intolerant one is. In other words, the more culturally intolerant values one holds, the 
greater the tendency to judge ‘negative’ behavior by non-Western persons more neg-
atively than ‘negative’ behavior by Western persons in vignettes. This finding serves to 
show that characteristics of contact situations do not serve as ‘objective’ determinants 
of the evaluation of contact situations, but are subjectively interpreted. The results thus 
indicate that imagined intergroup contacts are interpreted differently according to 
individuals’ cultural value frames concerning ideas about cultural differences. 
 These findings have several implications for research on the relationship between 
imagined interethnic contact and ethnic intolerance. First, this study shows that it is 
important not only to look at ‘objective’ contact situations, which in the case of Con-
tact Theory is usually exemplified through a distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘nega-
tive’ contacts, it is also important to theorize about cultural moderation effects in the 
subjective interpretation of interethnic contacts. Indeed, as described by Zaller, any 
opinion is ‘a marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a men-
tal picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it’ 
(Zaller 1992:6). Therefore, not only imagined contact research but also further research 
into the relationship between other forms of interethnic contact and ethnic tolerance 
can benefit from incorporating the idea that contacts are interpreted differently 
according to the interpretative frames that are salient in that specific contact situa-
tion.  
Second, the present study shows that the enthusiasm for ‘imagined contact’ as a tool 
for improving interethnic relations needs to be tempered. The findings indicate that 
the extent to which imagined contact will ‘help’ improving interethnic relations 
depends on people’s cultural (in)tolerance previous to the imagined contact. Hence, it 
was found that imagined contact only ‘helps’ for those who are already culturally tol-
erant. Furthermore, when it concerns ‘negative’ imagined contacts with non-Western 
persons, I have found that those are weighted more negatively by the culturally intol-
erant, and even though the differences are smaller, the ‘positive’ imagined contacts 
with non-Western persons were evaluated more positively the more culturally toler-
ant one is. It is therefore too soon to praise imagined interethnic contact as a tool in 
the process of improving interethnic relations. 
Third, this study, like all studies on imagined contact, is limited in the sense that 
only a rather superficial form of contact could be simulated through the vignettes 
used. As stated by Allport, such contacts might actually do more harm than good, 
especially among prejudiced individuals (Allport 1979[1954]: 263-264). On the one 
hand, this might serve to downplay the consequences of my findings for interethnic 
contacts in general. Hence, it was only shown that the evaluative consequences of 
imagined interethnic contacts are culturally moderated. One might therefore argue 
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that in real world experiences and in more extensive contacts, the contact effects that 
have been shown to be dependent on people’s cultural values will be less strong, or 
more easily overcome, since only then will contact really get a chance to do its work. 
Nevertheless, according to the cultural sociological perspective that has informed 
Ethnic Reification Theory ‘every action (…) is imbedded to some extent in a horizon 
of affect and meaning’ (Alexander and Smith 2003: 12). In other words, each kind of 
condition will eventually be evaluated through people’s cultural frames. Such cultural 
moderation can therefore be expected to work not only for imaginary exercises like 
imagining intergroup contact, but also in real life intergroup contacts. Additionally, it 
is often stated that the first impression is quite important in determining the extent to 
which a person will be willing to engage in more extensive contact. If the vignette 
simulation performed here can be compared to any real life situation, it might be most 
similar to such a first impression. In fact, this is what scholars studying imagined con-
tact seem to have claimed so far, since they tend to see imagined contacts as the first 
step in a chain that should ultimately lead to high quality in-depth interethnic rela-
tions (e.g. Husnu and Crisp 2010). Contrary to what is suggested in the literature on 
imagined contact, however, such first impressions, even if placed in a ‘positive’ context 
(i.e. the person in the vignette reacts willingly), do not always lead to the intention to 
further engage in such contact. In many ways, therefore, this study has shown that 
interethnic contact might not always ‘help’.
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6.  Conclusion: The Cultural Dynamics Between 
Interethnic Contact and Ethnocentrism
This study has been dedicated to further understanding under which circumstances 
interethnic contact leads to more or less ethnocentrism and how this can be explained. 
Two commonly used theories in this research field, Group Conflict Theory and Con-
tact Theory, were critically assessed. A common problem in both theories, as I have 
argued, is that the role of cultural values is by and large ignored. In Group Conflict 
Theory this can be seen from the main focus of the theory on economic factors, 
thereby leaving ‘little room for the systematic and comparative study of how ideo-
logical structures and cognitive heuristics are used to frame attitudes towards immigra-
tion’ (Pardos-Prado 2011: 1000). In Contact Theory the under-acknowledgment of 
cultural values is demonstrated by the fact that this perspective focuses mainly on situ-
ations where durable interethnic contacts, such as friendships, are already established. 
The mechanisms operating in such durable contact situations are then either extrapo-
lated to first time encounters, or such casual contacts are simply dismissed as being not 
effective for improving interethnic relations. In both cases, failing to include people’s 
cultural values as an explanation for the relationship between interethnic contact and 
ethnocentrism is problematic, since it can lead to misinterpretations of common 
research findings and can moreover form an obstacle to critical theorizing within the 
research field. 
With the aim of overcoming this problem, a cultural sociological alternative was 
developed in the realm of this research project, which was labeled Ethnic Reification 
Theory. This alternative is based on the idea that any situation, be it in national con-
texts or personal encounters, will be interpreted through people’s cultural value frames, 
which makes it vital to include such frames as explanatory variables to understand the 
dynamics between interethnic contact and ethnocentrism. Four empirical studies 
were performed to test this theory, as described in the previous chapters. In this chap-
ter, I will first recapitulate the main findings of those empirical studies and use those 
to answer this study’s main research question. Thereafter, I will discuss the implications 
of those findings for research on the dynamics between interethnic contact and eth-
nocentrism. Subsequently, I will critically reflect upon the moral dimension of such 
research, followed by some ideas for future research and some thoughts on the impor-
tance of cultural sociological research in general.
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6.1 Main research findings
The empirical analysis of this study consists of two parts, each consisting of two chap-
ters. The first empirical part, which comprises chapters two and three, is dedicated to 
studying how national contexts affect ideas about ethnic minorities. Predictions about 
the influence of such contexts were derived from both Group Conflict Theory and 
Ethnic Reification Theory. 
First, in chapter two, I studied the influence of national economic circumstances on 
ethnocentrism. While the country’s economic situation did have a direct effect on 
ethnocentrism and explained more than half of the variance in ethnocentrism over 
years, this turned out not to be rooted in an economic mechanism. Instead, the rela-
tionship between economic context and ethnocentrism was conditional on people’s 
cultural values. More specifically, those experiencing more distrust were found to be 
more ethnocentric the less affluent the economic circumstances in a country were. 
Based on these findings, I conclude that less affluent economic circumstances do not 
serve as a trigger for ethnic competition over scarce economic resources, but rather 
reinforce the negative effect of distrust on ideas about ethnic minorities. This means 
that, different from what is predicted by Group Conflict Theory (e.g. Quillian 1995; 
Blalock 1967; Levine and Campbell 1972), the relationship between national eco-
nomic context and ethnocentrism should not be interpreted as being constituted by 
an economic mechanism. Instead of increasing economic competition over scarce 
resources, less affluent economic circumstances increase the extent to which feelings 
of distrust are translated to ethnocentric ideas. As a consequence, it can be doubted 
whether anti-immigrant attitudes actually have ‘objective sources’ as for example 
argued by Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011: 817). Furthermore, whereas it was shown that 
the economy is indeed ‘important in determining people’s attitudes and behaviors’ 
(McLaren 1999: 169), it was also shown that this does not necessarily work through an 
economic mechanism. 
In the third chapter I studied the influence of immigration context on ethnocen-
trism. The basic idea in this chapter is that instead of expecting immigration context 
to act as an ‘objective’ force on ethnocentrism, which frames of interpretation the 
evaluative consequences of the share of immigrants in a country will be constituted 
should be studied. Following Group Conflict Theory and Ethnic Reification Theory 
respectively, economic interest-based and cultural values-based interpretations were 
distinguished. Whereas the economic interest approach turned out to be relatively 
unimportant for explaining ethnocentrism, the cultural values approach was all the 
more important. It might therefore come as no surprise that for the interpretation of 
the relationship between share of immigrants in a country and ethnocentrism, eco-
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nomic interests turned out to be of no importance. Hence, I did not find that a greater 
presence of immigrants in a country was associated with more ethnocentrism among 
those in a lower economic position. I did find such a framing effect for the Ethnic 
Reification interpretation: the greater the presence of culturally different immigrants 
in a country, the more ethnocentric ideas will be found among those with high 
authoritarian conceptions. Thus, what the third chapter has shown is that Group Con-
flict Theory is relatively unimportant for understanding ethnocentrism and the rela-
tionship between immigration contexts and ethnocentrism. It seems, individuals do 
not really differentiate between economically and culturally based ideas about ethnic 
minorities. On the contrary, people’s stance towards ethnic minorities and the extent 
to which this is influenced by immigration contexts is mostly defined by their percep-
tion of culture and their ideas about cultural differences.
 The second part of the empirical analysis, composed of chapters four and five, is a 
test of Ethnic Reification Theory for the interpretation of individual interethnic con-
tacts, which is contrasted with what is generally claimed in the Contact Theory tradi-
tion. First, in chapter four, it was studied to what extent self-selection plays a role in 
interethnic contacts. This is not a new topic in studies on interethnic contact; never-
theless, my findings indicate that it has been treated too lightly in a great number of 
studies. To study this I distinguished among three elements: type of contact according 
to the extent to which these contacts are prone to self-selection; the cultural values 
that drive self-selection; and the cultural values that serve as frames through which 
interethnic contacts are interpreted. Combining those three elements allowed for dis-
tinguishing between self-selection and interpretation of interethnic contacts. 
What was found is that intimate contacts such as interethnic friendships are mainly 
related to low levels of ethnocentrism because such relationships are mostly started by 
people who are already open to cultural differences. For the types of contact that are 
less prone to self-selection, which in this study is contact with neighbors and with 
colleagues, I found that the interpretation of those contacts is dependent on people’s 
level of education. While for those highest in education contact with colleagues and 
neighbors was associated with somewhat less ethnocentrism, such contact was associ-
ated with clearly more ethnocentric ideas amongst the less educated. This serves to 
indicate that the interpretation of casual interethnic contacts depends upon people’s 
cultural tolerance, an aspect that is by and large ignored in studies based on Contact 
Theory. Furthermore, while Contact Theory researchers claim that mainly interethnic 
friendships lead to prejudice reduction (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2011 for an over-
view), the analysis in chapter four shows that those types of interethnic contact are 
especially influenced by self-selection. The cultural sociological approach used in this 
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study thus leads to a fundamentally different interpretation of a common research 
finding. 
 Chapter five further elaborates upon this idea that people’s cultural values form the 
interpretative frames through which interethnic encounters are evaluated. Using a 
vignette experiment in which respondents had to imagine a meeting with a stranger 
in the train, I found that those low in cultural tolerance judge non-Western persons 
in a vignette more negatively than people who are more culturally tolerant. Further-
more, behavior that goes against social conventions of politeness was judged more 
negatively when done by non-Western persons in a vignette by people low in cultural 
tolerance. The latter serves to further contradict the contention of Contact Theory 
that characteristics of the contact situation are ‘objectively’ related to the evaluation of 
the situation. All in all, I have therefore shown that, contrary to the assumption that 
contact basically works as a prejudice-reducing instrument (see for example Husnu 
and Crisp 2010; Turner, Crisp and Lambert 2007; and Stathi and Crisp 2008), the 
interpretation of interethnic contacts depends on the cultural values that function as 
frames through which a contact situation is interpreted.
 I can therefore conclude that cultural values are essential for understanding under 
which circumstances interethnic contact will lead to more or less ethnocentrism. This 
idea is by and large ignored in the two commonly used theories for studying the 
dynamics between interethnic contact and ethnocentrism. The logic of Group Con-
flict Theory explains ethnocentrism as a phenomenon that mainly arises under cir-
cumstances that incite feelings of ethnic competition (cf. Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; 
Quillian 1995; Blalock 1967). Studies based on Contact Theory operate under the 
assumption that contact works for everyone in the same manner48, thereby ignoring 
the idea that contacts, just like any other event, are evaluated through people’s cultural 
frames of interpretation. Contrary to Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory, the 
present study has shown that people with an ethnic reified worldview, which are 
mostly less educated people, with low amounts of cultural capital, high amounts of 
distrust, and high amounts of authoritarianism, will evaluate interethnic contacts more 
negatively than those who are more highly educated, with higher amounts of cultural 
capital, lower amounts of distrust and holding less authoritarian values. There are cer-
tain circumstances under which this basic difference will come most pronouncedly to 
light: this is when economic circumstances in a country are less affluent, when the 
share of immigrants, both less educated and non-Western, is higher, and when social 
conventions of politeness are broken by non-Western individuals. Intimate interethnic 
contacts have been presented as ways to overcome such reluctant reactions towards 
ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, I have found that such intimate contacts are basically 
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self-selected. This means that those who do not favor cultural differences will tend to 
be unwilling to engage in such intimate interethnic contacts. 
Returning to the example at the beginning of this study of a meeting in a train 
with a stranger who has an ethnic minority background, I can conclude that the inter-
pretation of this situation does indeed depend on people’s frames of interpretation. 
Not for all people will such a meeting be necessarily seen in terms of an interethnic 
meeting. This will most likely be the case for those with an ethnically reified world-
view who are not open to cultural differences. It is therefore likely that the interpreta-
tion of such a meeting will differ according to individuals’ cultural tolerance. For those 
most culturally intolerant, such a meeting would probably lead to a negative judgment 
of the just-met stranger, whereas the opposite is true for those most culturally tolerant. 
As such, the dynamics of interethnic contact and ethnocentrism are in many ways 
dependent upon cultural values that serve as frames of interpretation through which 
immigration contexts as well as interethnic contacts are interpreted, just as predicted 
by the cultural sociological Ethnic Reification approach adopted in this study.
6.2 Implications for research on ethnocentrism
Even though the logic of Group Conflict Theory rightly assumes that national con-
texts affect ethnocentrism, I can only agree with Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) 
who, based on an overview of a great number of Group Conflict studies, conclude that 
it is not so much economic threat, but rather cultural threat which underlies ethno-
centrism and moderates those contexts effects. It is, however, not sufficient to simply 
add cultural threat to the competitive logic of Group Conflict Theory. For the logic of 
Group Conflict Theory presupposes an ethnic divide and assumes that economic and 
immigration contexts can have an ‘objective’ influence, be it in terms of economic or 
cultural interests, that exists beyond people’s subjective interpretations of such con-
texts. Such a positivist approach toward the relationship between economic and immi-
gration contexts and ethnocentrism is contradicted by the cultural sociological Ethnic 
Reification approach that I have introduced in this study. This approach is an attempt 
to treat belief in an ethnic divide as an explanatory variable by taking into account 
people’s ideas about cultural differences, which has shown to lead to a greater under-
standing of ethnocentrism and how it is influenced by economic and immigration 
contexts. Further research on contextual influences on ethnocentrism should take this 
vital insight into account.
 A second implication of the research findings of this study concerns the use of 
interethnic contact in sociological research. Whenever interethnic contact is incorpo-
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rated in sociological studies on ideas about ethnic minorities, it is the straightforward 
version of Contact Theory, as described in this study, that is usually applied (e.g. Savelk-
oul et al. 2011; Tolsma et al. 2008; Schneider 2008; McLaren 2003; Schlueter and 
Scheepers 2010).This means that sociological studies in which Contact Theory is 
tested mainly look at direct contact effects , thereby following the assumption of Con-
tact Theory that interethnic contact works the same for everyone. By showing that the 
evaluation of interethnic contact is dependent on the cultural frames through which 
this contact is interpreted, this study underlines the idea that the universal assumption 
underlying Contact Theory is overly naïve. Furthermore, by showing that interethnic 
friendships are mainly based on self-selection, this study calls into question the inter-
pretation that a negative relationship between interethnic friendship and ethnocen-
trism indicates a ‘genuine’ contact effect (such as for example claimed by McLaren 
2003). In sum, the use of Contact Theory in sociological research should therefore be 
critically revised. 
6.3 The moral dimension of ethnocentrism research
During the course of this study, in which I have read both classical works as well as a 
vast number of more recent studies on the dynamics between interethnic contact and 
ethnocentrism, I could not help but think that our sociological predecessors under-
stood things better than we do nowadays. Many of the insights that I have used to 
formulate Ethnic Reification Theory are taken from those classical works49, of which 
recent research seems to have distilled only some specific elements. Indeed, I am not 
the first one to notice that Allport’s seminal work has later on been canonized in a 
rather simplified manner, its main inheritance being the contact hypothesis (e.g. Torre 
2010; Bramel 2004). Although not claimed explicitly as was done for Allport’s work, 
the same can probably be stated for the Group Conflict perspective. Max Weber’s ideas 
about ‘social closure’ which he describes as ‘the process by which social collectivities 
seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a 
limited circle of eligibles’ (Parkin 1979: 125), are, for example, virtually unrepresented 
in the Group Conflict literature. This is remarkable since Weber’s ideas on social clo-
sure both echo the importance of competition intended as ‘the closure of social and 
economic opportunities to outsiders’ (Ibid, italics in original), and already call into 
question the assumption within Group Conflict Theory that such closure should nec-
essarily be ethnically defined by stating that it can be based on ‘virtually any group 
attribute’ (Ibid). Therefore, the ethnic divide that is presupposed in Group Conflict 
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Theory is highly questionable and can to some extent be seen as a form of ethnocen-
tric thinking itself.
Such theoretical simplification might be a consequence of the positivist logic that 
has reigned over sociology in the past decades (see for example Houtman 2009). 
Nonetheless, I would say there is yet another reason for the relative lack of critical 
theorizing in the research field dedicated to the dynamics between interethnic contact 
and ethnocentrism. Especially after the Second World War, social science researchers 
were concerned with improving interethnic relations. Indeed, as Torre states, ‘[t]he 
atrocities of World War II and the lingering racial segregation in the United States 
ignited the field of intergroup relations’ (Torre 2010: IV). Furthermore, Connolly 
echoes some critical voices in the social sciences when stating that ‘[f]or many com-
mentators (…) it is not the simplicity of the Hypothesis that has ensured its popularity 
within academic and political circles so much as its underlying ideological premises 
(Connolly 2000: 170). Allport himself had been among the first to state a desire for 
improving interethnic relations. Although such a drive might be considered valuable 
from a personal perspective, it can be detrimental for scientific research, ‘[f]or when he 
[the expert] begins to care too much, he begins to see what he wishes to see, and by 
that fact ceases to see what he is there to see’ (Lippmann 1997[1922]: 241).
 This moral dimension of research on the dynamics between interethnic contact and 
ethnocentrism can be discerned by the eagerness with which Contact Theory scholars 
formulate policy recommendations directed towards improving interethnic relations. 
As we have seen when discussing imagined contact research in chapter five, those 
involved in research on imagined contact have not hesitated to praise it as a new 
policy tool for increasing probabilities of interethnic contact and for improving 
interethnic relations (e.g. Crisp and Turner 2009; Turner, Crisp and Lambert 2007; 
Husnu and Crisp 2010; Crisp et al. 2008). This was done despite the fact that no 
research evidence is available that describes the long-term effects of imagining such 
interethnic contacts, and despite the fact that those studies were mostly performed 
among selective research samples of students who are more willing to engage in 
interethnic contacts in any case. 
Moreover, some scholars take their role of social engineers even a step further by 
testing the influence of taking propranolol – a drug that works as a beta-blocker and 
is also used as a tranquilizer – on explicit and implicit prejudice (Terbeck et al. 2012). 
It was found that taking propranolol reduces implicit bias, which is suggested to be 
useful in interethnic contacts among people who are reluctant to engage with ethnic 
minorities and might therefore normally experience anxiety during such contacts. 
Despite their warning that it requires careful ethical consideration, the authors do state 
their ‘findings might also be of practical interest’ (Terbeck et al. 2012: 424).
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 Although the moral dimensions of Group Conflict Theory are not as explicitly 
formulated as in Contact Theory, there is an important assumption in it that seems to 
transcend the level of scientific thought. As argued before, in Group Conflict Theory 
it is taken for granted that group divisions are essentially and necessarily constituted 
by ethnic background. To my knowledge, none of the recent studies on Group Con-
flict Theory presents a critical reflection upon this assumption. A pessimistic take on 
this would be that scholars in this field are probably aware of the fact that such a 
critical reflection would imply the erosion of the core foundation of the theory. A 
more realistic view of this matter, however, might be that scholars in this field are not 
aware of this assumption and somehow presuppose such an ethnic divide themselves. 
If so, this means they are in a way reproducing the status quo on this issue, instead of 
taking the objective distance needed to study ethnocentrism scientifically.
 As follows from the foregoing, some moral issues seem to have a part in both Con-
tact Theory and Group Conflict Theory. These moral issues might have formed an 
obstacle to critical theorizing in studies on ethnocentrism. Indeed, it would not be the 
first time that sociological development is endangered by its vulnerability to politici-
zation (as for example argued by Lipset 1994). Then, whereas many sociologists might 
in theory subscribe to Max Weber’s urge for value-free scientific work, it might not 
always be easy to live up to this in research practice. In my opinion, the cultural socio-
logical approach used in this study offers a sound starting point for putting value-free 
scientific work into practice. This is because it puts people’s own ideas in the forefront 
in attempting to understand how ethnocentric ideas come about. When doing so, the 
interpretative gap between what can be observed and what it means is reduced, leav-
ing less room for the scholar’s own values to interfere in this process. 
6.4 Ideas for future research
This study’s research findings not only close the door on important aspects of Group 
Conflict Theory and Contact Theory, they also open up new questions that have not 
been addressed in this study. The first thing that comes to mind is the current debate 
on the seeming contradiction between Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory. 
How might an Ethnic Reification approach contribute to this debate? Moving a bit 
away from more ‘traditional’ ways of studying ethnocentrism, a fundamental question 
is that of the extent to which evaluations of face-to-face contact situations are trans-
lated into more general ideas about ethnic minorities. Research so far, including this 
study, has assumed that such translation works the same for everyone. This assumption 
can, however, be questioned and requires further study. In addition, another area that 
117
has been disregarded in this study, as well as in others, is that of interethnic contacts 
through media and how those are related to ideas about ethnic minorities. The situa-
tion in terms of contact opportunities has changed, and continuous developments in 
the field of new media are now ‘transforming communication across cultures and (…) 
have dramatically increased contact between individuals and groups from different 
cultures’ (Shuter 2012: 219). One could therefore state that the interpretations of face-
to-face contacts can no longer be made in a vacuum and that it is at least as important 
to gain further insights in the interpretation of so-called mediated contacts. In the 
following I will develop some concrete ideas for research dedicated to the issues just 
named and explain how such research might lead to further insights into the ways in 
which interethnic contacts are related to ethnocentrism.
6.4.1  An Ethnic Reification answer to the contradiction between Group 
Conflict Theory and Contact Theory
A comparison between Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory leads to an inter-
esting contradiction: as we have seen before, Group Conflict Theory predicts that a 
greater presence of immigrants will lead to more ethnic threat and thus more ethno-
centrism. This is diametrically opposed to Contact Theory’s prediction according to 
which a greater presence of immigrants should be related to lower levels of ethnocen-
trism, and as such, this contradiction needs further exploration. Many scholars study-
ing opinions about ethnic minorities have acknowledged this contradiction (e.g. 
Bowyer 2009; Oliver and Wong 2003; Biggs and Knauss 2012), and many studies have 
been devoted to resolving it (for an overview see Della Posta 2013: 253). The general 
conclusion of such studies is that both group conflict and contact mechanisms operate 
simultaneously, but at different levels of analysis (Della Posta 2013; Laurence 2013; 
Biggs and Knaus 2012; Oliver and Wong 2003). Whereas Group Conflict Theory is 
found to work mostly in larger geographical units, such as the effect of the share of 
immigrants in a country on ideas about ethnic minorities, contact effects are mostly 
found at smaller units of analysis, for instance at the neighborhood level. 
Based on those research outcomes, scholars are generally advised to ‘employ geo-
graphic units of analysis appropriate to the actual loci of group conflict, such as polit-
ical jurisdictions or housing or labor markets’ (Bowyer 2009: 563). Similarly, ‘[w]hen 
comparing the impact of contact and conflict across racial environments, the racial 
composition of both the micro and macro contextual unit needs to be considered’ 
(Oliver and Wong 2003: 570). It should be furthermore considered that ‘what gener-
ates hostility is not just a large minority population, but also a high degree of segrega-
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tion’ (Biggs and Knaus 2012: 644), thereby suggesting that ethnic threat and contact 
mechanisms actually interact.
Despite those insights, it remains somewhat unclear exactly how we should under-
stand the finding that both ethnic threat and contact mechanisms operate simultane-
ously. Della Posta (2013) explains this by stating that contact mechanisms can only 
work on smaller levels, whereas threat mechanisms can work on all levels. Neverthe-
less, he only hypothesizes a contact mechanism on the lowest level, without explaining 
why the economic threat mechanism would not work on this lowest level. Two things 
are unclear here: first, why should contact mechanisms prevail over threat mechanisms 
on the lowest level? And second, lower levels are by definition embedded in higher 
levels. Given this, it is unclear how Della Posta’s views can disentangle ‘purely’ higher 
level effects from aggregated lower levels. The latter point is somewhat clarified by 
Oliver and Wong (2003), who state that ethnic spacial and social isolation should be 
taken into account. But more than anything this refers to conditions in which contact 
mechanisms cannot operate and does not really explain why both mechanisms are 
actually found. Laurence (2013) attempts to resolve this matter by claiming that within 
certain communities, namely those more economically deprived, both contact and 
threat mechanisms operate at the same time, whereas in other communities none of 
these two mechanisms are found (Ibid). If this is true, we still do not know to which 
people from those communities the respective mechanisms apply. The core of the 
matter is, therefore, left unanswered.  
  Even though the previous research findings show how Group Conflict Theory and 
Contact Theory can be reconciled statistically, the theoretical explanation of this phe-
nomenon is still rather unclear. Most importantly, research that has studied this con-
tradiction between these theories has to date been unable to explain which mecha-
nisms work for whom and at what contextual levels. This is not surprising, since the 
theories involved in those studies, as I have argued throughout this book, in fact do 
not offer a full answer to this question themselves. Whereas Group Conflict Theory 
fails to offer further understanding of who might be more inclined to define group 
divisions foremost along ethnic lines, Contact Theory does not further theorize upon 
the idea that interethnic contacts might not be perceived by everyone in the same way. 
These issues are resolved by Ethnic Reification Theory; therefore, applying this theory 
to the apparent contradiction between Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory 
might offer an important step forward towards resolving the issue theoretically.
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6.4.2  From specific interpretations to general ideas about ethnic 
minorities
The present study has laid the foundation for acknowledging that interethnic contacts 
are interpreted differently according to the cultural value frames in which those con-
tacts are evaluated. A next step would be to find out how evaluations of specific con-
tact situations are translated into more general and abstract ideas about ethnic minor-
ities. After all, it is not self-evident that interethnic contacts, even intimate ones such 
as friendships, will change the more general ideas that people have about ethnic 
minorities. Some interpretative process of translation should take place here, which 
will not necessarily work the same for everyone. 
 What is, therefore, needed to gain further insights into the conditions under which 
interethnic contacts might lead to changes in ethnocentrism is research that focuses on 
the interpretative process that takes place when translating specific interpretations into 
more general and abstract ideas. Such a study should go beyond the common practice 
in Contact Theory research of simply measuring the ‘effect size’ of contact on meas-
urements of the opinions about ethnic minorities, in which ‘explanations as to why 
particular respondents have experienced attitudinal change are not derived from a 
careful examination of their own experiences and perspectives but are simply “read 
off” from the presence of particular conditions existing within the contact’ (Connolly 
2000: 176). After all, such measurements are imposed on individuals by researchers and 
therefore obscure other interpretative processes possibly left unnoticed in predefined 
questionnaires. A qualitative research approach would therefore be more adequate 
here. 
An example for such qualitative research is to investigate intimate interethnic con-
tacts both by people who are otherwise uncomfortable with cultural differences, and 
by those more open toward cultural differences. Even though this study has shown 
that those more open toward cultural differences will be more likely to have intereth-
nic contacts, examples of culturally intolerant people who are engaged in durable, 
intimate interethnic contacts do exist. What comes to mind in this respect are everyday 
examples of interethnic friendships or neighborhood contacts in which the member 
of an ethnic minority group is seen as an atypical member of this ethnic group. The 
line of reasoning associated with such an idea could be something like the following: 
‘my friend Mohammed is not like those Islamic extremists, he is a good person’; ‘Jef-
frey, my neighbor is a really decent and hard-working person, he is nothing like those 
lazy Surinamese’.  
Studying such examples and contrasting those with intimate interethnic contacts 
among more culturally tolerant people might lead to important insights on two points. 
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First, it will provide further insight in the different mechanisms that people use to 
translate, or not translate, their interpretation of specific interethnic contacts into more 
general ideas about ethnic minorities. Second, studying such specific examples of inti-
mate interethnic contact among people who tend to be reluctant to engage with 
cultural differences can offer insights into the conditions under which they might be 
willing to engage in durable interethnic contacts after all. Therefore, instead of assum-
ing that intimate contacts work, as is done in Contact Theory, studying such examples 
offers the possibility of investigating how, why, and on what level those durable con-
tacts work.
6.4.3 Interethnic contacts in media contexts
Another line of research that would be worth pursuing is the one that focuses on 
mediated interethnic contacts. This is not only important because mediated intereth-
nic contacts, be it through news media, social media or other types of media, can be as 
prominent in people’s lives as face-to-face contacts. Studying the influence of different 
forms of mediated interethnic contact has the potential to broaden our understanding 
of the dynamics between contact and ethnocentrism even further, which might be 
especially true for social media, an example of which is given below.
Some recent studies have investigated the relationship between immigration-related 
news reports, share of immigrants and ethnocentrism (see for example Schlueter and 
Davidov 2013). A still rather unexplored area of research is that of interethnic contacts 
through social media. The internet has the advantage over face-to-face contacts and, 
for example, news media contacts, in that it can offer situations in which people get to 
know each other before having any background information, and thus before know-
ing the other person’s ethnic background. This can for example be the case in thematic 
internet forums that attract people who have an interest in a certain topic. Based on 
the conversations on that forum people can create a relationship even before having 
much knowledge of the other person’s background. Such situations are ideal for test-
ing whether bonding on a topic of shared interest can overcome the burden of ethnic 
background for people who would otherwise be inclined to avoid interethnic con-
tacts. Such research therefore has the potential to offer further insight into the condi-
tions under which interethnic contacts can be formed and how interethnic contacts 
influence ideas about ethnic minorities when the ethnic dimension of those contacts 
is known only in a later stage of the relationship.
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6.5 On the importance of cultural sociology
In this study I have critically assessed two commonly used theories for explaining the 
dynamics between interethnic contact and ethnocentrism. It was shown that, contrary 
to what is usually expected following Group Conflict Theory and Contact Theory, the 
relationship between interethnic contact and ethnocentrism can be best pictured as 
based on a process of cultural dynamics. It was proven fruitful to take into account 
people’s ideas about cultural diversity, which have been shown to structure the way in 
which interethnic contacts are evaluated. This study’s findings, therefore, not only offer 
greater insight into the circumstances under which interethnic contact leads to more 
or less ethnocentrism, but they can also serve as a testament to the importance of a 
cultural sociology.
 Contrary to its critics who claim that a cultural sociological approach can be at 
most useful for describing social situations, but not for explaining them, this study is 
an example of cultural sociological research that is fundamentally explanatory. This 
might be most convincingly underlined by the vignette experiment used in chapter 
five. Since experimental designs are especially apt for testing causal explanations, this 
vignette experiment has shown that cultural value patterns have real causal effects on 
the evaluation of contact situations. On a more abstract level, this experiment has 
therefore shown that ‘culture’ can work as an explanatory, dependent variable as well 
(cf. Houtman et al. 2013). This idea, however, is still not widely shared in sociology.  
Too often, culture is still perceived as a ‘residual category’ that cannot have any 
explanatory power in itself. As stated by Alexander (2005), ‘Sociology has never allowed 
culture to speak its name (…) It has been reduced to ideology or to values, and its 
contents have largely been read off the architecture of other structures, as a reflection 
or an inverted mirror’ (Alexander 2005: 22). This study has shown that such a subor-
dinated role for culture is unfortunate and that it is indeed fruitful to assume that ‘if 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas and Thomas 
1928: 572). Although this statement, better known as Thomas’ theorem, is world-
famous, it is all too often trespassed in sociological research. This is unfortunate to say 
the least: as shown in this study, taking Thomas’ theorem seriously and putting people’s 
own ideas in the center of analysis cannot only ‘also answer the “why” questions 
implied by causal claims’ (Jacobs and Spilman 2005: 11), it can do this even better than 
other sociological approaches can.
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Notes
CHAPTER ONE
1  Other studies have defined ethnocentrism in a more narrow way by stating that it combines out-
group derogation with in-group favoritism (e.g. Coenders 2001). However, in research practice several 
kinds of attitudes towards ethnic minorities which do not neatly follow this narrow definition have been 
presented under the flag of ethnocentrism (e.g. Eisinga and Scheepers 1989). Furthermore, some studies 
have even shown that in-group favoritism and out-group derogation do not necessarily go together (see 
for example Brewer 2007), which argues against this narrow definition of ethnocentrism. 
2  In fact, Allport’s formulation of the contact hypothesis shows remarkable resemblance to the ideas of 
another scholar in his time. In his 1950 book Homans formulated what is now called Homans’ Law, 
which is described by Collins (1994) as such: ‘Homans’s Law, states that the more individuals interact with 
each other, the more they come to like one another, the more similar they become to one another, and 
the more they tend to conform to a common standard. In other words, if a bunch of people are thrown 
together so that they have to interact – by working on the same job in the same place, by living in the 
same neighborhood or village – they start becoming a cohesive group; they develop a group culture that 
didn’t exist before, and they enforce their standards upon each other. (…) Homans’s Law explains how 
group pressures emerge from interaction. His principle has one crucial proviso, however: this process of 
group-formation occurs only if the members of the group start off as equals’ (Collins 1994: 134-135).
3  The authors following this rationale seem to assume that interethnic friendships should necessarily 
lead to the sharing of beliefs and values. It can, however, be questioned whether perceiving beliefs and 
values as similar is a necessary condition for friendship. Another possibility is that differing opinions on 
certain issues are acknowledged and accepted without adopting the befriended person’s view.  
4  Cultural sociology is not a new branch of sociology, since it has existed before, mainly in the 1930s. 
Different from the cultural sociology presented here, this older type of cultural sociology was seen as 
being rather conservative and filled with moral connotations.
5  Blumer already anticipated a broader definition of ethnic threat since he argued that ethnocentrism 
not only could be rooted in economic fears, but also in fears that immigrants may affect the prevailing 
way of life and the sense of national identity (Blumer 1958). Since this idea was only relatively recently 
reintroduced in Group Conflict studies, this is another example of how mainstream scientific forces can 
lead to theoretical simplification.
6  Only recently some authors have tested whether the interpretation of interethnic contacts differ 
among people according to the extent to which they hold authoritarian conceptions (e.g. Hodson 2008; 
Hodson et al. 2009; Dhont and Van Hiel 2010). Unfortunately, those recent studies are based on limited 
samples from undergraduates, which makes generalizations of the research findings highly problematic 
(e.g. Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010). 
CHAPTER TWO
7  There has been much less research attention to this specific role of economic conditions than to the 
presence of immigrants. In fact, in a 1995 publication, when the research tradition was already well devel-
oped, Quillian stated that whereas many scholars expressed this relationship between economic circum-
stances and ethnocentrism, it was still rarely studied explicitly (Quillian 1995). 
8 Please note that ‘ethnocentrism’ as used in this paper does not refer to the strict definition of this 
concept in which it is understood as a negative stance toward the out-group combined with a more posi-
124
tive stance towards the in-group. Just like in many other studies, we rather use it as an umbrella term that 
refers to all sorts of racist/xenophobic ideas and opinions. A prerequisite for such opinions, so we argue, 
is to perceive of, categorize and judge people based on their racial/ethnic background.
9  The years in which the survey was conducted are: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 
1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012.
10  The 17 years included in the analyses are: 1972, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 
1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002.
11  Looking at the items used one might argue that ‘racism’ would be a better label for this variable. 
Although racism might have been used as such in previous research, I have chosen to label this variable 
ethnocentrism to ensure continuity throughout the book. I believe this is justified given the broad defini-
tion of ethnocentrism that I use, namely a general negative predisposition towards out-groups, under 
which racism can be placed.
12  The exact categories for total family income in US dollars are: 1 ‘less than 1,000’; 2 ‘1,000 to 2,999’; 
3 ‘3,000-3,999’; 4 ‘4,000-4,999’; 5 ‘5,000-5,999’; 6 ‘6,000-6,999’; 7 ‘7,000-7,999’; 8 ‘8,000-9,999’; 9 
’10,000-14,999’; 10 ’15,000-19,999’; 11 ’20,000-24,999’; and 12 ’25,000 and more’.
13  An alternative measurement of unemployment is possible here which would include those defined as 
‘temporarily not working’. Defined such the percentage of unemployed in our sample would increase up 
to five percent. However, performing the analyses with a broader definition of unemployment does not 
lead to substantially different results. Therefore I chose to stick to the most strict measurement of unem-
ployment. 
14  Please note that the unemployment rate in the data sample used here is on average lower than the 
overall unemployment rate taken from the official statistics. This difference may be due to the fact that in 
the data sample I use all non-white persons are excluded.
15  It is unknown what period is the optimal period in which transition of ‘objective’ situations into 
subjective judgments will take place. Decisions on the time lag between economic indicators and survey 
answers are, therefore, by definition arbitrary. To assure the robustness of our results, we have also run the 
analyses using t-1 and t-2 respectively as time lags for the economic indicators. This did not significantly 
alter my results.
16  For reasons of clarity I did not report the full random slope models. Hence, all fixed effects will 
remain unchanged in the random slope models, so the only information needed in this step is the model 
fit value (-2*loglikelihood).
CHAPTER THREE
17  This chapter is a revised version of an article by Manevska and Achterberg (2013) that was published 
in the European Sociological Review.
18  The extent to which the share of less educated immigrants is considered an economic threat might 
depend on the total number of low-skilled individuals in a country. Furthermore, it can be argued that as 
a consequence of discrimination, language differences, and labor market and integration policies, educa-
tional level of immigrants might be less predictive of their economic position than it is for natives. How-
ever, a test of those alternative conceptualizations did not lead to significantly different results. For reasons 
of comprehensibility, I have chosen not to include those alternative measurements in the analyses pre-
sented in this chapter.
19  For reasons of clarity, ‘weak cultural position’ is used to indicate individuals who are prone to expe-
riencing distrust. Naturally, I do not wish to suggest that those individuals have less culture than people 
in a ‘strong cultural position’.
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20  Since differing results are expected for non-natives compared to natives, the former have been deleted 
from the sample. From all 35,582 respondents 4,633 were non-natives (measured as having at least one 
parent born in a foreign country). 
21  Some authors have used this scale or a similar one as a measurement of ‘perceived ethnic threat’ (e.g. 
Schneider 2008; Scheepers et al. 2002; McLaren 2003). Others have used such a scale as a measurement 
for anti-immigrant prejudice (e.g. Quillian 1995). Both cases match the definition of ethnocentrism used 
here, which is a negative stance toward out-groups in general.
22  I have also performed analyses with a broader measurement of labor market position by including a 
wider range of categories than just unemployment, as well as a subjective measurement in terms of per-
ceived labor market insecurity. Since those analyses did not result in significantly different findings, I have 
chosen to use only a measurement of unemployment which enhances comprehensibility of the analyses 
and furthermore puts less pressure on the statistical model which includes only 18 cases at the highest 
level and therefore requires a parsimonious use of parameters. Such a dichotomous approach to labor 
market position is even preferred by some authors (e.g. Semyonov et al. 2006, 2008) ‘for accentuating the 
differences between contrasting groups’ (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 319).
23  Usually, occupational educational level is referred to as a person’s cultural occupational status. We 
believe our interpretation of the measurement neither violates nor contradicts this original interpretation.
24  In a more extended version of the analyses, living environment, which distinguishes between living 
in a city and in a rural area, and religiosity were also included. Since those did not significantly alter the 
results, I have chosen not to include them in the final analysis for reasons of parsimony.
25  A rather elevated correlation between the share of less educated immigrants and the share of non-Western 
immigrants (0.81) exists. This might seem troublesome for the analyses. However, the same data have been 
used by Schneider (2008) and yielded interpretable results. Similarly, no problems with collinearity have 
arisen from the analyses (see also note 31).
26  It might be suspected that the percentage of non-Western foreign born is virtually the same as the 
total percentage of foreign born. This is not true: the total percentage of foreign born shows a stronger 
correlation with the percentage of less educated immigrants than with the percentage of non-Western 
immigrants. 
27  Comparing the model fit of an empty model with a fixed intercept (model 0) with an empty model 
with a random intercept (model 1) shows a statistically significant improvement. The differences in the 
average perceptions of ethnic threat in the 18 countries are thus statistically significant. Eleven percent of 
the total variance on ethnic threat can be attributed to differences between countries. 
28  Full models can be obtained upon request.
29  Although often recommended in the literature (Enders and Tofighi 2007; Paccagnella 2006), we have 
chosen not to center the individual level predictors to the group mean. Hence, this would lead to testing 
a model in which the relationship between an individual’s relative group position on an individual-level 
predictor and perceptions of ethnic threat is tested, while the theories under scrutiny do not hypothesize 
such effects. 
30  Since the standard errors of the individual-level predictors are rather stable throughout all models, no 
problems with multicollinearity between individual-level variables are suspected. Furthermore, no exces-
sively high correlations were found between individual-level variables (e.g. the Pearson’s r for education 
and authoritarianism is -.24, and for the latter and ethnocentrism it is .20). 
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CHAPTER FOUR
31  In these studies contact is operationalized variably: sometimes as contacts with friends sometimes 
with neighbors and/or colleagues. The results produced by these different types of operationalization do 
not differ markedly.
32  In a meta-analysis of interethnic contact studies, Pettigrew et al. (2011) compare contacts open to 
choice with no-choice contacts, holding that ‘no choice eliminates the possibility of selection bias’ (Pet-
tigrew at al. 2011: 274). They claim to find stronger contact effects for no-choice contacts, ‘just the oppo-
site as what we would expect from a strong selection bias’ (Ibid). However, they do not elaborate upon 
the way in which choice and no-choice contacts are measured. As a consequence, it is rather complicated 
for the reader to judge the legitimacy of their claim.
33  At this point, one might wonder why I wish to pursue a solution of the self-selection problem that is 
methodologically speaking inferior to the ideal solution. This can be understood by placing the problem 
in its scientific context: studies on the influence of interethnic contact are rather popular and are many 
times based on cross-sectional data. Even if not the ideal, any advancement that can be made to further 
understand the extent to which self-selection plays a role is therefore of great importance. This is espe-
cially important in the case of Contact Theory studies in which rather bold claims are made concerning 
the ‘beneficial effects’ of interethnic contact for people’s ideas about ethnic minorities, a claim that may 
in the end be based on the underestimation of the self-selection problem.
34  The authors following this rationale seem to assume that interethnic friendships should necessarily 
lead to the sharing of beliefs and values. It is, however, questionable whether perceiving beliefs and values 
as similar is a necessary condition for friendship. Another possibility is that differing opinions on certain 
issues are acknowledged and accepted without adopting the befriended person’s view.
35  For an interesting view on the implausibility of self-selection in neighborhoods, see: Putnam (2007: 
153-154).
36  Most of the variables overlap with those discussed in the previous chapter. However, since there are 
not very many variables to discuss and for ease of reading I have included the operationalization of those 
variables here as well.
37  Usually, occupational educational level is referred to as a person’s cultural occupational status. We 
believe our interpretation of the measurement neither violates nor contradicts this original interpretation.
CHAPTER FIVE
38   Variations on this general formulation have been studied as well. It was, however, concluded that dif-
ference in formulation such as providing more detailed descriptions of the situation did not result in 
different findings (Crisp and Turner 2009).
39  Pettigrew himself has stated that previous experiences and predispositions towards ethnic minorities 
are likely to influence the way in which interethnic contacts are interpreted (Pettigrew 1998).
40  I realize that I differ here from previous research in which it was claimed that contact would mainly 
work for those most prejudiced (see Hodson 2011). 
41  In some cases, for example, when the researcher wants to prevent inconsistent combinations within a 
vignette, deviations from random assignment of vignette characteristics to vignettes can take place.
42  Unlike in ‘classical’ experiments, no control group is needed in a survey-based vignette experiment. 
This is because all necessary comparisons can be made within the complete sample. A simple example 
may serve to further substantiate this claim: consider the situation that one would like to assess whether 
feminine or masculine vignettes are evaluated differently by men and by women.  To be able to test this, 
you would need to have examples of men and women both assessing the feminine vignette and of men 
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and women both assessing the masculine vignette. This is provided for in the design itself. Therefore, all 
comparisons that can possibly be needed are included within the design, so no control group is required.
43 The other two vignette characteristics are first, the vignette person’s economic position, which varies 
as follows: 1‘has dropped out from school and is still looking for a job’; 2 ‘has graduated from university 
and is looking for a job’; 3 ‘works as a bank director’; 4 ‘works as manager of a factory for dairy products’; 
5 ‘works as stockbroker at the stock market’; 6 works as the manager of a big commercial company’; 7 
‘works as a journalist at a renowned national newspaper’; 8 ‘works as a psychiatrist’; 9 ‘works as a teacher’; 
10  ‘works as artistic director of a theatre’; 11 ‘works as a car mechanics’; 12 ‘works as a road worker’; 13 
‘works as a cleaner’; 14 ‘works as a plumber’. And second, the tone in which the telephone conversation 
was held, which was either not mentioned, or mentioned as being held in a ‘loud tone’. Although talking 
loudly on the phone might arguably be seen as a form of breaking social conventions, I have chosen to 
use only the negative reaction to the respondent’s request. This is because the latter is explicitly directed 
to the respondent and in that sense provides a stronger treatment.
44  Given the way in which Eastern Europeans are currently framed in public debates in the Netherlands, 
it is justified to categorize them as ‘non-Western’.  
45  The correlation between both scales amounts to .59 (p<.01).
46  Results are available upon request.
47  Ideally speaking, one would want to test a three-way interaction here. However, this resulted in prob-
lems with collinearity that I was unable to resolve. I have therefore chosen a statistically less sophisticated 
method, which nevertheless also serves for testing the hypothesis.
CHAPTER SIX
48  As explained in chapter 5, this is mostly not explicitly stated in Contact Theory research. It can be 
inferred from the ways in which Contact Theory is usually tested. For a more detailed description see 
chapter 5, pp. 91.
49  Many times when presenting my work at conferences I would get the comment that my work is not 
really ‘new’, a remark that mostly comes with some kind of apology. Apparently, some scholars think it is 
an insult when your ideas are judged as being not ‘new’. I would say that, quite on the contrary, it is not 
so important if certain ideas have never been heard before, but rather it is all the more important what 
place they take within a scientific debate. So, yes, indeed, the cultural sociological approach that I present 
here is based on ‘old’ ideas, but they are generally absent in today’s ‘mainstream’ research practice that 
studies the dynamics between interethnic contact and ethnocentrism, and I have shown that reinvigorat-
ing those ‘old’ ideas leads to important new insights.
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Dutch summary
De etnische scheidslijn voorbij. Naar een cultuursociologische verklaring van etnocentrisme
Stel je voor dat je in de trein zit en een man met een andere etnische achtergrond 
komt tegenover je zitten. Als je later gevraagd wordt deze man te beschrijven, zou je 
dan als eerste aan zijn etnische achtergrond denken, of zouden er eerst andere ken-
merken in je opkomen? Als deze man zich onbeleefd zou gedragen, zou zijn etnische 
achtergrond dan uitmaken voor jouw oordeel over hem? Voorgaande vragen kunnen 
slechts beantwoord worden als er meer bekend is over de frames van interpretatie die 
betrokken zijn bij de beoordeling. Immers, het vormen van een oordeel over iemand 
die je voor het eerst ziet gebeurt via een proces van sociale categorisering, gebaseerd 
op kenmerken van de persoon die door de waarnemer belangrijk geacht worden. Het 
kan gaan om iemands uiterlijke verschijning, manier van praten, etnische achtergrond, 
of welk ander kenmerk dan ook dat opgemerkt kan worden en meegenomen kan 
worden bij de beoordeling van dergelijke terloopse ontmoetingen. Welke elementen 
meegenomen worden bij dergelijke categorisering is afhankelijk van het betekeniska-
der van waaruit die beoordeling plaatsvindt. Hoewel het hier beschrevene beschouwd 
wordt als een algemeen geldend principe, is het idee dat frames van interpretatie van 
belang zijn vaak niet terug te vinden in onderzoek naar de invloed van interetnische 
contacten op denkbeelden over etnische minderheden.
 In hoofdstuk één wordt beschreven hoe culturele waarden die fungeren als betekenis-
kaders genegeerd worden in de twee leidende theorieën in onderzoek naar etnocen-
trisme, wat in dit onderzoek in brede zin begrepen wordt als een negatieve houding 
tegenover etnische minderheden. Terwijl de groepsconflicttheorie vooral gericht is op 
economische factoren als een verklaring voor etnocentrisme, bestudeert de contact-
theorie met name hoe etnocentrisme verminderd kan worden door contact met etni-
sche minderheden. Het kernidee van de groepsconflicttheorie is dat negatieve denk-
beelden over etnische minderheden een gevolg zijn van etnische competitie om 
schaarse goederen. Dergelijke competitie zou vooral voorkomen bij mensen met een 
zwakke economische positie omdat deze vergelijkbaar is met de economische positie 
van de meeste minderheden en zij dus waarschijnlijk om dezelfde schaarse goederen 
moeten strijden. Een probleem met de etnische competitietheorie is echter dat deze 
niet uitlegt waarom schaarste van goederen per definitie zou leiden tot intensivering 
van etnische competitie en niet in een vijandige houding tegenover andere sociale 
groepen. Immers, alleen wanneer men al denkt in termen van etnische scheidslijnen 
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zal schaarste van goederen ervoor zorgen dat etnische minderheden en niet andere 
sociale groepen tot zondebok gemaakt worden. 
De contacttheorie is gebaseerd op Gordon Allports contacthypothese volgens welke 
interetnische contacten zullen leiden tot vermindering van etnocentrisme wanneer 
deze contacten plaatshebben tussen individuen van een gelijke status, wanneer een 
gezamenlijk doel wordt nagestreefd, wanneer er samengewerkt wordt, en wanneer er 
institutionele steun voor het contact bestaat. Deze contacthypothese is later verder 
uitgewerkt tot de contacttheorie, waarbij het werk van Thomas Pettigrew en collega’s 
leidend is geweest. In de contacttheorie is de nadruk vooral komen te liggen op 
intieme interetnische contacten, zoals vriendschappen, omdat met name dergelijke 
contacten de mogelijkheid zouden bieden mee te leven met iemand van een andere 
etnische groep en als dusdanig de scheidslijn tussen ingroup en outgroup te vervagen. 
Hoewel Allport, die als grondlegger van de contacttraditie gezien wordt, benadrukte 
dat in gevallen waarin mensen sterk bevooroordeeld zijn het onwaarschijnlijk is dat 
interetnisch contact zal leiden tot reductie van etnocentrisme, gaat men er in onder-
zoek naar de contacttheorie vanuit dat reductie van etnocentrisme via interetnische 
contacten algemeen geldend is en wordt derhalve niet in aanmerking genomen dat 
culturele betekeniskaders, en dan met name de houding ten aanzien van culturele 
verschillen, interpretaties van interetnische contacten kunnen beïnvloeden.  
Het negeren van culturele waarden in de groepsconflicttheorie en de contacttheo-
rie kan ertoe leiden dat veel gevonden onderzoeksresultaten, zoals de negatieve 
samenhang tussen opleiding en etnocentrisme en de negatieve samenhang tussen inte-
retnische vriendschap en etnocentrisme, onjuist geïnterpreteerd worden. De alterna-
tieve theorie die in dit onderzoek ontwikkeld is, de etnische reïficatietheorie, is erop 
gericht dit probleem op te lossen door culturele waarden die van belang zijn voor het 
denken over etnische minderheden op te nemen als verklaring voor etnocentrisme. In 
verscheidene eerdere studies naar etnocentrisme is gesuggereerd dat ‘cultuur’ een 
belangrijke rol speelt voor het verklaren van etnocentrisme. Echter ontbreekt er nog 
een eenduidig theoretisch perspectief waaronder culturele verklaringen voor etnocen-
trisme geplaatst kunnen worden. Het ontbreken hiervan is door sommige onderzoe-
kers aangeduid als reden dat de rol van cultuur nog altijd onderbelicht is in onderzoek 
naar etnocentrisme. Een dergelijk eenduidig theoretisch perspectief kan geformuleerd 
worden vanuit een cultuursociologische benadering waarin twee elementen gecom-
bineerd worden: een culturele interpretatie van de relatie tussen opleidingsniveau en 
etnocentrisme, en het idee dat contexten geen betekenis van zichzelf hebben maar 
slechts betekenis krijgen op basis van culturele interpretatiekaders. Deze twee elemen-
ten samen vormen wat ik de etnische reïficatietheorie heb genoemd.
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Het kernidee van de etnische reïficatietheorie is dat de mate waarin iemand een 
etnisch gereïficeerd wereldbeeld heeft zowel het hebben van etnocentrische denk-
beelden verklaart als fungeert als frame waardoor interetnische contacten en immigra-
tiecontexten worden geïnterpreteerd. De welgevestigde bevinding dat opleiding 
negatief samenhangt met etnocentrisme kan begrepen worden aan de hand van de 
mate waarin iemand een etnisch gereïficeerd wereldbeeld heeft. Het is namelijk aan-
nemelijk dat laatstgenoemde samenhangt met opleidingsniveau. Dit kan als volgt 
begrepen worden: hoewel opleiding veelal gebruikt wordt als indicator voor iemands 
economische positie, fungeert opleiding ook als indicator voor culturele positie. 
Opleiding is namelijk ook een indicator van cultureel kapitaal, dat in deze context 
zoveel behelst als het vermogen om culturele expressies als dusdanig te herkennen en 
de betekenis ervan te begrijpen. Cultureel kapitaal wordt, in moderne liberale demo-
cratieën tenminste, geacht een gedenaturaliseerd idee van cultuur te stimuleren, wat 
het tegenovergestelde is van een gereïficeerd beeld van cultuur. 
Met een gereïficeerd wereldbeeld wordt bedoeld dat de werkelijkheid gezien wordt 
als statisch, natuurlijk en onveranderlijk. Een dergelijk idee van de sociale werkelijk-
heid gaat goed samen met een beeld van de eigen cultuur als iets ‘natuurlijks’ en iets 
wat onveranderd behouden moet blijven. Een dergelijk gereïficeerd wereldbeeld gaat 
ook samen met het idee dat etniciteit en cultuur vaststaande combinaties zijn, waarbij 
gedacht wordt dat iemand met een Nederlandse achtergrond per definitie de Neder-
landse cultuur zal aanhangen, iemand met een Turkse achtergrond de Turkse cultuur, 
enzovoorts. Vanuit een dergelijk etnisch gereïficeerd perspectief wordt iedereen met 
een andere etnische achtergrond gezien als drager van een ‘deviante’ cultuur. Het 
tegenovergestelde is waar voor mensen met een gedereïficeerd wereldbeeld. Zij zullen 
culturele verschillen als legitiem zien en als vast onderdeel van de samenleving. Ook 
zullen mensen met een gedereïficeerd wereldbeeld etniciteit niet zien als iets wat op 
‘natuurlijke’ wijze samenhangt met een bepaald cultureel verhaal. Zij zullen eerder 
geneigd zijn te denken dat ieder mens een eigen cultureel verhaal aan kan hangen om 
de wereld mee te duiden, ongeacht etnische achtergrond. Samengenomen zullen 
mensen met een gereïficeerd wereldbeeld dus eerder geneigd zijn om culturele ver-
schillen af te wijzen, terwijl mensen met een gedereïficeerd wereldbeeld culturele 
verschillen eerder zullen omarmen. 
Het is te verwachten dat twee waardepatronen samengaan met de mate waarin 
iemand een gereïficeerd wereldbeeld heeft: autoritarisme en wantrouwen. Dit is voor 
eerstgenoemde het geval omdat het afwijzen van culturele verschillen en deze zien als 
schending van de natuurlijke orde naar alle waarschijnlijkheid samen zal gaan met een 
voorkeur voor orde en regels. Een gereïficeerd wereldbeeld zal ook samengaan met 
wantrouwen jegens anderen aangezien elke persoon in potentie een bedreiging kan 
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vormen voor wat als ‘normaal’ gezien wordt, waarbij dit met name het geval is voor 
mensen met een andere etnische achtergrond omdat zij per definitie gezien worden 
als dragers van een ‘deviante’ cultuur. 
Samenvattend kan dus gesteld worden dat etnocentrisme verklaard kan worden uit 
de mate waarin iemand een etnisch gereïficeerd wereldbeeld heeft, wat samenhangt 
met opleidingsniveau, cultureel kapitaal, autoritarisme en ervaren wantrouwen.  De 
culturele interpretatie van de negatieve relatie tussen opleidingsniveau en etnocen-
trisme is dus gebaseerd op het principe van etnische reïficatie. Ditzelfde principe is 
ook van toepassing op het tweede element van de etnische reïficatietheorie, namelijk 
de interpretatie van interetnische contacten en immigratiecontexten. Dergelijke con-
texten zullen alleen gerelateerd zijn aan etnocentrisme als deze geïnterpreteerd wor-
den door een frame wat zelf gerelateerd is aan etnocentrisme. Het meest belangrijke 
frame in dit opzicht is volgens de etnische reïficatietheorie de mate waarin iemand 
een etnisch gereïficeerd wereldbeeld heeft, of anders gezegd, de mate waarin iemand 
de werkelijkheid ziet in termen van etnische scheidslijnen. 
In dit onderzoek wordt de etnische reïficatietheorie systematisch getoetst ten 
opzichte van respectievelijk de groepsconflicttheorie en de contacttheorie. De onder-
zoeksvraag die hiermee beantwoord wordt luidt als volgt: Onder welke omstandigheden 
leidt interetnisch contact tot meer of minder etnocentrisme en hoe kan dit verklaard worden? In 
vier empirische hoofdstukken worden deelvragen onderzocht waarbij de fundamen-
tele elementen uit de groepsconflicttheorie en de contacttheorie worden gecontras-
teerd met de etnische reïficatietheorie. In alle hoofdstukken wordt gebruik gemaakt 
van kwantitatieve data. Waar mogelijk is steeds Nederlandse data gebruikt, voor hoofd-
stuk twee en drie moest echter uitgeweken worden naar respectievelijk Amerikaanse 
data, namelijk het General Social Survey, en landen vergelijkende data, met inbegrip van 
Nederland, uit de eerste wave van het European Social Survey. Het vierde hoofdstuk 
gebruikt eveneens het European Social Survey maar dan alleen data die betrekking heb-
ben op Nederland. Waar de eerste drie empirische hoofdstukken dus gebaseerd zijn op 
secundaire data, is het laatste empirische hoofdstuk gebaseerd op primaire data verza-
meld binnen de derde wave van het CROCUS Survey on Worldviews in the Netherlands.
Hoofdstuk twee bestudeert in hoeverre de relatie tussen economische context en 
etnocentrisme begrepen kan worden uit iemands economische of culturele positie. 
Het is een bekend fenomeen dat onder relatief onfortuinlijke economische omstan-
digheden gezocht wordt naar een zondebok, maar het is nog onduidelijk of dit feno-
meen ingegeven wordt door economische of culturele motieven. In dit hoofdstuk 
wordt dan ook bestudeerd in hoeverre de relatie tussen economische context en etnocentrisme 
begrepen kan worden uit de economische of culturele positie van individuen. Volgens de groeps-
conflicttheorie zouden relatief onfortuinlijke omstandigheden leiden tot meer etno-
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centrisme omdat economische bronnen, zoals laaggeschoolde banen en sociale huis-
vesting, dan schaarser worden wat leidt tot intensivering van competitie om schaarse 
goederen. Dit zal vooral het geval zijn bij mensen met een zwakke economische 
positie omdat zij in sterkere mate afhankelijk zijn van dergelijke bronnen. De groeps-
conflicttheorie voorspelt dan ook dat hoe slechter de economische omstandigheden 
zijn, des te meer mensen in een zwakke economische positie, gemeten als een laag 
inkomen en een zwakke arbeidsmarktpositie, er etnocentrische denkbeelden op na 
zullen houden. Echter, aangezien eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat culturele 
motieven op individueel niveau belangrijker zijn dan economische motieven als ver-
klaring voor etnocentrisme, zou het ook zo kunnen zijn dat relatief slechte economi-
sche omstandigheden het culturele mechanisme wat leidt tot etnocentrisme versterkt. 
Het kan dan ook zo zijn dat onder relatief slechte economische omstandigheden 
mensen met een etnisch gereïficeerd wereldbeeld in sterkere mate etnocentrisch zul-
len zijn dan onder meer voorspoedige economische omstandigheden. Oftewel, op 
basis van de etnische reïficatietheorie kan verwacht worden dat het effect van oplei-
ding en wantrouwen op etnocentrisme sterker zal zijn naarmate de economische 
omstandigheden in een land slechter zijn.
Hoewel uit de analyses is gebleken dat de economische situatie een direct effect 
heeft op etnocentrisme en meer dan de helft van de variantie in etnocentrisme over 
de tijd verklaart, is dit effect niet het gevolg van een economisch mechanisme zoals te 
verwachten volgens de groepsconflicttheorie. In plaats daarvan bleek de relatie tussen 
economische context en etnocentrisme af te hangen van de culturele waarden die 
mensen erop nahouden, namelijk doordat onder minder fortuinlijke economische 
omstandigheden diegenen die minder vertrouwen in andere mensen hebben in ster-
kere mate etnocentrische denkbeelden hebben dan onder relatief voorspoedige eco-
nomische omstandigheden. Op basis van deze bevindingen concludeer ik dat minder 
fortuinlijke economische omstandigheden niet zozeer werken als een impuls voor 
etnische competitie om schaarse goederen, maar met name het positieve effect van 
wantrouwen op etnocentrisme versterken. De bevinding dat slechte economische 
omstandigheden samenhangen met meer etnocentrisme kan dus niet verklaard wor-
den door de economische logica van de groepsconflicttheorie, maar door een cultu-
rele logica zoals verwacht volgens de etnische reïficatietheorie.
In hoofdstuk drie wordt op een vergelijkbare manier de etnische reïficatietheorie 
getoetst ten opzichte van de groepsconflicttheorie, ditmaal in relatie tot het aandeel 
immigranten in een land. De vraag die hierbij centraal staat is in hoeverre het aandeel 
immigranten in een land etnocentrisme beïnvloedt en hoe dit verklaard kan worden op basis van 
economische of culturele motieven. Volgens de groepsconflicttheorie zou een groter aan-
deel immigranten in een land leiden tot meer etnische competitie en dus tot meer 
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etnocentrisme. Dit zal vooral het geval zijn als het gaat om immigranten met een 
zwakke economische positie, zoals laagopgeleide immigranten, omdat verwacht wordt 
dat er dan competitie plaats zal vinden tussen hen en autochtonen in eenzelfde zwakke 
economische positie. Dezelfde logica kan hierop toegepast worden als wanneer natio-
nale economische omstandigheden verslechterd zijn: economische bronnen, zoals 
laaggeschoolde banen en sociale huisvesting, worden schaarser wat leidt tot intensive-
ring van competitie om schaarse goederen. Een relatief hoog aandeel immigranten in 
een land zal er dan ook toe leiden dat in sterkere mate etnische dreiging ervaren 
wordt, resulterend in meer etnocentrische denkbeelden. De bijbehorende hypothese 
is dat mensen met een laag inkomen, een zwakke arbeidsmarktpositie en een sterke 
mate van autoritaristische denkbeelden er meer etnocentrische ideeën op na zullen 
houden en dat dit sterker het geval zal zijn hoe groter het aandeel laagopgeleide immi-
granten in een land. 
Volgens de etnische reïficatietheorie wordt de immigratiecontext van een land niet 
geïnterpreteerd volgens een economische logica, maar hangt interpretatie ervan af van 
de mate waarin iemand een etnisch gereïficeerd wereldbeeld heeft. Voor mensen met 
een etnisch gereïficeerd wereldbeeld mag verwacht worden dat een groter aandeel 
niet-Westerse immigranten zal leiden tot meer etnocentrisme, omdat een dergelijk 
groter aandeel immigranten in sterkere mate een schending van de ‘natuurlijke’ orde 
betekent en in sterkere mate gezien wordt als het onder druk zetten van de eigen cul-
tuur. De resultaten van de empirische analyse wijzen erop dat de economische inter-
pretatie van de groepsconflicttheorie niet ondersteund wordt. In plaats daarvan bleek 
het zo te zijn dat een groter aandeel cultureel verschillende (niet-Westerse) immigran-
ten in een land leidt tot meer etnocentrische ideeën onder mensen die in sterke mate 
autoritaristische denkbeelden hebben. Het lijkt er dus op dat mensen niet zozeer 
onderscheid maken tussen economische en culturele ideeën over etnische minderhe-
den, maar dat het voor de interpretatie van immigratiecontexten vooral van belang is 
hoe men denkt over cultuur en over culturele verschillen, ofwel, in hoeverre men een 
etnisch gereïficeerd wereldbeeld heeft.
Hoofdstuk vier is gericht op het vraagstuk van zelfselectie in interetnische contacten. 
Dit is een welbekend probleem bij het bestuderen van de relatie tussen interetnische 
contacten en etnocentrisme. Het punt is dat de causale volgorde niet eenduidig is: 
volgens de contacttheorie leidt interetnisch contact tot minder etnocentrisme, het is 
echter ook aannemelijk dat etnocentrisme leidt tot minder interetnisch contact. 
Ondanks verscheidene inspanningen om dit zelfselectie probleem op te lossen, zijn er 
aanwijzingen in de literatuur dat dit probleem nog altijd onderschat wordt. Het is 
namelijk zo dat intieme interetnische contacten, zoals vriendschappen, aangemerkt 
worden als het type contact waarbij reductie van etnocentrisme het sterkste plaats-
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vindt. Dit is echter ook het soort contact waarbij zelfselectie het meest waarschijnlijk 
is. Oftewel, het is nog onduidelijk of de sterke negatieve samenhang tussen interetni-
sche vriendschap en etnocentrisme geïnterpreteerd moet worden als contacteffect of 
als effect van zelfselectie. Om dit probleem op te lossen worden in dit hoofdstuk drie 
elementen onderscheiden: het type contact naar ruimte voor zelfselectie; culturele 
voorkeuren voor zelfselectie; en culturele interpretatie van interetnische contacten. De 
deelvraag die in dit hoofdstuk beantwoord wordt luidt dan ook als volgt: In hoeverre 
kunnen zelfselectie en ‘echte’ contacteffecten onderscheiden worden door de dubbele rol van oplei-
ding als drijfveer achter zelfselectie en als basis voor de interpretatie van interetnische contacten te 
bestuderen?
 Omdat typen contact verschillen in de mate waarin er ruimte is voor zelfselectie 
wordt er een onderscheid gemaakt tussen interetnische vriendschappen enerzijds, en 
buurtcontact en contact op het werk anderzijds. Bij laatstgenoemde twee vormen van 
contact zal er minder ruimte zijn voor zelfselectie dan het geval is bij interetnische 
vriendschappen. Het tweede element dat onderscheiden wordt betreft de culturele 
voorkeuren op basis waarvan zelfselectie plaats zal vinden. Het is te verwachten dat 
ideeën omtrent culturele diversiteit zelfselectie aan zullen sturen. Aangezien interet-
nisch contact vereist om te gaan met mensen met een andere culturele achtergrond, 
ligt het in de lijn der verwachting dat mensen die minder open staan voor culturele 
verschillen minder geneigd zullen zijn om interetnische contacten aan te gaan dan 
mensen die in sterkere mate open staan voor culturele verschillen. Aangezien eerder 
onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat de mate waarin iemand open staat voor culturele 
verschillen positief samenhangt met opleidingsniveau, valt het te verwachten dat 
laagopgeleiden sterker geneigd zullen zijn interetnische contacten te vermijden, ter-
wijl hoogopgeleiden eerder geneigd zullen zijn interetnische contacten aan te gaan. 
Opleiding speelt echter niet alleen een rol bij selectie van contacten, het is ook te 
verwachten dat de interpretatie van interetnische contacten afhangt van iemands 
opleidingsniveau. Dit kan begrepen worden vanuit een framing perspectief: het is aan-
nemelijk dat interpretatie van interetnische contacten, net als elke andere situatie, af zal 
hangen van de culturele waarden die fungeren als culturele interpretatiekaders van 
waaruit situaties geduid worden. Toegepast op interetnisch contact valt op basis van 
een framing perspectief dus te verwachten dat hoe men denkt over etnische diversiteit 
herbevestigd wordt via interetnisch contact. Oftewel, individuen kunnen dezelfde 
contactsituatie verschillend van elkaar interpreteren afhankelijk van de manier waarop 
zij tegen etnische diversiteit aankijken. Ook hier is een centrale rol weggelegd voor 
opleiding: hoger opgeleiden zullen positiever staan tegenover etnische minderheden 
dan laagopgeleiden, interetnisch contact bij hoogopgeleide autochtonen zal dus 
samengaan met minder etnocentrisme dan interetnisch contact bij laagopgeleiden. 
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Op basis van deze drie elementen kunnen twee clusters van hypothesen afgeleid 
worden, respectievelijk van toepassing op contact dat vatbaar is voor zelfselectie (inte-
retnische vriendschappen) en contact waarbij dit niet zozeer het geval is (buurtcontact 
en contact met collega’s). De drie hypothesen uit het eerste cluster luiden als volgt: Er 
is een positieve relatie tussen opleiding en interetnische vriendschap; er is een nega-
tieve relatie tussen interetnische vriendschap en etnocentrisme; er treedt geen framing 
op waardoor het niet zo is dat het hebben van interetnische vriendschappen de relatie 
tussen opleidingsniveau en etnocentrisme versterkt. Alleen als al deze drie hypothesen 
bevestigd worden kan men concluderen dat de relatie tussen interetnische vriendschap 
en etnocentrisme voornamelijk toe te schrijven is aan zelfselectie. Het tweede cluster 
hypothesen heeft betrekking op buurtcontact en contact met collega’s. Aangezien 
verwacht wordt dat zelfselectie hier geen grote rol speelt wordt er niet noodzakelijker-
wijs een relatie verwacht tussen opleidingsniveau en deze twee vormen van contact. 
Aangezien verwacht wordt dat deze vormen van contact verschillend geïnterpreteerd 
zullen worden, kan ook geen relatie voorspeld worden tussen deze twee vormen van 
interetnisch contact en etnocentrisme. Er wordt wel verwacht dat interetnisch contact 
met buren en met collega’s ervoor zal zorgen dat de negatieve relatie tussen opleiding-
sniveau en etnocentrisme sterker zal zijn, dit omdat dergelijke contacten al bestaande 
denkbeelden over etnische minderheden zullen herbevestigen.
Uit de resultaten blijkt dat intieme interetnische contacten, zoals vriendschappen, 
met name gerelateerd zijn aan een mindere mate van etnocentrisme omdat zulke rela-
ties voornamelijk worden aangegaan door mensen die al een open houding hebben 
ten aanzien van culturele diversiteit. Voor de typen contact waarbij zelfselectie minder 
een rol kan spelen, zoals bij buurtcontact en bij interetnisch contact op het werk, heb 
ik gevonden dat de interpretatie van dergelijke contacten afhankelijk is van iemands 
opleidingsniveau. Terwijl interetnisch contact met collega’s en met buren voor hoog-
opgeleiden in geringe mate samen bleek te hangen met minder etnocentrisme, was er 
voor laagopgeleiden sprake van meer etnocentrisme bij het hebben van dergelijke 
interetnische contacten. Deze bevinding toont aan dat de interpretatie van terloopse 
interetnische contacten afhankelijk is van de mate waarin men cultureel tolerant is, 
een aspect wat goeddeels genegeerd is in onderzoek gebaseerd op de contacttheorie. 
Daarnaast heeft de analyse in dit hoofdstuk aangetoond dat met name interetnische 
vriendschappen onderhevig zijn aan zelfselectie, dit terwijl onderzoekers naar de con-
tacttheorie claimen dat vooral interetnische vriendschappen leiden tot reductie van 
etnocentrisme. Mijn onderzoeksbevindingen geven reden tot het betwijfelen van deze 
claim en de cultuursociologische benadering die in dit onderzoek is toegepast leidt 
dan ook tot een fundamenteel andere interpretatie van een vaak gevonden empirische 
relatie.
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In hoofdstuk vijf wordt de etnische reïficatietheorie ten slotte getoetst voor de inter-
pretatie van ingebeelde interetnische contacten. Onderzoekers binnen de contacttra-
ditie hebben de laatste jaren de loftrompet geblazen over de potentie van ingebeeld 
interetnisch contact als manier om het terugdringen van etnocentrische ideeën te 
bevorderen. Echter, net als ander onderzoek in de contacttraditie, zijn onderzoekers er 
steeds vanuit gegaan dat ingebeeld interetnisch contact een algemeen geldend effect 
heeft. De etnische reïficatietheorie suggereert echter dat interpretatie van interetni-
sche contacten afhankelijk is van culturele waarden die fungeren als interpretatieka-
ders. Om dit te toetsen heb ik gebruik gemaakt van een vignetexperiment waarin 
respondenten zich een ontmoeting inbeeldden met een onbekende die tegenover hen 
kwam zitten in de trein en een telefoongesprek voerde. In het vignet werd onder 
andere de etnische achtergrond van de onbekende gevarieerd, alsook de reactie van de 
onbekende op het verzoek van de respondent om zachter te praten. De analyseresul-
taten wijzen erop dat mensen met weinig culturele tolerantie niet-Westerse vignet-
personen negatiever beoordelen ten opzichte van Westerse vignetpersonen dan het 
geval is bij mensen die in sterke mate cultureel tolerant zijn. Daarnaast werd gedrag 
wat ingaat tegen conventionele beleefdheidsnormen sterker veroordeeld bij niet-Wes-
terse vignetpersonen door mensen die in mindere mate cultureel tolerant zijn. Laatst-
genoemde bevinding weerspreekt de veelgemaakte claim in onderzoek naar de con-
tacttheorie dat kenmerken van interetnische contactsituaties op een ‘objectieve’ manier 
verbonden zijn aan evaluaties van dergelijke situaties. Op basis van deze bevindingen 
kan de veelgemaakte claim dat contact simpelweg werkt als een instrument om etno-
centrisme te reduceren dan ook in twijfel getrokken worden. Interpretatie van inge-
beelde contacten is afhankelijk van culturele waarden die fungeren als frames waarbin-
nen contactsituaties geïnterpreteerd worden. Dit is in hoofdstuk vier aangetoond voor 
terloopse contacten als buurtcontact en contact met collega’s en in hoofdstuk vijf voor 
ingebeeld contact.
Samenvattend kan ik dus concluderen dat culturele waarden essentieel zijn om te 
verklaren onder welke omstandigheden interetnisch contact tot meer of minder etno-
centrisme zal leiden. Dit idee is grotendeels onderbelicht gebleven bij de twee lei-
dende theorieën over de relatie tussen interetnisch contact en etnocentrisme. Binnen 
de groepsconflicttheorie wordt etnocentrisme verklaard als een fenomeen dat met 
name opkomt onder omstandigheden die aanleiding geven tot het ervaren van etni-
sche competitie om schaarse goederen. Onderzoek in de contacttraditie is goeddeels 
gebaseerd op de assumptie dat interetnisch contact voor iedereen op dezelfde manier 
werkt, waarbij het idee genegeerd wordt dat evaluatie van contacten, net als van elke 
andere situatie, gebaseerd is op culturele interpretatiekaders. Tegengesteld aan de 
groepsconflicttheorie en de contacttheorie heeft dit onderzoek aangetoond dat men-
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sen met een etnisch gereïficeerd wereldbeeld, met name laagopgeleiden, met een 
geringe hoeveelheid cultureel kapitaal, een grote mate van wantrouwen, en sterke 
mate van autoritaristische ideeën interetnische contacten negatiever zullen beoorde-
len dan hoger opgeleiden, met meer cultureel kapitaal, weinig wantrouwen, en weinig 
autoritaristische denkbeelden. 
Onder bepaalde omstandigheden komt dit verschil tussen mensen met een gereïfi-
ceerd wereldbeeld en met een gedereïficeerd wereldbeeld het sterkst naar voren. Dit 
is het geval als economische omstandigheden relatief slecht zijn, als het aandeel immi-
granten in een land hoger is, en als sociale beleefdheidsconventies geschonden worden 
door personen met een niet-Westerse etnische achtergrond. In eerder onderzoek wer-
den intieme interetnische contacten gepresenteerd als manieren om afwijzende reac-
ties jegens etnische minderheden terug te dringen. Mijn bevindingen wijzen er echter 
op dat dergelijke intieme contacten met name bestaan bij de gratie van zelfselectie, 
wat betekent dat mensen die negatief staan tegenover culturele diversiteit niet snel 
geneigd zullen zijn om intieme interetnische contacten aan te gaan.
Teruggrijpend op de ontmoeting in de trein met een onbekende man van een 
andere etnische achtergrond, zoals in het begin beschreven, kan ik concluderen dat de 
interpretatie van deze situatie inderdaad afhankelijk is van iemands interpretatieframes. 
Niet iedereen zal een dergelijke ontmoeting per definitie zien als een interetnische 
ontmoeting, dit zal vooral het geval zijn bij mensen met een etnische gereïficeerd 
wereldbeeld die afwijzend staan tegenover culturele verschillen. Het is dan ook waar-
schijnlijk dat de interpretatie van een dergelijke ontmoeting zal verschillen naar de 
mate van culturele tolerantie die iemand erop nahoudt. Een dergelijke ontmoeting zal 
voor personen die in hoge mate cultureel intolerant zijn waarschijnlijk leiden tot een 
negatieve beoordeling van de onbekende persoon, terwijl het tegenovergestelde het 
geval zal zijn voor mensen die in sterke mate cultureel tolerant zijn. De dynamiek tus-
sen interetnisch contact en etnocentrisme is dus in vele opzichten afhankelijk van 
culturele waarden die fungeren als kaders waarbinnen zowel migratiecontexten als 
concrete situaties van interetnisch contact geïnterpreteerd worden, zoals voorspeld in 
de cultuursociologische etnische reïficatiebenadering die in dit onderzoek is toege-
past.
Hoewel in verscheidene eerdere onderzoeken de houdbaarheid van de groepscon-
flicttheorie als verklaring voor etnocentrisme in twijfel is gesteld, blijft onderzoek 
vanuit deze theoretische benadering schijnbaar onverminderd populair. Middels de 
etnische reïficatietheorie ontwikkeld in deze studie heb ik getracht een cultuursocio-
logisch alternatief voor het verklaren van etnocentrisme te bieden, wat inzicht geeft in 
de condities waaronder en de personen waarbij etnocentrisme met name op zal 
komen. In plaats van het denken in termen van etnische scheidslijnen als gegeven te 
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nemen stelt deze cultuursociologische benadering etnische reïficatie juist centraal als 
verklarende variabele. Deze studie heeft aangetoond dat een dergelijke benadering 
leidt tot een beter begrip van etnocentrisme en van hoe etnocentrische denkbeelden 
worden beïnvloed door economische en immigratie contexten. Het zou dan ook 
vruchtbaar zijn om een dergelijke cultuursociologische benadering in vervolgonder-
zoek over te nemen.
Ook het gebruik van de contacttheorie in sociologisch onderzoek naar de relatie 
tussen interetnisch contact en etnocentrisme zou op basis van mijn onderzoeksbevin-
dingen herzien moeten worden. Wanneer interetnisch contact wordt opgenomen in 
sociologisch onderzoek naar denkbeelden over etnische minderheden wordt over het 
algemeen de eenvoudige versie van de contacttheorie zoals hier beschreven gebruikt. 
Dit houdt in dat over het algemeen alleen directe relaties tussen interetnisch contact 
en etnocentrisme bestudeerd worden, waarbij de a-sociologische assumptie gehan-
teerd wordt dat interetnisch contact voor iedereen op dezelfde manier werkt. Een 
dergelijke assumptie is echter een te naïeve benadering van de werkelijkheid, wat 
ondersteund wordt door mijn bevinding dat interpretatie van interetnische contacten 
afhangt van culturele betekeniskaders. Op basis van mijn bevindingen kan bovendien 
de claim in twijfel getrokken worden dat de negatieve relatie tussen interetnische 
vriendschap en etnocentrisme toe te schrijven is aan ‘echte’ contacteffecten, zoals 
veelal beweerd wordt in onderzoek naar de contacttheorie. Immers, gebleken is dat 
interetnische vriendschappen voornamelijk bestaan bij de gratie van zelfselectie op 
basis van culturele voorkeuren, waardoor interetnische vriendschappen met name 
voorkomen bij mensen die al open staan ten opzichte van etnische minderheden in 
plaats van dat interetnische vriendschappen zorgen voor minder negatieve denkbeel-
den over etnische minderheden. Kortom, ook het gebruik van de contacttheorie in 
sociologisch onderzoek naar etnocentrisme zou kritisch herzien moeten worden.
Naast bovengenoemde implicaties voor onderzoek naar etnocentrisme kunnen 
mijn onderzoeksbevindingen ook dienen als een bevestiging van het belang van cul-
tuursociologie. Tegengesteld aan de vaak geuite kritiek op cultuursociologisch onder-
zoek dat dit slechts gebruikt kan worden voor het beschrijven van sociale situaties en 
niet zozeer voor het verklaren ervan, is mijn studie een voorbeeld van cultuursociolo-
gisch onderzoek dat fundamenteel verklarend is. Dit wordt wellicht het meest onder-
streept door het vignetexperiment wat gebruikt is in hoofdstuk vijf. Experimentele 
designs zijn bij uitstek geschikt om causale verklaringen te toetsen. In mijn vignetex-
periment is dan ook aangetoond dat culturele waardepatronen daadwerkelijk een cau-
saal effect hebben op de beoordeling van contactsituaties. Op een abstracter niveau 
heeft dit experiment dan ook aangetoond dat ‘cultuur’ kan fungeren als een verkla-
rende variabele in plaats van slechts als te verklaren fenomeen, een idee dat nog niet 
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wijd verbreid is binnen de sociologie. In tegendeel, cultuur wordt nog vaak gezien als 
niet meer dan een ‘restcategorie’ waarvoor geen verklarende rol is weggelegd. Deze 
studie heeft aangetoond dat een dergelijke ondergeschikte rol voor cultuur onfortuin-
lijk is omdat het geleid heeft tot onjuiste interpretaties van veel gevonden onderzoeks-
bevindingen. Het heeft ook aangetoond dat de cultuursociologie, wellicht zelfs beter 
dan andere sociologische benaderingen, wel degelijk in staat is om verklarende vragen 
te beantwoorden.
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